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THE SECOND MARTYRDOM OF MARY STUART.

IT IS a remarkable coincidence that the cause for the beatification of Mary Stuart, the hapless Queen of Scots, should, on its announcement, be the signal for the beginning of a fresh campaign of calumny, all over the English-speaking world, respecting her character. Were the movers in this discreditable business persons who possessed any respect for the Catholic processes of beatification and canonization, one might give them credit for a right motive in zealously guarding the great posthumous honors of the Church from profanation. In her lifetime Mary was accused by her Calvinistic enemies in Scotland as being privy to or having prompted the murder of her husband, Lord Darnley; but after due trial was cleared of all blame. She was afterwards accused of having loved Earl Bothwell while his first wife was living. The charge has been sifted, and, duress having been shown, she is found blameless in that matter, too. Now she is being tried once more. The mode in which this cruel injustice is being wrought is inexpressibly detestable. It is not enough that this Queen of many woes paid with her life for the crime of having offended the crowned embodiment of English Protestant malice, but her memory must be blackened and her crown of womanly honor sought to be torn from her brows by heartless defamers who hate her for her virtues and gloat over the memory of her misfortunes as so many fitting punishments for the crime of opposing the march of Presbyterian Protestantism in her dominions. For that temerity she will never be forgiven by the followers of Calvin who write in the press. "She was accused of murder and adultery," re-

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marked "The Independent" recently; but the writer omitted (inadvertently, let us hope) to mention that she was tacitly acquitted of both charges. The chief defamers of the unfortunate Queen, in modern days, have been James Anthony Froude and a swarm of lesser lights of English literature; in earlier years Friedrich von Raumer, a Prussian aristocrat and diplomatist, who wrote a "History of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" and other ambitious works of an historical and biographical character. A strong Protestant bias ran through his writings, as may well be expected, considering his nativity and religious and political training. Robert Buchanan, a Scottish historian of Mary's own epoch, was another of those whose religious bias helped to darken the Queen's reputation. On the other hand, Dr. Robertson, a Scotch Protestant historian, and Miss Agnes Strickland, another Protestant one, deeply read and most painstaking in their researches, gave Mary fair treatment in their historical works. Mr. Andrew Lang, who is also a most painstaking investigator of such matters, has examined all the State papers connected with Queen Mary's life, imprisonment, trial and death, and made out a strong case for the exoneration of the ill-fated lady from the dreadful charges leveled at her by her bitter enemies. But there seems to be an unappeasable intention to maintain the guilt of the royal lady, right or wrong, on the part of some Protestant writers—all the more malignant since the question of beatification was raised and acted on in a preliminary way. A vile play called "Sir Walter Raleigh" is one of the agencies now being employed to sustain the thesis that the Queen was a thoroughly bad woman and one who ought to be consigned to excoriation and infamy rather than given the honors of saintship. This play is being put on the stage in all the principal theatres of Great Britain and Ireland. It arouses the long-dormant fires of sectarian hate wherever it is presented, and is bitterly resented by the Catholic portion of the population as a gross insult to the Catholic religion. All the villainous inventions of Froude and other defamers of the Queen were accepted as gospel truth by the authors of this calumnious play, and are nightly presented in action on the stage. Whole passages have been taken bodily from Froude by the anonymous author or authors—for the writers had not the courage to give their names to the farrago. Now, of Froude another English historian whose name is a synonym for scholarship and impartiality, Mr. Freeman, the author of "The Norman Conquest" and other great historical works, said that "he was a man of talent and learning, but was afflicted with an incurable habit of mendacity, and his mind was so twisted that he could not bring himself to tell the truth, even if he had the wish to do so." These are the strongest words that one historian could write of another, and they were written deliberately, and no one ever thought of interposing on behalf of the man whom they consigned to infamy as an incurable and chronic falsifier and liar.

Father Ambrose Coleman, O. P., having had his attention called to the offensive and unjust things attributed to Queen Mary and her religion in the play of "Sir Walter Raleigh," denounced it as a plagiarism (for the most part) from Froude's malignant "history." He wrote a lengthy refutation of its principal falsehoods for "The Catholic Times," of London.

In opening his subject he said: "Froude labors in his history of the trial and execution of Mary Queen of Scots to prove two things which are not only untrue, but are most distasteful and horrifying to the feelings of Catholics. These two points, too, are brought out in the play 'Sir Walter Raleigh.' First, that the Pope and the Jesuits and other priests were implicated in plots against Elizabeth's life. 'The assassination of Elizabeth,' he says, 'was the first idea of the most devout of Catholic priests.' Again: 'The original instigator (of the Babington plot) appears to have been John Ballard, one of the two Jesuits who had sought and obtained the sanction of Gregory XIII. to the Queen's murder.' Secondly, that Mary Queen of Scots was a criminal, irreligious, a hypocrite and a participator in plots against Elizabeth. 'She was a bad woman,' he says, 'disguised in the livery of a martyr, and if in any sense she was suffering for her religion it was because she had shown herself capable of those detestable crimes which in the sixteenth century appeared to be the proper fruits of it.' He also says that 'it would be affectation to credit her with a genuine feeling of religion.' We cannot read Froude's account of Mary's execution without thinking he must have been actuated by diabolical malice in penning it. Every step she took, every word she uttered at that awful moment, is twisted by him into a proof of her hypocrisy. 'She died with a lie upon her lips,' he says. Mr. Arthur Innes, in his 'England Under the Tudors,' published in 1905, says: 'Mr. Froude is dramatically at his best in telling the story, but his partisan bias is correspondingly emphasized.' It is well to have the opinion of a Protestant historian on Froude, though he puts it very mildly. We may say on our part that Froude, though dramatically at his best in this account, is historically at his worst, that calumny of the living. But in spite of Froude's calumnies, the memory of Mary Queen of Scots is still a cherished heirloom to the Catholics of these isles and far beyond."

The charge that Mary had been guilty of murder related to the blowing up of the residence known as Kirk o' Field, outside Edinburgh walls. There was a ruined church or chapel close by the house, and a churchyard. A passage called Thieves' Row ran just outside the city wall and up to Darnley's house, which had an exit on the sinister-named alley. Lord Darnley had been occupying the house near the ruined church, which had been fitted up for him by the Queen, while staying in Edinburgh awaiting the baptism of their son (afterwards King James I. of Great Britain and VI. of Scotland). The great Scottish lords hated Darnley, because they suspected that he was secretly laboring with the Catholic lords in England to undo Knox's reformation work in Scotland by means of a combination of forces on the border land between the two kingdoms. There had been estrangement between the Queen and her husband ever since the murder of David Rizzio, her secretary, in which outrage Darnley was by slanderous tongues reported to have been implicated. But the real cause of the coolness would appear to be the rough and disrespectful demeanor of Darnley towards the royal lady his wife. Roughness and wild behavior were common characteristics of the Scottish nobles at that illiterate period, it is pretty generally admitted. Many instances of it are found in Scott's novels, as well as in the more formal Scottish histories. Faction fighting, abductions and cattle rieving were, along with hunting the deer, the great pastimes of the Highland chiefs. The age was crude in most European countries, but in Scotland it was in many respects barbarous, because of the feuds of the great houses. Mr. Andrew Lang, by his vivid picture of what Queen Mary found it when she landed from the deck of a French ship, enables one to fancy what sort of a bed of roses the dainty royal lady, brought up amid all the luxury and elegance of the French Court, was called to when fate brought her the Scottish crown. Knox and his iconoclasts had been at work before her arrival, and the results are thus depicted by Mr. Lang:

"Mary rode through a land of new-made ruins, black with fire, not yet green with ivy. On every side wherever monks had lived and labored and dealt alms and written manuscripts desolation met Mary's eyes. The altars were desecrated, the illumined manuscripts were burned, the religious skulked in lay dress or had fled to France, or stood under the showers of missiles on the pillory. It was a land of fallen fanes and of stubborn blind keeps with scarce a window that she passed through, with horse and litter, lace and gold and velvet, troops of gallants and girls. In the black tall Tolbooth lurked the engines of torture that were to strain or crush the limbs of Bothwell's Lambs. Often must Mary have seen on the skyline the gallows tree and the fruits which that tree bore and the flocking ravens; one of that company followed Darnley and her from Glasgow, and perched ominous on the roof of Kirk o' Field, croaking loudly on the day of the murder. So writes Nau, Mary's secretary, informed, probably, by one of her attendants."

As to Edinburgh itself, when long after Mary's time that cluster of tall rookeries was known by the suggestive appellation of "Auld Reekie" because of its foul smells, what must have been its sanitary and unsightly condition two centuries earlier? Mr. Lang gives some idea of its savage characteristics:

"The monasteries of the Franciscans and Dominicans lay on either side of St. Mary in the Fields or Kirk o' Field, with its college quadrangle and wide gardens. But in Mary's day the monastic buildings and several churches lay in ruins owing to the recent reform of the Christian religion and to English invaders. The palaces of the Cowgate and the Canongate were the homes of the nobles; the wynds were crowded with burgesses, tradesmen, 'prentices and the throng of artisans. These were less godly than the burgesses—were a fickle and fiery mob, ready to run for spears or use their tools to defend their Mayday sport of Robin Hood against the preachers and the Bible-loving middle class. Brawls were common, the artisans besieging the Magistrates in the Tolbooth, or the rival followings of two lairds or lords coming to pistol shots or swordstrokes on the causeway, while burgesses handed spears to their friends from the windows. Among popular pleasures were the stake, at which witches and murderesses of masters or husbands were burned; and the pillory, where every one might throw what came handy at a Catholic priest, and the pits in the Norloch, where fornicators were ducked. The town gates were adorned with spikes, on which were impaled the heads of sinners against the law."

It is important that account be taken of these general conditions of the Scottish capital and Scottish society, as well as of the whole moral atmosphere of Scotland, as affected by the Calvinistic upheaval, at the period under survey. In especial it ought to be noted that magic and witchcraft loomed largely in the life of that dark period, and lent a lurid horror to the many tragic dramas that were enacted before fawning pedantic judges and under the forbidding roofs of structures like the Tolbooth of "Auld Reekie," which was likewise known as "The Heart of Mid-Lothian." Scott pictures some of them in his stories dealing with "Bonnie Dundee" and the Covenanters and the rieving Highland caterans and the dark superstitions and eerie rites of the fierce clansmen as they prepared for war. These conditions being duly weighed and absorbed, it will not be difficult to comprehend why the name and fame of Mary Stuart became clouded in course of time and why it proved so easy to get up a prejudice against her so intense and unpitying as to consign her memory to infamy without any demand for the real facts on which so cruel a verdict had been found.

The murder that is referred to in the charge against Queen Mary was that of her second husband, Lord Henry Darnley, a son of the Earl of Lennox. The motive for this crime, her enemies allege, was revenge for the murder of her secretary, David Rizzio. This murder was instigated by Darnley, as some historians say, because of jealousy of the favor which the Queen had shown towards the secretary. The murder, and all the papers relative to it that could be procured, were inquired into by a commission of the Scotch Lords at Edinburgh, and subsequently by a commission of English Lords at Westminster, and nothing reliable to connect the Queen in any way with the foul deed was forthcoming. Bothwell was accused of having been one of a group of Lords who had signed a "band"—or entered into a conspiracy, to which each put his signature—to kill Darnley. The legal process against Bothwell was formally opened in the law courts in Edinburgh in the April following the murder (February, 1567). Lord Lennox, in evident dread lest some matter injurious to his son's own reputation should be revealed at the inquiry, tried to have the process put off, and Queen Elizabeth sent a special request to the same end. But the Queen of Scots was firm in her determination to have the crime fully investigated and the criminals brought to justice. The "process" accordingly opened. It began on April 12, and as a result of the investigations Bothwell was "cleansed," according to the legal phraseology of the time, and Lord Huntly and other nobles who were accused along with him of complicity in a conspiracy had their lands restored to them by decree of Parliament. On the same night there was a meeting of several noblemen and ecclesiastics at Ainslie's tavern in Edinburgh, at which there was another "band" entered into, declaring that as Bothwell is, and has been judicially found, innocent of Darnley's death, the signatories bind themselves to defend his (Bothwell's) course and advance his marriage with Queen Mary.

It is wholly untrue to state, as "The Independent" did not hesitate to state, that the Queen of Scots was "accused of murder." Her name did not appear in any legal or official reference to the assassination of her husband; neither was there any reference to that tragedy when, much later on, she was formally accused, by

Elizabeth's orders, of conspiracy against her life and power, while a prisoner in one of her strongholds and a discrowned and friendless Queen. By what warranty is such a frigthtful accusation made? On the rambling, unsifted, self-contradictory and transparently malignant gossip of the "historian," George Buchanan, a contemporary writer, and the swarm of scandalmongers, but bad story-tellers, who furnished most of the materials for the Lennox MSS. Scotland was not the only country wherein at that time the pen of the scandalmonger was to him more than a purse of gold. With the "Reformation" wave there was swept in a vast shoal of sharks who settled down to gorge themselves on the mass of putrid defamation about the Old Church and its adherents and champions that had been sedulously garnered and tended by earlier writers, as if in anticipation of the advent of a ready market and a greedy demand. The Scottish capital was the chief storm centre of religious fury for many years, and pen and press were continuously busy in supplying the pabulum that was most desiderated by the fierce assailants of the old order. Buchanan wrote a narrative on the subject of Darnley's murder, which he called the "Detection." The story is a mass of falsehoods and concoctions, so clumsy as to make one wonder how he had the effrontery to publish some of them in view of what had been published to prove they were inventions, between the time when they were written by him and the time that the pretended events which he related were denied in public by some of those who participated in the murder, as they were being led to the gallows or the stake, to suffer torture and death for their crime. Buchanan's story of the behavior of Mary and Bothwell and Darnley, prior to and shortly after the murder of the latter, paints Mary in a light as infamous as any of the wicked women of Scripture or the Italian romances. Not Jezebel or Messalina or Catherine de Medici, not even Ninon de l'Enclos, wickedest of all women, could compare to Mary in the openness and shamelessness of her infidelity to her husband while he lay ill at Kirk o' Field. Such would appear to be the case, according to Buchanan. Mary was accused by other slanderers of the appalling design of getting rid of both her husband and her child. A volume called "The Book of Articles," a companion one to Buchanan's "Detection," says that she determined while at Craigmillar to get rid of both her husband and her son by murder. At the time she was said to have been planning this unnatural crime the State papers show that she was writing to Archbishop Beaton in Paris asking him to endeavor to have the honor of the titular captaincy of the Scots Guard in France conferred upon her son by the French sovereign. Lord Lennox, Darnley's father, in his MSS. accusations, says that the Queen went to Stirling, in the April following Darnley's murder, in order to see her son and to try to poison him. Is it likely that if the Queen could possibly be so steeped in unnatural sin as to think of such a crime she would entrust the knowledge of it to anybody about the Court? Lennox was himself the victim of self-poison when he penned the dreadful accusation. He hated the Queen with a ferocity that left him powerless to perceive that he was writing rank nonsense that no man of common understanding would believe. How far this man was answerable for the folly that had brought down vengeance upon his son's head it is not possible in the meagre knowledge of their intercourse, at that lamentable period, to pronounce an opinion. Yet anybody who goes through the manuscripts that he has left must conclude that he was an evil adviser at that critical time to a young man who had offended the Queen as he had done, in many inexcusable ways, and who was by nature singularly obstinate, irascible and self-opinionated, as all authorities agree that Darnley was.

In the consideration of the problems of this tragic story the reader should not leave out of sight the fact of Mary's position as a royal personage who had duties and responsibilities, of a very important and delicate nature at times, to discharge. She was obliged to maintain and defend the rights of the Scottish Crown, and any attempt to infringe upon these, or offer her own person indignity, was punishable, by Scottish law, as in the case of the English Crown, too, as treason—a crime demanding the death penalty as well as precedent torture.

There is not the slightest doubt but that Darnley was the prime mover in the plot to assassinate the Queen's Italian secretary, David Rizzio. His mind had been filled with vengeful thoughts by the talk of his rough companions about the intimacy—criminal intimacy they disloyally represented it to be—between the Queen and the talented foreigner. It was enough that both were Catholics—Papists—children of the Scarlet Woman that sat upon the seven hills at Rome. It is the law of England to-day that criminal intimacy with a Queen, even at her own solicitation, is high treason. Similar severities were prescribed in the Scottish law, save in regard to the matter of consent. It was also treasonable to slander the reputation of the sovereign, male or female. Yet during Mary's reign the most infamous calumnies were spread by her enemies concerning her conduct with various men of her Court and Council—Rizzio, Darnley (before the marriage), Bothwell, Lethington and some others. Darnley himself before his death had given out the most shocking slander concerning the Queen, his wife, that any person in the form of a man could utter—that is to say, if Lennox, his crafty and ambitious father, can be, in any statement whatever, relied on. Lennox says that Darnley, his son, told him that shortly before the birth of his son the Queen had advised him to take a mistress, and said if possible to let the mistress be Lady Moray, because she hated that nobleman, and if he, her husband, could make him "wear horns," she (Mary) "would never love him the worse" (for it). The lengths to which the Scottish nobles of that era were prepared to go in vilification of this unhappy Catholic lady were simply astounding. Darnley himself was one of the most reckless of these lawbreakers. His conduct with regard to Rizzio's slaughter was that of a vulgar bravo and cutthroat, rather than a King, as he pretended he was. He got up a blood band with the other lords whom he secured to do the actual butchery. The document is extant. It is entitled a "Band of Assurance for Murder," and is cited by Goodall, one of the contemporary chroniclers. In it Darnley guaranteed his allies and accomplices against the blood-feud of the "great persons," these meaning, Mr. Lang thinks, the Earls Bothwell, Atholl and Huntly. "The deed," it proceeds to say, may chance to be done in presence of the Queen's Majesty, within her palace of Holyrood House. The preamble goes to show that it was believed that the murder she would be compelled to witness, as in Rizzio's case, might in her pregnant condition cause her to die from shock. In any event, she was to be morally disgraced. Mr. Lang denounces the barbarous ruffianism of these noble traitors with an earnestness that proves the depth of an honest indignation at so great a disgrace being put upon the Scottish name by unmanly and cowardly brutes—as these conspirators undoubtedly were, every single one of them. "So unscrupulous were Mary's foes," he writes, "that Cecil told De Foix, the French Ambassador in London, how Rizzio had been slain in Mary's arms; *reginam nefario stupro polluens.* Cecil well knew that this was a lie; and it is natural to disbelieve every statement of a convicted liar and traitor like Darnley." Darnley then had used those abominable words regarding his beautiful and pious Catholic wife, Mary Stuart! Could the depth of masculine degeneracy have any lower level than this?

Jealousy is a maddening aberration, making those who are stirred by the passion so irrational that they know no restraint in word or deed. Darnley had been made jealous by the tales of the crew who were spying upon the Queen, his wife, black-hearted villains, ever on the watch to find some movement of hers that would furnish a seeming ground for inference of an evil intent behind it. The incident of the handkerchief in the play of "Othello" well illustrates the ease with which the most innocent act in all the world may be translated into a trick of dissembling lasciviousness, watching its opportunities for indulgence. Every word and act of Queen Mary's at this period of her life were secretly noted and transmitted by the spies to the treacherous Cecil, the ancestor of the late Marquis of Salisbury; and we have seen how the story lost nothing in the transmission when it came to be told again by the villain who paid for it. Later on it was Walsingham who hired the spies and transmitted their information to the deadly enemy of Mary Stuart, the poison-fanged Elizabeth Tudor. The spy system was initiated by the Protestant nobles at the Scottish Court, and John Knox, the foaming, frothing reformer and iconoclast, had no small share in its introduction. Darnley's motives, however detestable, are at least intelligible. But what excuse can be offered for the malevolence of men like George Buchanan for the concoction of tales so horrible as they pieced together to destroy the reputation of their lawful sovereign? What imaginations must they have had, when they could actually describe on paper, as if they had been eye-witnesses of the scene, what took place between the Queen and Bothwell, when they surreptitiously met at Alloa and Stirling and sundry other rendezvous, to give rein to their lawless passion for each other (according to these inventors) before the marriage which Bothwell forced on her when she was his prisoner. Buchanan is bold enough to say that the Queen became sick from excessive indulgence of this criminal passion. He undertakes to utter this odious calumny without offering a particle of proof in support of it. To whom would either of the guilty parties, had there been an iota of truth in the statement, confide so awful a secret?

Mary was "accused of adultery and murder," as "The Independent" charges, but who accused her and what was the verdict? She was never formally accused by any responsible tribunal, but she was made the object of vile attacks by a cowardly crew of moral assassins because she professed and practiced the religion they detested and sought to destroy. Mr. Lang, an honest Protestant investigator, has analyzed the whole story, and found her to be a wronged woman. He sums up the reasons they had for their hate, and they are cogent ones, it will be seen.

Bothwell, the Machiavelli in the tragic story of Mary Stuart was a typical Scot in the realm of adventure. He was of the clan Hepburn—a sort of Young Lochinvar in matters of love, and a sort of Ballie Nicol Jarvie in matters of business. Having been born and brought up on the matchless military training ground, Nature's academy, so to speak, the Scottish Border, he would have been a phenomenon had he not been a good fighter. The Hepburns had been from time imprescriptible pirates, smugglers, freebooters and men who loved not the tribe of gaugers and excisemen. James Hepburn, the Bothwell of Queen Mary's time, was a "canny Scot," as regards party and religion, in the truest sense of that term. He was alternately on the side of the upper and the under dogs, as the far-flung conflict between Catholic and Huguenot, Puritan and Pope's man, swayed up and down, hither and thither, as the strength of either party rose or fell for the time being. Young Hepburn was a soldier in the service of Mary of Guise, as Scottish Regent, and saw some tough fighting when she fell out with the Protestant Lords of the Congregation. He tried to "feather his nest" in the campaign, as the diary of the siege of Leith shows. He is shown to have been very active in robbing peaceful traders and travelers in the neighborhood. He was one of those who condemned the Earl of Arran (in contumacy) to death as being the cause of the Protestant rebellion in Scotland. He captured Cockburn of Ormiston, who was conveying English gold to the Lords of the Congregation—and incidentally, it may be inferred, "assimilated" the booty for himself. The Cockburns, in retaliation, attacked his castle at Crichton, and sacked it, but he contrived to get away beyond their reach. He challenged the Earl of Arran to single combat, but that worthy had not much stomach for fighting, and left Bothwell to swagger as cock of the walk. Bothwell was sent by the Regent Mary to ask help from France, and on the journey he carried away Anna Throndssön, a Norwegian lady, to whom he had been betrothed, and after a little while deserted her. Then he was married privately, or became "handfasted" to the widow of Sir Walter Scott of Buccleugh, Janet Beaton, niece of Cardinal Beaton, who is described by Scott in "The Lady of the Lake" as the Wizard Lady of Branxholme. This lady was afterwards charged, when the murder of Darnley was being investigated, as one of those who had helped Bothwell to win the heart of Queen Mary by means of her magic arts. Later it was reported that the doughty Bothwell had no fewer than three wives all living, but only one of these, Lady Jane Gordon, sister of Earl Huntly, was known to have been legally married. Scottish marriage laws were, and are still, the loosest in all the world, as the trial of the Yelverton case in Dublin many years ago abundantly proved. Bothwell would appear to have had a winning way, notwithstanding a certain domineering and bullying manner, with the fair sex; and must have had a tongue like that of Richard Earl of Gloucester, who boasted that he could "wheedle with the devil" by means of it, when he could get out of the scrapes of cosmopolitan marital entanglements so easily as he is shown to have done. The forger was no less busy, at that time, with his false pen than the slanderer with his false tongue. A number of documents, contained in a casket, were relied on by the defamers of Queen Mary to show that she was as evil in her heart as they endeavored to prove her by fabricated stories of her conduct. Mr. Lang has carefully gone through these and found that forgery was artfully mixed with the genuine handwriting of the Queen to establish the charge that there was guilt in her relations with Bothwell before that masterful adventurer succeeded in getting her into his power to terrorize her into glutting his traitorous ambition.

Mary Stuart's lot was to be slandered horribly during her whole lifetime, once she had passed her girlhood. Slander was the grand hedonism of the age, and in the courts of royalty it held especial high revel. The fact that the young Queen persisted in her attachment to the old religion, which was the special object of the Reformers' slanders, was *per se* a reason why venomous tongues and pens should make of her life a target. Mr. Lang says that while Bothwell was in France it was reported of him that he spread a story regarding Queen Mary the most frightful that an evil mind could conceive. She was branded as having entered into incestuous relations with her uncle, Cardinal Beaton. The Reformers had evidently been reading the Italian romancists, the story of the Cenci, and the legends of the Borgia gens. The extreme Protestants, who clamored for the blood of all "idolators," as they styled the Catholics, by making an alliance with the political chiefs in Scotland, were at that time led by two very able but slippery tacticians, Earls Moray and Lethington, who both entertained the grand hope of seeing the crowns of England and Scotland united in Queen Mary or her issue. But when they had the plan for a meeting of the two Queens well under way they found them all awry when it came to the point of getting Elizabeth to designate Mary as her successor. Elizabeth regarded the proposal as tantamount to one asking her to sign her own death warrant. Neither would she listen to any proposals for marriage for either herself or Mary Stuart. Marriage was utterly repugnant to Elizabeth's scheme of life; she desired perfect freedom for all her actions and her volatile affections, or passions. Hence Moray and Lethington found their assiduous labors of love to be completely fruitless, so far as the British Queen was concerned; and in a short time afterwards the Scottish Queen, after pardoning the treason of Earl Lennox, had seen and admired his son, Henry, Lord Darnley, who was as a Catholic hated by the greater number of Scotch nobles of the more powerful order, who were almost to a man Knoxite Calvinists.

Mary gave desperate umbrage to all these by marrying Darnley.

despite their threats; and they resented the step by assembling in arms, at the instigation of her cousin Elizabeth. Mary gave to Bothwell, about the same time, the high post of Border Governor, to which Darnley's father, Lennox, aspired; and this angered Darnley, who, with all his handsome person, had the small mind that denotes men born not to govern, but to sulk and conspire. At this juncture the trouble about the Queen's Italian secretary, David Rizzio, began to agitate the circle at Holyrood, and to make matters more disagreeable to Darnley, the Queen granted a pardon to the Hamiltons, who had been in rebellion and were as much detested by the Lennox folks as any intruding foreign favorites could be. Then Darnley's father, Lennox, who had had to seek pardon for his own treason, began to stir up discontent against the Queen's rule and insidiouly throw out hints, at first dark, then open, in regard to their sovereign's honor. David Rizzio was accused of having secured from the Queen the pardon for the Hamiltons, and that was enough for the ambitious Lennoxes, who themselves aspired to the crown of Scotland. The "Book of Articles," put in against Mary at the time of the investigation into Darnley's murder, in Edinburgh, was substantially an indictment, clause by clause, and the charges were supplied mainly by Lennox. The grand object aimed at by that scheming traitor was to prove a motive in Mary's mind for the removal of her husband, his son, by murder, and that motive was her criminal passion for Bothwell. She it was, according to this archdefamer, who contrived, in coöperation with her guilty lover, to have Darnley brought to Edinburgh for treatment when he was ill, and arranged to have the house blown up, after she had failed in a plan to have him removed by poison. Mary was further charged with having tried to induce Bothwell to get rid of his wife (Lady Jane Gordon), of whom she was said to be intensely jealous, by poison. Mr. Lang is enabled to declare, from comparison of the letters cited in the "Book af Articles," with Lennox's infamous charges, that the author had access to Cecil's "Journal"—he goes so far, indeed, as to conjecture that it was one and the same hand that wrote both these alleged proofs of Mary's guilt—proofs which frequently contradict in one sentence what is alleged in a previous or subsequent one. These documents are freely mentioned in the records of the respective commissions which examined the facts as to Darnley's murder, both in Edinburgh and Westminster, but there was never any actual trial of the case, inasmuch as Elizabeth acted with such duplicity that Mary would not agree to recognize her right to jurisdiction or to sanction the procedure that was proposed to her by Elizabeth's malevolent emissaries and go-betweens.

There was a mass of manuscripts relative to the case that was sufficient to bewilder the most clear-headed and patient. Mr. Lang has gone very sedulously over the most important portions of this, and he has shown that the hand of the forger had been so cleverly employed in the work of blackening Mary's character as to make the investigator almost ready to "Doubt Truth to be a liar," in the words of the love-distraught wooer of Ophelia. So much for the imputation that because the Queen of Scots was accused of murder she was, therefore, to be held guilty of the foul crime. She was ready to face those who invented the accusation, but they were not allowed by Elizabeth to go into proof of their charges —no doubt for the most excellent of reasons.

As for the other imputation, that she was accused of adultery, the facts relied on by Mr. Lang are, in several particulars, entirely at variance with the theory of Mary's guilt, in relation to Bothwell. They show that Bothwell was supported by many of the Scotch nobles, and in fact urged to seize the Queen and use force to coerce her to marry him, after he had gotten a divorce from his wife, Lady Jane Gordon—which he did, on the ground of a consanguinity which was not discovered when he had made application for a license to marry that lady. There is no doubt whatever that Bothwell's designs against his beautiful sovereign were as brutal and merciless as those of Tarquin toward Lucretia, and that he was aided and abetted in that foul treason by a large number of the semi-savage Scotch nobles—the same crew who murdered David Rizzio in her presence and when she was advanced in pregnancy, with the hideous design that thereby her unborn offspring might be killed or rendered idiotic—a design that in King James' regard seemed not to have been altogether a failure, for he never could bear, it is said, the sight of a sword being pulled from its scabbard, and was not remarkable for any intellectual ability, save in theological subtleties and love of tedious controversy.

Three weeks before the Queen's confinement she was represented by Lennox (says Buchanan's "Detection") as trying to induce Darnley to make love to Lady Moray and make her his mistress, for the mere purpose of gratifying the Queen's dislike of Moray, and making him, as she is reported as saying, "wear horns." Darnley told this story, not only to his father, Lennox, but to a servant of his. The idea of a woman on the eve of a crisis that might end in death conceiving such a grotesquely horrible plot against her own marital right and honor is the perfection, surely, of clumsy malice in invention.

"Whatever Mary's feelings toward Darnley," says Mr. Lang, in discussing this sickening slander, "when making an inventory of her jewels for bequests in case she and her child both died, she left her husband a number of beautiful objects, including the red enamel ring with which he wedded her. Whatever her feelings toward Moray, she lodged him and Argyll in the Castle during her labor. 'Huntly and Bothwell would also have lodged there, but were refused.' (Robertson's 'Inventories' is the authority relied on.) Sir James Melville (writing in old age) declares that Huntly and Lesley, Bishop of Ross, 'envied the favor that the Queen showed unto the Earl of Moray,' and wished her to 'put him in ward,' as dangerous. Melville dissuaded Mary from this course, and she admitted Moray to the Castle, while rejecting Huntly and Bothwell." Melville was no friend of Mary's in early life; he wrote this of her in his old age. Was this the conduct of a vile wanton or that of a noble Christian lady, on the verge of the greatest trial a woman has to face in life? Moray was, so far from being objectionable to the Queen, deep in her favor at that very time, so much so that she confided to him the dangerous secret that the Pope had sent her money. She well knew, at the same time, that Darnley was intriguing against her because of her favor toward Moray, and was trying to get pressure brought to bear on her to have George Douglas, Darnley's henchman in the Rizzio assassination, pardoned and allowed to return from exile. Mary's passion for Bothwell began, according to Lennox, almost at the moment when she had recovered from the pangs and troubles of her accouchement. She had illicit intercourse with him at the very same time as he was being thwarted by her in his and Darnley's plots to ruin Moray and Lethington, the Secretary of State. Mary, according to Buchanan, incontinently went off to Alloa, along with Bothwell and his "crew of pirates," and joined in disgraceful reveling there with them. Touching this same period, Lennox gives a different story. He says she went to Stirling "before her month," when even women of low degree keep to the house, and "took her pleasure in most uncomely manner, arraied in homely sort, dancing about the market cross of the town." Evidently Buchanan and Lennox are "Arcades ambo" on this subject—liars both.

Mary and Darnley and Moray and Bothwell went a-hunting in Meggetdale, and Mary went to work to reconcile all parties, but she and Darnley had a furious quarrel, and he set spies to keep surveillance over her conduct. It was at this period (September, 1566) that Buchanan, probably inspired by Lennox, makes the intrigue between the Queen and Bothwell take a criminal turn. The Queen was in Edinburgh, working at the budget and finance in the Exchequer House. There was a pleasant garden in the rear of that building, and a chamber where the Queen took her rest after this tedious labor was over for the day. Into this apartment Bothwell gained entrance through the treachery of an attendant, Lady Reres, where he overcame Mary's virute by force. "She was betrayed into his hands by Lady Reres," wrote Buchanan. Later on the same credible historian alleges that Mary, while a prisoner of Bothwell's, was induced to consent to marry him by reason of the fact that he had forcibly violated her. If the Queen had had any guilty love for the brutish noble, why should he be driven to the disgraceful extremity of forcing that which was already his by guilty consent?

Similarly with regard to the wounding of Bothwell by a Border robber, Buchanan avers that she rode like a madwoman to Hermitage, his residence, when she heard of the matter, and on her return to Jedburgh to prepare for his reception there she got sick because of their excessive indulgence in their passion—a very singular line of behavior for a very sick man and a very anxious woman, as Mary is represented to have been at the time. Mr. Lang says:

"All this is false. Mary stayed at least five days in Jedburgh before she rode to Hermitage, whither, says Nau (her secretary), Moray accompanied them. She fell ill on October 17—a week before Bothwell's arrival at Jedburgh. On October 25 she was despaired of, and some thought she had passed away. Bothwell arrived in a letter about October 25. These were no fit circumstances for 'their old pastime,' which 'they took so openly, as they seemed to fear nothing more than lest their wickedness should be unknown.'"

At the precise time that Buchanan was penning such atrocious calumnies about his Queen the French Ambassador, Du Croc, was writing to his sovereign about her thus: "I never saw Her Majesty so much beloved, esteemed and honored." (October 17.)

Mr. Lang takes very great pains to show that Buchanan's accusations, as well as Lennox's, are in many important particulars utterly worthless as historical evidence as to the private life of Queen Mary, yet he treats other portions of the same writers' statements as evidently deserving of serious attention as bearing on correlated transactions of the same period. This is, it may not unreasonably appear, a work of supererogation. When the patient critic has shown them to be false witnesses as to the most serious crimes they could allege against man or woman, no weight need be attached to any other charge they make or evidence they adduce. *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,* is a rule that still holds good.

We have most valuable testimony on this momentous subject in the notes of Dr. Lingard touching the actual life of the Queen at the very time chosen by Buchanan and Lennox to blast her fame in the eyes of the world. His evidence is taken from the works of contemporary writers—Keith, Maitland, Laing, Chalmers and others. Shortly before the falling out between the Queen and Darnley over the murder of Rizzio, the story was put forward that she was then living in the most shameful adultery with Bothwell. It is impossible, says Lingard, to reconcile such a statement with the testimony of those who were present when the Queen exhorted Darnley to explain his motives of discontent. "Her Majesty said that she had a clear conscience, that in all her life she had done no action which could anywise prejudge (prejudice) his or her own honor; nevertheless, as she might perhaps have given offense without design, she was willing to make amends as far as he should desire, and therefore prayed him not to dissemble the occasion of his displeasure, if he had any, nor to spare her in the least matter."

Darnley, the narrative goes on (and this is the official report presented to the Lords of Council) replied that she had not given him any occasion for discontent. To this the Lords add these significant words: "We testify that, as far as things could come to our knowledge, he has had no ground of complaint, but, on the contrary, that he has the very best reason to look upon himself as one of the most fortunate princes in Christendom, could he but know his own happiness." The Lords who signed this declaration were, it should be remembered, Protestant adherents, Knox followers, men who hated the Queen's religion, but could not but love her for her grace and queenly dignity. How does this testimony look beside that of the wretched scribe, Buchanan, depicting the Queen as scampering off like a drunken courtesan to dance like a wood nymph around the market place at Stirling and play the wanton almost in public along with the man who afterwards abducted her? Maitland, says Dr. Lingard, sent a copy of this letter to the Archbishop of Glasgow, to be forwarded to the King of France, the Queen mother, and the Cardinal of Lorraine. It was confirmed by letters on the same subject from Du Croc, the Ambassador, and Sir James Melville.

As for the charge of Buchanan that the Queen rode, like a woman distraught, from Jedburgh to Hermitage Castle (twenty miles), when she heard that Bothwell had been wounded by an outlaw, to bring him back to have him nursed under her own supervision, Dr. Lingard shows that she allowed eight days to pass ere going to Hermitage, and that she returned to Jedburgh the same day. This is the testimony of Chalmers, one of the contemporary historians; he says that "her visit might be for a political purpose, as he (Bothwell) was Lieutenant of the Border, and as she ordered a mass of papers to be forwarded to him the next day."

It is not necessary to the purpose of this paper to follow the melancholy story of Mary's life, from the dismal period when she was placed in the power of a brutal subject, to be banished by his fellow lords and driven into the hands of her enemy, the English Queen. To examine, so far as possible, into the truth or falsity of the statement that Mary was guilty of the murder of her husband, Lord Henry Darnley, and afterwards of adultery with the ringleader of the assassins, Earl Bothwell, was all that the limits of this article would permit. Bothwell was tried by the Lords immediately on the appearance of a placard in Edinburgh accusing him and several of his dependents of the crime. The accuser was unknown. He was not content with implicating the Earl; he said also "the Queen herself assented thereto." Lennox, the murdered man's father, who left no stone unturned to discover the instigators of the crime, did not find anything to show that the Queen had any privity in the mysterious tragedy, else he would have found some means of gratifying his venom against his sovereign in connection with the anonymous placard. As to Bothwell, he demanded a speedy trial, and when the process was over and there was no direct proof of guilt forthcoming, Bothwell issued a public challenge to combat to any accuser—"according to usage and the laws of war"—who thought it incumbent on him to repeat the accusation. There was none forthcoming. Hence Bothwell was legally and formally acquitted of the charge of murder as regards the Queen's husband. This being so, the Queen must necessarily have been held blameless as to the same transaction. That the crime was a political and not a personal one, not arising out of such a thing as a guilty amour, does not admit of a single doubt. Those who desire to gain the truth as to the conspiracy and the real underlying motives for its foundation had better take up Dr. Lingard's narrative of the events, which led up to the Scottish Reformation and the enthronement of Mary Stuart. Therein they will find that the division of the Church and the Crown lands among the Scottish nobility was a dominant factor in the motives of those who contrived the murder of Darnley, inasmuch as his connection with the Catholic nobles and their adherents in England made him a host of open and secret enemies; and here is one reason why the theory that his wife, the Catholic Queen of Scotland, who would be more likely to shield him than to have any part in his taking off, should be suspected of guilt in the matter.

"It is acknowledged by all," says Lingard, "that the Queen acted, at first, as an innocent woman would have acted. She lamented the fate of a husband to whom she had been so lately reconciled. She expressed a suspicion that it had been intended to involve her in the same destruction, and she repeatedly announced her resolution to take ample vengeance on the authors of so flagitious a crime. Her chamber, according to custom on the death of a king, was hung with black; the light of the day was excluded, and in darkness and solitude she received the few who were admitted to offer their respects or condolence. . . . Judicial inquiries were instituted, and a proclamation was issued offering rewards in money and land for the discovery and apprehension of the murderers, with a full pardon to any one of the party who would accuse his accomplices."

So much for the insinuation contained in the statement that the Queen "was accused of murder." She was never so accused, except by anonymous insinuations, and only such unconscionable writers as Buchanan and Froude have ventured to make insinuations tantamount to direct charges, and charges as tantamount to a verdict of guilty. Writers with consciences and honor and reputations to preserve, such as Miss Strickland and Mr. Andrew Lang, do not accept the malice of maligners as historical evidence. They have examined all the facts, as far as these were procurable, and these speak strongly against the theory of any connivance of the Queen in the plot that made her a widow for the second time. The murderers, whoever they were, must certainly have been members of that nefarious gang of nobles who banded themselves together, under oath and blood bond, to bring about her seizure by Bothwell and her enforced marriage with that reprobate adventurer. The accusation of adultery rests upon similar shady and questionable foundations. Lingard cites the testimony of Du Croc, the French Ambassador, who had visited the Queen on the day of her marriage to Bothwell. Although nominally free then, guards were posted all about the passages leading to the Queen's apartments, and nobody was allowed to visit the Queen or speak to her except in the presence of Bothwell. The Ambassador testified in letters to the King of France that he found her very sorrowful, and that she had told him she never would be cheerful again, and had no wish but to die. Mary had written to the Archbishop of Glasgow, as regards the marriage, that it was "accompanied with force," and Sir James Melville, who had been taken prisoner along with her, declared that expression meant what he had reason to believe, the marriage was preceded by violation, for the very purpose of procuring the Queen's consent. The explanation, if accepted, shatters the theory of guilty love prior to the marriage, and proves the authors of the calumnies, Buchanan and Lennox, to be the basest sort of disloyal defamers, creatures who disgraced the form of man by attacking a defenseless woman, for the vilest personal ends.

As for the subsequent life and ultimate fate of the unhappy Mary there is no controversy over anything involving her personal character as in the memorable Darnley-Bothwell episode. She was done to death for religious and political reasons by one of the foulest conspiracies, mainly built on a system of diabolical forgeries and perjured testimony of spies, all contrived by the Machiavellian Minister of Elizabeth, Walsingham. The truth of the conspiracy and the methods by which it was carried out have all been unfolded by the State papers bearing on the subject of "The Babington Conspiracy." It is one of the blackest chapters in the long volume of English evildoing in regard to both Scotland and Ireland. Mary herself knew full well that her religion was the principal reason why she was imprisoned and kept in prison for eighteen years. Jealousy of her beauty was, no doubt, a factor in the course adopted toward her by the ill-favored and artificial relative who held her in keeping; and there were several minor motives as well. But the fierce hatred of the Catholic religion and the fears of a Catholic restoration in the British Isles were the great impelling forces that led to Mary's tragic end.

When Mary Stuart was convicted of plotting against the Queen of England, the Lords and Commons sent a couple of commissioners to the Castle at Fotheringay to apprise her of the fact. In doing so they told her that the Parliament had concluded that no security for Elizabeth's person or the reformed religion was possible while she (Queen Mary) lived. The high-spirited Stuart indignantly denied the charge of plotting against her Tudor relative, and declared that her real crime was adherence to the religion of her fathers—a crime of which she was proud, and for which she would be happy to lay down her life. When the day of her execution arrived, Fletcher, Dean of Peterborough, began a course of moral torture while she was preparing for the fatal moment by prayer. She prayed in Latin for the enemies who were sending her to death, for Christ's afflicted Church, for her son James, for her cousin, Elizabeth; and holding up her crucifix, implored: "As Thine arms, O Lord, were stretched out upon the cross, so receive me into the arms of Thy mercy, and forgive me my sins." Fletcher and other Protestant onlookers objected to her resorting to "such Popish trumperies, but she repelled their rudeness with royal dignity. So she died, like a martyr, with no word of fear, but a prayer for her enemies on her unwincing and beautiful lips.

Shortly before her execution the Queen wrote thus to her relative, the Duke of Guise: "My good cousin, I bid you, whom I best love on earth, farewell, since, in virtue of an unjust sentence, I am about to die, in such fashion as, God be praised, none of our family, and still less of my station, ever did before. Do you thank God thereof, for upon this earth I was useless to His and the Church's cause, but hope that death may prove my steadfastness to the faith and my willingness to die for the maintenance and restoration of the Catholic Church in this unhappy island. And although never executioner yet dipped his hand in our blood, be not you, my friend, ashamed for this; for the judgment of heretics and Church enemies, who have no right over me, a free Queen, is honorable before God and profitable to the children of the Church. Did I belong to the former, this blow should not light upon me. All of our house have been persecuted by that sect, as your good father, with whom I hope to be received into mercy by the just Judge.

"I commend to you my poor servants and the payment of my debts, and entreat a pious foundation for my soul, not at your cost, but after the manner that you will hear from my disconsolate servants, the witnesses of my last tragedy. May God bless you, your wife, children, brothers and cousin, and all of his! The blessing of God, and that which I would bestow upon my children be upon yours, whom I no less commend to God than my son, the unhappy and deceived!

"God give you grace to endure through life in the service of the Church! Never may this honor depart from our family, but men, like women, be ever ready (setting aside all other worldly considerations) to shed their blood for the upholding of the faith! As for me, I hold myself, on father's and mother's side, born to make the offering of my blood, and I have no purpose to degenerate. Jesus, who was crucified for us, and all holy martyrs, make us by their intercession worthy to offer up our bodies for His honor!

"Fotheringay, Thursday, 24th November.

"They have taken away my canopy, thinking to degrade me. Since then my warden came, and proffered to write about it to the Queen, that having been done not by her order, but upon advice of certain counsellors. I showed them on that canopy, instead of my arms, my Saviour's cross. You will hear the whole matter. Since then they have been quieter.

"Your affectionate cousin and perfect friend,

"MARY, Queen of Scotland, Dowager Queen of France."

That document ought to settle for ever the question as to the claim of Mary Stuart to be considered one of the white-robed company who sealed their devotion to Christ with their rich life-blood, one might without presumption be permitted to think. No doubt it will have due weight with the sage ecclesiastics whose privilege it will be to say the deciding word on that momentous point.

John J. O'Shea.

Philadelphia.

CHURCH AND STATE.

VII.

THE MONOPHYSITE CONTROVERSY.

THE apparent unanimity of the Fathers of Chalcedon, and the enthusiasm with which they had greeted the Tome of Pope Leo the Great, must have seemed to pious Christians of the fifth century the happy prelude to a long and much needed period of concord between the various parties that, in the East more particularly, had for many years disturbed the peace of the Church. Such a forecast, unfortunately, would have been destined never to be realized. For no sooner was the Council of Chalcedon dissolved than it became evident that little dependence on this, as on so many other occasions, could be placed on the perseverance in any given convictions of the Bishops of the Eastern empire.

In the present instance two chief causes operated to disturb the short-lived harmony of Chalcedon. The first of these was that, owing to the insistance of the Papal Legates, the question in debate was now so clearly defined that there was no longer a possibility of mistaking its meaning, a fact not at all to the taste, for example, of the Bishops who loved to pose as followers of St. Cyril of Alexandria. But while these extremists might have given considerable trouble at Alexandria, it may be doubted whether the monophysites would have met with any success worthy of moment in the East had not the Council of Chalcedon raised another issue whose ill effects were destined to continue long after the monophysite controversy was buried in oblivion. This issue was the status of the Bishop of Constantinople in the Christian hierarchy.

In previous papers we have seen that, from the time of the erection of Constantinople into the capital of the empire, its episcopal throne was an objection of ambition eagerly sought after by

Eastern prelates. Eusebius of Nicomedia established a precedent in this respect and did not scruple to violate a canon of the Church, which at that date was regarded as inviolable, prohibiting the transfer of Bishops from one see to another. It was also in the order of things that the incumbent of Constantinople should by reason of his proximity to the court become one of the most important ecclesiastical personages in the Empire. Thus, that the question of the new status of the Bishop of the capital should arise was inevitable, for it could hardly be expected that he would remain content merely as a suffragan of the Archbishop of Heraclea.

The first Council of Constantinople (381) attempted a solution of the problem by an enactment to the effect that henceforth the Bishop of Constantinople should take rank before even the two great Oriental Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch and immediately after the Pope. But this elevation was merely one of rank and conveyed no jurisdiction. Actually, however, during the seventy following years, the influence of the Bishop of Constantinople in the ecclesiastical provinces adjoining the capital was all-important, which being the case, the Council of Chalcedon adopted a canon (28) regularizing the situation by extending his jurisdiction over the provinces of Thrace, Pontus and Asia, thus creating a patriarchate of Constantinople. The See of Jerusalem was at the same time elevated to patriarchal rank and its jurisdiction extended at the expense of the Patriarch of Antioch.

Whatever justification there may have been in the circumstances of the case for this act of the Council of Chalcedon, the authors of canon 28 made the mistake of advancing as the only reason for an act of so great moment the claim that, because of its civil rank, Constantinople was entitled to second place in the Christian hierarchy, at the same time suggesting that the uncontested primacy of Rome was due solely to its importance as the ancient capital of the Empire. "The Fathers" (of Nice), they say, "with reason accorded to the See of old Rome its privileges, because it was the imperial city." But the Fathers of Nice did nothing of the kind; they merely recognized the well-known fact of Rome's primacy and made no pretense of conferring on the Apostolic See an authority which it had enjoyed from the beginning. But a specious reason being the best to hand, the Council of Chalcedon adopted this, and thereby at a critical moment introduced a new source of discord into a sufficiently complicated situation.

For Leo the Great was not the type of Pope who would let pass unchallenged the introduction into the canon law of the Church of a principle so vicious that it was capable of undermining all hierarchical authority. That the Fathers of Chalcedon feared this consequence is apparent from their letter to Leo announcing the results of the council. They begin by greeting the Pope in the most flattering terms. They have reveled, they assure Leo, as at an imperial banquet, in the spiritual food wherewith Christ has supplied them through his great dogmatic letter. They have deposed Dioscorus and condemned Eutyches, knowing that the Pope as their chief was present in spirit, as the head over the members, approving of their conduct and all but visible to them through the wisdom of his representatives. They have also decided upon certain other matters which, they are persuaded, His "Holiness will accept and ratify," to their great satisfaction and that of "the most devout and Christ-loving Emperors." True, Leo's representatives vehemently opposed what they allude to, namely, the elevation of Constantinople in rank and jurisdiction, but only because the legates wished the initiative in the matter to be taken by the Pope himself. But the case was urgent, and they considered the meeting of the council opportune for its settlement, confident of his approval and knowing he would take the broad view that "every success of the children redounds to the parent's glory." Accordingly, they conclude, "we entreat that you honor our decision with your assent, and as we have yielded to the head our agreement in things honorable, so may the head also fulfill for the children what is fitting. For thus will our pious Emperors be treated with due regard, who have ratified your Holiness' judgment as law, and the See of Constantinople will receive its recompense for having always displayed such loyalty on matters of religion towards you, and for having so zealously linked itself to you in full agreement."[1]

The Emperor, as well as Anatolius, also addressed the Pope with a view to obtaining his approval of the contentious canon. But Leo soon made it clear that he would never sanction the proposed arrangement relative to the Bishop of Constantinople. The reasons for his attitude are found in his letters on this subject to his various Eastern correspondents. Replying to the Emperor, in the first place, the Pope, after congratulating Marcian on the success of the recent council, goes on to express his surprise that the council and the Emperor should, by their action relative to Constantinople, have taken the risk of again disturbing the peace of the Universal Church to gratify the selfish ambition of an individual. In the first place, continues the Pope, the antecedents of Anatolius are more than dubious. He is known to have obtained his position through the favor of the Emperor and his ordination at the hands of Dioscorus of Alexandria. In spite of these suspicious antecedents the Pope, through regard for the piety of Marcian and wish-ing to be kind rather than just to Anatolius, had entertained hopes that the latter's elevation to the bishopric of the capital might turn out well. But now he finds Anatolius more ambitious than ever. The Pope has no objection to the exalted rank of the royal city of Constantinople, but the Emperor must remember that things secular stand on a different basis from things divine, and that there can be no sure building save on that rock which the Lord has laid for a foundation. "Let it be enough," therefore, "for Anatolius that by the aid of your piety and by my favor and approval he has obtained the bishopric of so great a city. Let him not disdain a city which is royal, though he cannot make it an Apostolic See, and let him on no account hope that he can rise by doing injury to others. For the privileges of the churches, determined by the canons of the Holy Fathers and fixed by the decrees of the Nicene Synod, cannot be overthrown by any unscrupulous act, nor disturbed by any innovation." The charge of defending this determination of the first general council is committed to the Pope, who would be untrue to his office were he to permit the gratification of the wish of a single Bishop at the expense of all.[2]

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[1] S. Leo M. Ep. 98.

In his reply to the letter of Anatolius the Pope enters more fully into the canonical side of the proposed innovation. Leo is greatly grieved that the Bishop of Constantinople has, in disregard, as the Pope believes, of the Nicene canons, endeavored, by taking advantage of the temporary eclipse of the Church of Alexandria, to obtain for himself second place in the hierarchy. Nor will Alexandria be the only sufferer by the new arrangement, for Antioch will lose third place and various metropolitans will be deprived of their ancient honors. As to the ordinance of the first Council of Constantinople, Rome knows nothing of it, since it was never brought to the attention of the Apostolic See. Moreover, the claim that those most concerned had agreed to the proposed arrangement is more specious than accurate; if they yielded, it was either through modesty or sheer weariness. But it is incumbent on the Pope to see that their ancient rights are not usurped by Anatolius. "The rights of provincial primates may not be overthrown, nor metropolitan Bishops be defrauded of privileges based on antiquity. The See of Alexandria may not lose any of that dignity which it merited through St. Mark, the evangelist and disciple of St. Peter, nor may the splendor of so great a Church be obscured by another's clouds, Dioscorus having fallen through his persistence in impiety. The Church of Antioch, too, in which first, at the preaching of the blessed Apostle Peter, the Christian name arose, must continue in the position assigned it by the Fathers. . . . For the see is on a different footing to the holders of it, and each individual's chief honor is his own integrity."[3]

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[2] S. Leo M. Ep. 104.

Meanwhile the East was awaiting news from Rome as to whether or not the Pope approved of the Council of Chalcedon, for, it seems, Leo had sent no reply to the official letter of the Bishops. This omission, we learn from a letter of Marcian to Leo, was being taken advantage of by the monophysites who were proclaiming through the Orient that the Pope had actually disapproved of the acts of the council. "We are extremely surprised," writes the Emperor, "that after the Council of Chalcedon and the letters addressed to you by the venerable Bishops, informing you of what had been done, we have not received from your clemency any response to be read in the churches and thus carry your approval to the knowledge of all. Let your Holiness deign to send such a letter certifying to all the churches and all the peoples that you ratify the acts of the council."

The Pope's answer, dated March 21, 453, informs the Emperor that his letter to Anatolius was sufficient evidence of his approval of the council, had not the latter, because of the rebuke it contained of his ambition, withheld it from publication. He now, as the Emperor requests, sends a formal letter, addressed to the Bishops, ratifying all that they had done at Chalcedon, with the exception of the twenty-eighth canon. Only the first part of this letter, however, was read to the people; all that referred to the 28th canon was omitted. Some further suspicious actions on his part led the Pope to break off all correspondence with Anatolius, until in 454, at the intervention of the Emperor, a reconciliation was effected. Anatolius, in resuming correspondence with Leo, pleaded that not he, but the Bishops, had taken the initiative in regard to his elevation, and that, in any event, the enactment of the council relative to Constantinople was invalid without the approval of His Holiness.[4] But while Anatolius thus seemed to resign his newly acquired dignity and to acquiesce in the decision of Rome, nevertheless, from this time both he and his successors assumed and exercised all the jurisdiction which the rejected canon attempted to confer.

While this question was occupying the attention of Rome and Constantinople resistance to the dogmatic decree of Chalcedon was making headway in the Orient. It began at Jerusalem, whither the news of the council's determination had been brought by a monk named Theodosius. According to the story told by this personage, the Bishops at Chalcedon, including their own Bishop, Juvenal, had betrayed the faith. This version of the case was readily accepted, with rather unpleasant consequences for Juvenal, who, with his new patriarchal honors, must have expected a triumphal entry into his episcopal city. Instead of this, Juvenal, on his return, found popular opinion, through the efforts of Theodosius, aided and abetted by Eudocia, the widow of Theodosius II., so decidedly adverse, that he was obliged to seek aid at Constantinople. Nothing less than a military expedition on a small scale was necessary to restore him.

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[3] S. Leo M. Ep. 106.

[4] S. Leo M. Ep. 132.

In Alexandria, also, serious trouble arose over the deposition and exile of Dioscorus and the appointment of his successor, Proterius. So aroused were the Alexandrians by these acts that serious rioting occurred, during which a body of troops called out to preserve order were driven by the mob into the serapeum and burned alive. After this the presence of a strong military force was necessary to hold the city in control. The situation became even worse after the death of Dioscorus (454), when a schismatic Patriarch of Alexandria was elected in the person of Timothy Ælurus. Timothy, however, was also condemned to exile by the imperial authorities, an act which so exasperated his adherents that on Holy Thursday, 457, they murdered the orthodox Patriarch Proterius. Just at this time the firm hand of the Emperor Marcian was withdrawn by death from the helm of state, and his successor, the Emperor Leo, ascended the throne.

The monophysite question continued to occupy general attention throughout the reign of Leo I. (457-474), but no event of decisive importance occurred during this period. Timothy Ælurus remained in exile, first at Gangra and subsequently in the Crimea, but the Alexandrians declined to accept the orthodox successor of Proterius, Timothy Salophaciolus. The successor of Leo, his son-in-law, Zeno, lost his throne within a year after his accession, and a new development in the long-drawn-out controversy occurred when Basiliscus assumed the reins of empire.

For one of the earliest acts of Basiliscus was to pronounce in favor of the monophysites. The long exile of Timothy Ælurus now came to an end, and the monophysite Patriarch was received at Constantinople, on his journey homeward, with the greatest consideration. At his suggestion, indeed, Basiliscus issued an "encyclical" in which the Emperor commanded that "the most holy Bishops in every church" should anathematize and commit to the flames "the so-called Tome of Leo and all things said and done at Chalcedon."[5] More than five hundred Eastern Bishops obeyed this imperial order. Acacius, however, at this time Bishop of Constantinople, although he had previously shown some leanings towards monophysitism, declined to accept the decision of the royal Pontiff.

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[5] Evagrius, H. E. III. 4.

After this successful debut Timothy Ælurus held a synod at Ephesus, the members of which accepted the imperial encyclical, and even addressed a letter to Basiliscus, exhorting him to remain steadfast in the policy he had inaugurated. In return for his coldness towards Ælurus the synod now withdrew the province of Asia from the jurisdiction of Acacius and conferred on the Bishop of Ephesus the right to consecrate its metropolitans. After these achievements the synod dissolved and Timothy continued his journey to Alexandria, where he was received with great rejoicings.

But the monophysite victory was destined at this time to be of short duration. The hostility of Constantinople, both lay and monastic, with Acacius at its head, to the religious policy of Basiliscus, proved a fatal obstacle to its success, and it was too late when the ephemeral Emperor realized that he had adopted the losing cause. He attempted, indeed, to retrace his steps and issued an anti-encyclical annulling the previous encyclical. But the dethroned Zeno was already marching on the capital, at the head of the troops which, under his Isaurian fellow-countrymen, the Generals Illus and Trocundus, had been sent to capture him. At his approach Basiliscus fled from Constantinople, and subsequently, with his family, perished of hunger in Cappadocia.

A reaction at once took place in the ecclesiastical situation. The Bishops of the province of Asia were among the earliest to express their regrets, and wrote a "repentant memorial" to Acacius, whose authority they had so lately repudiated, imploring pardon and explaining that they had accepted the encyclical of Basiliscus under compulsion. Timothy Ælurus was saved by death (477) from again treading the path of exile, but his see remained obstinately monophysite, and a monophysite successor, Peter Mongus, was ordained in his place. Timothy Salophaciolus, the orthodox Patriarch, was, indeed, officially reinstated and Mongus compelled to go into retirement. But the Alexandrian monophysites, although they greatly esteemed Salophaciolus, would not accept him as their Patriarch, and demanded at Constantinople that after his death Peter Mongus should be recognized as his successor.

The Catholic Alexandrians, however, would not agree to this, and petitioned Zeno, through a priest named John Talaia, for the appointment of an orthodox Patriarch. But the Emperor was just then preparing to carry out his Henoticon policy and compelled Talaia to promise that he would not endeavor to obtain the Catholic succession at Alexandria.

The conditions at Antioch and Jerusalem were scarcely more satisfactory than those at Alexandria; a continuous struggle for supremacy had for many years been carried on in both of these cities between orthodox and monophysite. With a view to ending this state of things in the Eastern Church, Acacius of Constantinople, who had thus far well served the cause of orthodoxy, advised the Emperor to adopt a new policy, which, he thought, would bring order out of the existing chaos. But while the end was laudable, the means of effecting it were, to say the least, peculiar. At the instance of Acacius, Zeno issued a decree, afterwards known as the Henoticon, addressed to the Bishops, clergy, monks and faithful of Alexandria, Egypt, Libya and Pentapolis, exhorting all of these to return to union with the Universal Church, on certain conditions which he thought they would readily accept. The two principal features of the Henoticon were its insistance on the creeds of Nice and Constantinople and its practical rejection of the Council of Chalcedon. Nestorius was anathematized, as well as Eutyches (the Alexandrians themselves had long since rejected the views of the latter personage) and the anathematisms of St. Cyril were formally accepted. All reference to the question of the natures of Christ, as well as to the Tome of Pope Leo, was studiously avoided. "And these things," concluded the royal Pontiff, "we write, not as setting forth a new form of faith, but for your assurance. And every one who has held or holds any other opinion, either at the present or at any other time, whether at Chalcedon or in any other synod whatsoever, we anathematize."[6]

The Henoticon was, of course, accepted by Acacius, by Peter Mongus, who thereby obtained recognition as Patriarch of Alexandria, and by Martyrius of Jerusalem. Those Bishops who declined to obey the imperial mandate were deposed, among them being John Calandion of Antioch, whose rival, Peter the Fuller, obtained his place. But events soon proved that union on the basis of silence on essential points was not likely to be of a lasting character. The Alexandrians, in the first place, were not satisfied even with the concessions of the Henoticon, and demanded nothing less than an explicit repudiation of the Tome and the Council of Chalcedon. Their intransigent attitude caused Peter Mongus no small embarrassment, from which he endeavored to escape by means which brought on him the stigma of "time-server" and "double-dealer."[7] The Patriarch's versatility, indeed, was surprising, for while on the one hand he assured Acacius that he was convinced by "the most powerful proofs" adduced by the Patriarch of Constantinople in support of the contention that Chalcedon was in complete accordance with Nice, on the other hand, the adherents of Mongus in Alexandria were occupied in circulating a fictitious correspondence, representing Acacius as rejecting the former of these councils, imploring the favor of his Alexandrian colleague, and even accepting a penance imposed on him by Peter. His efforts, however, were only partially successful, for a body of malcontents, whom he was unable to satisfy, broke off relations with him and organized themselves into a schismatic body known as "the headless ones" (acephali).

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[6] Evagrius, H. E. III. 14.

[7] Evagrius, H. E. III. 17.

A second and still more fatal obstacle to the success of the Henoticon was the pronounced opposition of Old Rome. Acacius and Zeno, in drawing up their union formula, had acted as though no such person as the Pope existed. These two dignitaries, indeed, seemed to regard themselves as the most important factors in the Universal Church, and to imagine that the Constantinopolitan chiefs of Church and State could, at will, undo the work of an œcumenical council. The Pope, therefore, knew nothing of the result of their joint deliberations until the Henoticon had been launched upon the Eastern world. The first news on the subject appears to have been brought to Rome by the exiled Patriarch of Alexandria, John Talaia, and subsequently by the orthodox monks of Constantinople. Thereupon, Pope Felix III. (483-492) at once took steps to undo the mischief, and with this end in view an embassy of two Bishops, Misenus and Vitalis, and a defensor proceeded to Constantinople, bearing with them a citation for Acacius to answer for his conduct before a Roman synod. The envoys were also entrusted with a letter from the Pope to Zeno exhorting the Emperor to uphold the Council of Chalcedon and not to tolerate further the onward march of heresy. But the Papal Legates proved unworthy of their commission, and, partly by misrepresentations, partly by threats, allowed themselves to be circumvented, so that they assisted in Constantinople at a solemn religious function in which the name of Peter Mongus was recited in the diptychs. Thus were the people of the capital led to believe that Pope Felix approved of the Henoticon.

But the orthodox monks of the monastery of the Acœmetæ saw through the manœuvres of Acacius and hastened to inform the Pope of the fall of his legates. Whereupon Felix summoned a council at Rome, which pronounced upon the unfaithful envoys sentence of excommunication and deposition. Acacius also, because of his failure to obey the Papal summons and his conduct towards the legates, was deposed and excommunicated.

This sentence of the Roman Synod was forwarded to Constantinople by the Defensor Tutus, who, with some difficulty, succeeded in placing it in the hands of the Acœmetæ. These undertook its delivery, and after several failures one of the brethren succeeded in attaching it to the pallium of the Patriarch during a ceremony in St. Sophia. The response of Acacius to the sentence completed the rupture between East and West; he caused the name of Felix to be removed from the diptychs and punished the daring monastic offenders against his dignity, some with imprisonment, some with death.

The bearer of the sentence of Acacius brought also a letter from the Pope to the Emperor in which Felix reproached Zeno for the manner in which his legates had been treated, and gave him the choice of communion with Peter the Apostle or with Peter Mongus. In all matters strictly religious, wrote the Pope, the Emperor must make up his mind to learn rather than to teach; according to the divine constitution of the Church royalty itself, in matters of faith, is subject to the priests of God.[8] But Zeno took no heed of this remonstrance and gave his full support to the excommunicated Patriarch of Constantinople. Thus began the Acacian schism between East and West, which continued during the next thirty-five years (484-519). All opposition in the East was stamped out by Emperor and Patriarch, and numerous exiled Bishops joined John Talaia at Rome, to await better days.

Acacius died in 489, and his successor, Flavita or Flavitas, immediately after his election, made advances to Rome. Felix III., however, declined to receive him into communion, because of his refusal to break off relations with Peter Mongus and to remove the name of Acacius from the diptychs. Flavita died a few months after his election, and his successor, Euphemius, went still further in his efforts towards reconciliation with the West; he broke with Peter Mongus and restored the Pope's name to the diptychs. But he declined to fulfill the third condition for reunion by refusing to remove from the diptychs the names of his two predecessors. In all other respects Euphemius was entirely orthodox.

The Emperor Zeno died in April, 491, and, having no direct heirs, his brother Longinus endeavored to obtain the succession. But the widow of Zeno, the Empress Ariadne, pronounced for the Silentiary Anastasius (491-518), who thus, with the hand of the Empress, obtained the imperial prize.

The new Emperor was suspected in Constantinople of leaning towards manichæism, and in consequence the Patriarch Euphemius, before the enthronement, insisted on his signing a document to the effect that he would maintain the faith inviolate; in other words, that he would accept the Council of Chalcedon. But the Emperor, adopting a policy of *laissez faire,* did not live up to his word, and gave orders that Chalcedon should neither be proclaimed nor repudiated. This policy, however, pleased nobody, and in his endeavor to carry it out the Emperor was obliged to exile both Chalcedonians and anti-Chalcedonians. Euphemius himself was deposed on a charge of heresy, made by the monophysite Patriarch of Alexandria, Athanasius (496); from this date Anastasius began to lean more and more towards monophysitism.[9]

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[8] Felix III., Ep. VIII. 5.

While Eastern Emperors, sometimes assisted by Patriarchs, were thus attempting to regulate Church matters according to their own will, the ideas of the Popes on the question of the relations of the Church to the civil power were gradually assuming definite form. And it was time that they should, for in the East, more than ever before since the death of Marcian, the Emperors had been acting as though they were entitled to rule the Church as well as the State by divine right, while their claim to such authority was only too generally acknowledged in their dominions, practically if not theoretically.

If such an usurpation on the part of the State were to continue, then it would be only a question of time until the Church would be merely a department of the civil government. Pope Felix III., as we have seen, had expressed himself strongly on this point, but it was his successor, Pope Gelasius I. (492-496), who formulated the theory of Church and State which has ever since been regarded as the earliest clear expression on the question of the respective spheres of the two powers. The occasion of this pronouncement was a correspondence between Gelasius and the Emperor which originated in the following manner. After Theodoric had defeated his rival, Odoacer, and assumed in Italy the title of king, he sent to Constantinople two ambassadors, Faustus and Irenæus, to obtain from the Emperor approval of his action. The ecclesiastical situation between East and West, among other matters, was discussed at the court with the king's representatives. The Emperor complained of having been condemned by the Pope and expressed his surprise that Gelasius had not written to him by the ambassadors. The Patriarch Euphemius, on his part, complained that Acacius had been condemned by Pope Felix alone, which, he claimed, was in violation of the canons.

In reply to these allegations the Pope answered that, in the first place, Acacius, having practically repudiated the Council of Chalcedon, had condemned himself. The consequence of this act was that not only the Pope, but every Bishop, was bound to break with the late Bishop of Constantinople. Euphemius, continues Gelasius, talks of violated canons. But is it not the canons which decree that all disputes shall, in the last resort, be judged at Rome, and that from the decisions of Rome there is no appeal? Now, Acacius knew quite well that Timothy Ælurus, Peter of Antioch and other Bishops had been deposed by the Apostolic See; yet he, after the acceptance by these Bishops of the Henoticon, restored them to communion, thereby presuming to reverse a decision of the Pope.

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[9] Evagrius, H. E. III. 30.

Moreover, by what authority were the orthodox Bishops of Alexandria and Antioch, the second and third sees in Christendom, with many other Bishops, expelled from their dioceses? Yet, while all this has been done by the secular and religious powers of Constantinople, these same powers now complain of being separated from communion with Rome. Further still, Acacius never, as the Greeks allege, asked pardon of the Apostolic See; on the contrary, he resisted to the end all the Pope's efforts to win him back to orthodoxy. As to the present state of the question Euphemius must understand that the supreme authority in matters religious rests in the Apostolic See, whereas, on the other hand, the civil rulers, as Christians, are to be judged by Bishops, and particularly by the Vicar of St. Peter. No Christian, no matter how exalted his position, may arrogate the right to judge in things divine; the ruler who would do so is merely a persecutor.[10]

Replying next to the Emperor the Pope, first of all, defends himself against the charge of discourtesy.[11] He reminds Anastasius that when, some time before, the imperial ambassadors were in Rome they everywhere announced that they had been ordered by their master to hold no communication with the Pope. Which being the case, Gelasius fails to understand how the Emperor can regard it as an offense to receive no communication from himself. Then, evidently having in mind the arbitrary methods of Anastasius and his imperial predecessors of dealing with religious questions, the Pope defines, for the benefit of the Emperor, the proper domain, in the Christian dispensation, of the secular ruler. "August Emperor," he writes, "this world is governed by two powers: by the sacred authority of Pontiffs and the royal power. Of these the responsibility laid upon priests is by far the weightier, since they will have to account to God even for kings. You know, dearest son, that although in dignity you are exalted above all other men, yet in all religious matters you devoutly bow your head to those who are charged with the administration of things holy, to whom you look for the means of salvation. Furthermore, in all that regards the reception and administration of the sacraments you must acknowledge that, far from having any right to command, you are bound to obey; that in matters of this order you are dependent on their judgment, and that consequently you have no right to attempt to subject them to your will. For if the ministers of religion, knowing that authority in all worldly affairs rightly belongs to you, readily obey you, is it not equally becoming that you in turn should, in the religious sphere, obey those who are charged with the disposition of our august mysteries? Everybody knows that it is a duty of Bishops to speak boldly in defense of religion when occasion demands, and that, on the other hand, which God forbid, those who despise their authority run grave risk of salvation. But if the faithful thus owe submission to Bishops in general, who worthily direct the interests of religion, how much more do they not owe submission to the Bishop of that see to whom God has assigned preëminence over all Bishops."[12]

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[10] Gelas. I. Ep. 4.

[11] Gelas. I. Ep. 8.

In another of his works, speaking of the separation of spiritual from secular authority in the Christian dispensation, Pope Gelasius says that in former times there were, like Melchisedech, individuals who legitimately exercised the priestly as well as the royal office, and that Satan imitated this practice among pagans, so that, for example, the Roman Emperors were also Supreme Pontiffs. But Christ our Lord, mindful of human frailty, and knowing that it would be an aid to salvation, forever separated the two spheres, the consequence being that henceforth Christian rulers, on the one hand, need the services of Bishops in seeking the way of eternal life, and, on the other hand, Bishops depend in temporal matters upon the civil rulers.

Therefore, when the civil power endeavors to encroach upon the spiritual domain, every priest worthy of the name is in duty bound to resist the attempted usurpation. Thus did Nathan, the prophet, in the case of David, and in Christian times Ambrose of Milan separated from communion the Emperor Theodosius. Pope Leo also rebuked the younger Theodosius in the affair of the latrocinium, Pope Hilary the Emperor Anthemius and Popes Simplicius and Felix the Emperors Basiliscus and Zeno.[13]

Pope Anastasius II., who, in 496, succeeded Gelasius, adopted a more friendly attitude than that of his immediate predecessors towards the Emperor of the same name. This did not mean, however, as the party in Rome hostile to his policy seemed to think, that the Pope was disposed to sacrifice the principle at issue. What he did was to resume the custom of notifying the Emperor of his election. A delegation of two Bishops bearing his letters arrived at Constantinople, where the pacific tone of his communications made a favorable impression. The Pope had also authorized his legates to enter into relations with the Apocrisiarius at Constantinople of the schismatic Patriarch of Alexandria, while he himself, through the deacon Photinus, effected a reconcilation with Bishop Andrew of Thessalonica, one of the most uncompromising of Acacians.

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[12] Gelasius I. Ep. XII. 2.

[13] Gelasius I. Ep. XXVI. 11.

But these conciliatory acts of the Pope appear to have been regarded by two different parties as merely weakness. In Rome the intransigents would not hear of concessions, whereas, on the other hand, Theodoric's ambassador at Constantinople, the consular Festus, gave the Emperor the assurance that he would persuade the Pope to go so far even as to accept the Henoticon.

Pope Anastasius II. died, however, before Festus had an opportunity of attempting to try on him his powers of persuasion, but in the election of his successor Festus is found taking a leading part. The candidate he favored was the priest Laurentius, while a majority of the clergy and people gave their votes to the deacon Symmachus. The result was a double election and subsequently an appeal to King Theodoric to act as arbitrator in the dispute. Theodoric decided that the rightful Pope was he who was first ordained and had with him a majority of the electors. These conditions being found on the side of Symmachus, he was declared Pope; his unsuccessful competitor was given the bishopric of Nocera.

But this arrangement of matters did not at all reconcile Festus and the senatorial party, who were his chief supporters, to their defeat. Their hostility to Symmachus manifested itself anew about the beginning of the year 501, when they charged the Pope before King Theodoric with having celebrated Easter on the wrong date. Symmachus was cited to the royal court to answer this puerile accusation, but on arriving at Ravenna he accidentally discovered that other and much graver charges were being prepared against him by his enemies; whereupon, declining to walk into the trap, he immediately returned to Rome.

This sudden departure, however, unfavorably impressed the king, who now all the more readily listened to the new accusations, the most serious of which were that the Pope was guilty of a grave moral lapse and had unlawfully disposed of Church property. In the absence of the accused the Arian King took it upon himself to appoint a Visitor, in the person of the Bishop of Altino, to proceed to Rome, for the purpose of renewing the Paschal ceremonies, after which, he decided, a synod would be convened to examine into the other accusations against Symmachus.

The synod thus ordered met in April or May, 501, and held its first session in the basilica of S. Maria in Trastevere. But the Bishops were not at all satisfied as to the manner of their convocation, and their first act was to protest that Theodoric had no authority to convene an ecclesiastical council. Only the Pope, they maintained, could lawfully call them together, and even had the Pope summoned them to Rome, they, as Bishops, had no authority to pronounce judgment on one who held the preëminent dignity of successor of St. Peter.

To these protests the King replied that the Pope had consented to the convocation of the council, an assertion which Symmachus confirmed. The Pope then agreed to waive his prerogative of being judged by no tribunal, but on condition that the Visitor should previously be dismissed and the churches be restored to his direction. Theodoric, however, declined to accept these stipulations, and the synod dissolved without accomplishing anything.

A second attempt to end the trouble was made by Theodoric some months later. He again summoned the Bishops of Italy to meet in Rome, September 1, 501, and at the same time sent three royal officials to reassure the Pope as to his intentions and obtain his consent to appear before the new synod. Symmachus agreed to this proposal, and the second synod met in the church of Santa Croce. But while the Pope, accompanied by the royal officials, was crossing the city from St. Peter's, where he resided, to Santa Croce, he and his escort were assailed with such violence by the partisans of Festus that, but for the intervention of his royal escort, he would have lost his life. Symmachus thereupon returned to St. Peter's, and, naturally, while such conditions prevailed, declined making a second attempt to appear before the assembly at Santa Croce. This refusal put an end to the synod, for the Fathers again declined to judge the Pope without the Pope's consent. Their decision they communicated to Theodoric in the following terms: "We may not," they inform the king, "proceed further. According to the canons, all Bishops may appeal to the Pope, but what is to be done when the Pope himself is in question? In his absence we can neither judge him, nor declare him contumacious, because, in the first place, in the beginning, he presented himself before the judges, and, above all, because no one has ever yet seen a Pope judged by Bishops." Before the dissolution of the synod the Bishops exhorted the priests who sided with the senatorial party to return to obedience. But the parties addressed declined to follow this advice, and the schism continued, for, though a majority of the clergy and people were with Symmachus, the Senate and an influential minority of ecclesiastics were strongly opposed to him.

In a still further effort to reconcile parties at Rome a synod composed of eighty-one Bishops and thirty-seven Roman priests met the following year (502) in St. Peter's, under the presidency of the Pope. The only business of importance transacted, however, related to Church property. By order of the Pope the deacon Hormisdas read to the council a document bearing on this subject, having reference to the decision of an assembly of the Roman clergy, held in the mausoleum of St. Petronilla, adjoining St. Peter's, some twenty years earlier, in the interregnum following the death of Pope Simplicius. The tenor of this document was to the effect that, at the suggestion of Cæsina Basilius, Prefect of the pretorium to King Odoacer, the aforesaid priests had adopted a resolution prohibiting the future Pope from alienating Church property, and in addition a claim was made in behalf of Odoacer that he should have the right of confirming the Pope about to be elected.

The assembly of 502 listened with indignation to the reading of this production, which showed a barbarian king endeavoring to emulate in their pretensions over the Church the Eastern emperors. The synod at once pronounced the decree null and void and prohibited the civil authorities from in future enacting laws relative to ecclesiastical property.

The question of principle thus disposed of, Pope Symmachus, who had been accused by his adversaries of squandering the goods of the Church, at once issued, with the assent of the synod, a decree in the same sense as that just revoked, only more precise in its regulations; in future no Pope might alienate, by sale or exchange, the property of the Church, the revenues from which were to be expended for the maintenance of the clergy, of prisoners and strangers.

The enemies of Symmachus maintained their attitude of opposition several years after this date. This they were able to do by the indirect connivance of Theodoric, who, weary of unsuccessful efforts to settle the Roman question, permitted the senatorial party to bring back to Rome the old rival of Symmachus, Laurentius, again in the character of anti-Pope. Eventually, however, Theodoric was persuaded by Dioscorus, deacon of Alexandria, to suppress the activities of Festus, the chief cause of all the trouble; this done, opposition to the Pope in a great measure disappeared and Laurentius passed the remainder of his days in retirement.

Hormisdas succeeded Symmachus on the Papal throne in 514, and appears to have been a candidate acceptable to all parties in Rome. This fact proved all the more fortunate in that, within a few months after his accession, advances were again made by Constantinople to the Pope with a view to bringing to an end the schism that, for too long a period, had divided East and West.

The circumstances under which negotiations were again resumed were as follows. After the deposition in 511 of the Patriarch Macedonius II., a priest named Timothy, persona grata to the Emperor Anastasius, was chosen his successor. The new Patriarch accepted the Henoticon, but in his synodica he observed complete silence as to the Tome and Chalcedon. John Nikaiotes, of Alexandria, attempted to draw from Timothy an explicit declaration on these two points, but received a rebuke for his pains. Yet the two Patriarchs entered into communion, although Nikaiotes openly repudiated the Tome and the council. Alexandria and Constantinople being thus again united, the Emperor experienced little further difficulty in obtaining for his Patriarch general recognition; the Bishops of Palestine and Syria, however, merely received the synodica of Timothy, which was free from heresy, but declined to approve the deposition of Macedonius. The orthodox leaders in the Orient, Flavian, Patriarch of Antioch, and Elias of Jerusalem, were deposed, and monophysite successors, Severus at Antioch, John in Jerusalem, appointed in their stead.

But popular opposition to the Emperor's will in his capital still continued, and at one time became so serious as almost to cost Anastasius his throne. It appears that some years before this crisis in the reign of Anastasius, and while Macedonius still occupied the patriarchal chair, a party of monophysites, on a certain occasion, had attempted, first in a chapel of the imperial palace and later in the basilica of St. Sophia, to sing the Trisagion with the heretical addition, "Who for us was crucified." A riot followed of so grave a character that the Emperor was for the moment obliged to yield. But after the exile of Macedonius, Anastasius renewed the attempt to introduce monophysitism into the liturgy through the chanting of a phrase distinctively monophysite in signification. Accordingly, by imperial direction, on a Sunday in November, 512, the choir of St. Sophia again chanted the heretical ending to the Trisagion. The result again was a riot, which in the course of a few days developed into a rebellion of such proportions that the aged Emperor, in the Circus Maximus, proffered his resignation of the imperial sceptre. The people, however, for the second time, accepted his assurances and left him in peace.

But, as usual with Anastasius, the insincerity of his yielding became apparent the first favorable opportunity. He began his reign probably wholly indifferent to the religious issue, whereas towards its close, he demanded explicit acceptance of the Henoticon, and therefore when circumstances, after the incident described in the Circus Maximus, seemed propitious, persecution of the Chalcedonians again became the order of the day.

The consequence was a new revolt, this time headed by an officer of the imperial army, of Gothic descent, named Vitalian. Vitalian was not in reality much interested in the theological controversy that distracted the empire, but he had personal grievances against the Emperor which he saw a way of avenging by a pretense of zeal for orthodoxy. The rebellious officer, accordingly, at the head of an army of Huns, devastated the provinces of Thrace and Mysia, after which, advancing on Constantinople, he inflicted a disastrous defeat on Hypatius, the Emperor's nephew, who had been sent against him with an army of 80,000 men. In a naval engagement Vitalian was also victorious, and thus was able to advance to the neighborhood of the capital, where the Emperor was compelled to accept his terms.

These terms included the appointment of Vitalian as Magister Militum of Thrace, the restoration of the banished orthodox Bishops, especially Macedonius and Flavian, to their sees, and the convocation of a general council at Heraclea, in Thrace, under the presidency of the Pope.

In fulfillment of the last part of this convention Anastasius wrote to Pope Hormisdas two letters, dated December 28, 514, and March 28, 515, to which the latter responded in a friendly manner. Subsequently the Pope sent a delegation, headed by Ennodius, Bishop of Ticinum, to Constantinople for the purpose of continuing negotiations for the reunion of the Eastern and Western portions of the Church.

The conditions laid down by Hormisdas to this end were presented with all due moderation, but on examination they were found to be substantially the same as those demanded by his predecessors. The Pope asked, first of all, recognition of the Council of Chalcedon and the acceptance of Leo's Tome. In the next place he stipulated that Nestorius, Eutyches, Dioscorus, Acacius and their followers should be condemned, and, finally, that the exiled orthodox Bishops should be restored, particular cases to be judged on their merits by the Apostolic See.

The Emperor yielded on all points, save that of the condemnation of Acacius, which, he claimed, public opinion in the East would not tolerate. It is more than likely, however, that the defeat, shortly after the opening of negotiations, of Vitalian by Justin, the future Emperor, had rendered Anastasius indifferent to the ending of the schism. Still, the feeling on the subject in Constantinople was too strong, the desire for reunion too ardent, to allow the matter to drop altogether. In July of the following year (516), accordingly, Anastasius sent two court officers, Theopompus and Severianus, to Rome with letters for the Pope and the Senate. The Pope was not at all pleased that two laymen, whom he subsequently discovered to lean towards monophysitism, had been entrusted with ecclesiastical negotiations. Indeed, Hormisdas began to have serious doubts as to the good faith of the Orientals, as we learn from a letter he wrote at this time to Avitus, Bishop of Vienne. "As to the Greeks," declared the Pope, "they proffer vows of peace with the mouth rather than with the heart, and their words are more fair than their acts." However, he continued negotiations and dispatched to the East a second embassy. But neither party would yield the point at issue, the consequence being that things remained in statu quo until the sudden death of Anastasius, July 8, 518. Some months previously the Patriarch Timothy had preceded the Emperor to the grave and was succeeded by John II., a Patriarch, who, while at heart orthodox, yet had subscribed the condemnation of the Council of Chalcedon.

The successor of Anastasius was his Captain of the Guard, Justin, the conqueror of Vitalian, who in religious matters proved an adherent of orthodoxy. The consequences of this fact were soon apparent in ecclesiastical affairs. A first indication of the changed conditions manifested itself in the conduct of the Patriarch John, who, at the urgent demand of the people, publicly professed the faith of Chalcedon and restored to the diptychs the names of Pope Leo, Euphemius and Macedonius. To give greater authority to this act the Patriarch convened a synod which met at Constantinople, July 20, 518, under the presidency of the Archbishop of Heraclea. Forty-three Bishops were present, but the Patriarch did not assist at the sessions. The synod approved of what the Patriarch had already done, and through John, at the request of the orthodox monks of the capital, petitioned the Emperor for the restoration of the exiled Bishops. The council also condemned and deposed Severus, the monophysite Patriarch of Antioch.

Three synods held the same year, in Jerusalem, in Tyre and Syria II., followed the lead of Constantinople, and in general throughout the empire a reaction towards orthodoxy began with the accession of Justin. Negotiations were again resumed with Rome by a letter from the Patriarch John informing Pope Hormisdas of the decisions of the Synod of Constantinople. The Patriarch asked that a new embassy be sent to the East for the purpose of ending the schism. A letter of like tenor was sent to Hormisdas by the Emperor's nephew, Count Justinian, inviting the Pope in person to Constantinople, and, in the event of his acceptance being impossible, requesting him to send plenipotentiaries. The invitation was forwarded to Rome by a high court functionary, Count Gratus.

In reply the Pope sent an embassy consisting of two Bishops, a priest and two deacons, with a *Libellus* which was to be signed by every Bishop who desired to enter into communion with Rome. This formula demanded the explicit condemnation of Acacius, the author of the schism, but made some concession on the question of his successors, the well-intentioned Patriarchs Euphemius and Macedonius, who were condemned only indirectly: "similarly," it read, "we anathematize Acacius, formerly Bishop of Constantinople, who made himself accomplice and follower of these heretics (Eutyches, Dioscorus, etc.), together with all who persevered in their fellowship and communion." Seeing no way out of the matter, since everybody wanted reunion, the Patriarch John subscribed the *Libellus,* and subsequently the names of the three Patriarchs, Acacius, Euphemius and Macedonius, with those of the Emperors Zeno and Anastasius, were, in the presence of the Papal Legates, removed from the diptychs.

Thus ended the first serious breach between Rome and Constantinople. To regard the outcome merely as a triumph of an ambitious Papacy over the civil power, as is frequently done, is wholly to mistake the character of the issue between Eastern and Western Christendom at the beginning of the sixth century. Briefly stated, this was the right of the Church to freedom of action in her own sphere, a right, as we have seen, ignored and set aside in a more flagrant manner by the Emperors Zeno, Basiliscus and Anastasius than even by any of their predecessors. The two former of these Emperors went so far as to anathematize those who would not accept their pronouncements in a matter of faith, and all three agreed in rejecting the dogmatic decision of an œcumenical council, substituting in its place a dogmatic decision of their own.

Were such acts allowed to pass unchallenged, the Church would soon have degenerated into a mere governmental department of the State. In the East, we have seen, no serious resistance to their action was attempted, but, on the contrary, an ambitious Patriarch of Constantinople, Acacius, threw all the weight of his influence into the opposite scale. In other words, Acacius was guilty of doing all in his power to establish a precedent which would enslave the Church of which he was one of the highest officials. Yet some sentimentalists regard the Pope's insistance, in the reign of Justin, on excluding his name from the diptychs of the Church he betrayed as cruel!

The Popes of this period, on the other hand, with the growing consciousness of their responsibilities noted in a previous paper, would make no compromise of essential principles. They realized to the full that they were the divinely appointed guardians of the deposit of the faith, and that in consequence, no matter how apparently advantageous a compromise like the Henoticon might at first sight appear, they could not, without betrayal of trust, accept this via media out of the difficulty. Had Felix III., Gelasius or Hormisdas followed the lead of Acacius in rejecting an œcumenical council in favor of an imperial pronouncement on a question of faith, the authority of conciliar decisions would have been forever undermined. But so far were these Popes from acting in this way that, however much allowance they might be disposed to make for Euphemius and Macedonius, yet even these, because they persisted to the end in upholding Acacius, had to be regarded as schismatics and as such excluded from communion with the Universal Church.

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THE WORDSWORTHIAN THEORY OF SOLITUDE.

I learned betimes to stand unpropped,
And independent musings pleased me so,
That spells seemed on me when I was alone.
Yet could I only cleave to solitude
In lonely places; if a throng was near,
That way I leaned by nature. For my heart
Was social, and loved idleness and joy.
—The Prelude.

WE ARE all acquainted with the Wordsworth of "independent musings" and strange cleavings to solitude; but the Wordsworth whose heart was social, the lover of idleness and joy, must speak from the pages of "The Prelude" or else forever hold his peace. And yet, once he has spoken, we discern that the poet knew his own heart. The recluse is the complement of the lover of society, and both may be clearly traced through the simple intricacies of the Wordsworthian palimpsest. For half a century the author of "The Prelude" lived in the romantic seclusion of Grasmere Vale, first at Dove Cottage, near the northern end of the lake, and later at Rydal Mount, on the road to Ambleside. There he marveled at the echoing shout of the cuckoo, mysteriously reflected from the slanting hillsides; there, while wandering "lonely as a cloud," he chanced upon the daffodils and attended their dance without an invitation; there, as a boy, with his sister Dorothy, he chased the butterfly, a very hunter, rushing on his prey,

With leaps and springs
I followed on from brake to bush;
But she, God love her, feared to brush
The dust from off its wings.

Dorothy never counted for society; she was the poet's other self. In long walks with her under the blue witchery of encalmed skies, past daisy-rimmed riverbeds, he spelled out the meaning of the fair vistas before him. From that first childish uplift of the heart upon beholding a rainbow over a Westmoreland meadow, his sympathies ripened and deepened until his soul compassed a charity so catholic that it embraced not only the thrilling harmonies of "the deep power of joy," but also the subtler minor chords of "the still sad music of humanity." The deep power of joy rings clear and triumphant in many of the shorter poems, such as "To the Green Linnet," "To a Highland Girl" and "The Primrose of the Rock;" the still sad music of humanity becomes thematic in the story of Margaret, the afflicted; in the tale of the old Cumberland Beggar; in the impressive annals of the leech-gatherer on the lonely moor, and in the melancholy narrative of the forsaken Michael sitting broken-hearted against the gray stone pile that never grew to be a sheepcote. Thus there are two sides to Wordsworth, a social and a solitary. In virtue of the one he holds that "the mind of man is a thousand times more beautiful than the earth on which he dwells;" that man himself is the crown of all visible natures, "a being first in every capability of rapture, through the divine effect of power and love." In virtue of the other, he writes:

> When from our better selves we have too long
> Been parted by the hurrying world and droop,
> Sick of its business, of its pleasures tired,
> How gracious, how benign, is Solitude.

Wordsworth was a social solitary who loved not man the less, but nature more. Since solitude is the test of the strong, the laureled are predestined to loneliness. All the saints have loved the desert. The Master Himself set the example. Of His thirty-three years here on earth thirty belong to the period known as the hidden life and only three to the public ministry. When Paul received the revelation which was to determine the future course of his days he records that he conferred not with flesh and blood, but went into the fastnesses of Arabia. It was three years before he came forth, and then it was for the purpose of spending fifteen days in conference with the chief of the Apostles. Elijah within his secret cave; John the Baptist crying out from his wilderness; Thomas a'Kempis meditating in his narrow cell; Loyola framing his high plans in the sepulchral grotto of Manresa—such men are isolated of necessity by the largeness of their aims and the altitude of their souls. Even genius of a natural order requires protection from the free-for-all fumes of publicity. The vine-clad hills of Italy produced Virgil; an exile more bitter than death nourished the soul of Dante; the bonny fields of Ayrshire gave us Burns;

and Surrey and the Isle of Wight are jointly responsible for Tennyson. "An artist," says Ruskin, "should be fit for the best society and should keep out of it." Chopin, Wagner and Beethoven lived their higher lives when they followed this advice; Bunyan, Milton and Cervantes are never-dying examples of the efficacy of its application. Bunyan saw the light of the New Jerusalem through the iron gratings of Bedford Jail; Milton closed his eyes upon the gardens of earth before he opened them upon the garden of Paradise, and Cervantes in prison with his one poor arm wrote our gladdest, and all but our saddest book, and called it "Don Quixote."

But there are diseased and distorted forms of solitariness. Byron and Thoreau are of this cynical, satirical, misanthropic type. Byron, though never an out-and-out pessimist, had his fits of rebellion against the constituted order of things. Then out of the quakerent vents of his volcanic soul he would send forth harmonies of hate:

> I have not loved the world, nor the world me.
> I have not flattered its rank birth, nor bowed
> To its idolatries a patient knee,
> Nor coined my cheek to smiles, nor cried aloud
> In worship of an echo. In the crowd
> They could not deem me one of such; I stood
> Among them, but none of them.

Yet must we not forget that other Byron—the courageous republican, the liberal in politics; the hater of despotism in every form; the martyr to the revival of the Hellenic spirit and the restoration of the glory that was Greece. His outbursts against man and society are transitory eclipses of his truer, deeper self. Thoreau was more consistent in his incivism. In his hermitage at Walden he had three chairs, "one for solitude, two for friendship and three for society." "But," he hastens to explain, "I never found the companion that was so companionable as solitude. . . . While I have the friendship of the seasons I trust that nothing can make life a burden to me. . . . Why should I be lonely? Is not our planet in the Milky Way?" His sentiments on retirement and the healing power of nature are uniformly sound; the stars are not more numberless than the hearts that they have comforted. But when after pages of rarely beautiful, natural description we come suddenly into an icy sea of scorn drifting manward we begin uneasily to reach for charts and compasses. There is no wisdom in trusting a pilot who is not a lover of his kind. "The names of men," he writes, "are as cheap and meaningless as Bose and Tray, the names of dogs. I will not allow mere names to make distinctions for me; but still see all men in herds. . . . I have seen more men than usual lately, and well as I was acquainted with one, I am surprised to find what vulgar fellows they are. They do a little business each day to pay their board; then they congregate in sitting rooms and feebly fabulate and paddle in the social slush." To his disdain for mankind in general he joins a towering approval of himself. "I am not afraid of praise," he writes, "for I have tried it on myself. The stars and I belong to a mutual admiration society." And again: "Mine is a sugar to sweeten sugar with; if you will listen to me, I will sweeten your whole life." Strange misdirection of love, attempting to live from within, when of necessity it must fare forth to enrich the heart of a brother before it can return to gladden the sender. Poor Thoreau! He harmed himself more than anybody else with the dreary burden of his Walden philosophy.

To the dreamer at Grasmere were unfolded the sibylline leaves of the same green and blue book bound within earth and sky. He, too, was a lover of streams and woods. But he lingered in their mossy haunts not to brood over imagined woes, nursing contempt and hatred for the kindly race of men. Solitude for him was opportunity for a threefold commerce: communion with nature, with his own soul and with God. For as Sir Thomas Browne opined, "there is no such thing as solitude, nor anything that can be said to be alone and by itself, save God, who is His own circle and can subsist by Himself." Wordsworth was too sweetly reasonable to gloom much over his own miseries. Refreshed and strengthened by meditation upon the glories of creation and the divine perfections of their fashioner, he descended from the mountains of contemplation bearing tidings of joy to the valley-dwellers below. Nature smiled upon him and he smiled back in return. Through his sonnets on the River Duddon we may glimpse the reaction of his heart to that external world which sometimes seemed so unreal to him, as he tells us in one of his notes, that he was forced to grasp at a wall or a tree to recall himself from tempting abysses of idealism back to the commonplaces of a workaday realism. Come and see this stream, he invites his readers. And as we walk by his side the music of his words blends with the murmur of the torrent. Duddon is fairer than Bandusia, beloved of the Sabine farmer, he continues. It outrivals the flower-margined fountains of Persia and the ice-arched rapids of the Alps. Along its banks hang clustering alders, quivering aspens and silver colonnades of birch. The birds jubilate in its thickets; the bees ply their harmless robberies among its flowers. Wild strawberry, trembling eyebright and purple thyme enamel its emerald bed. The rill widens into a brook, the brook into a bridge-spanned ribbon of light with hamlets, chapels, towns and towers nestling in its ever-widening valley. It reaches the plain of Donnerdale, and here the poet would willingly linger, for this valley is haunted by memories of faces smiling in death and by ghosted dreams of a past that is gone beyond recall. But the river rushes on impatiently to join the Thames; bards may come and bards may go, but it flows on forever. And the current has its desire. Its waters mingle with the lordly volume of the London stream and its spirit is at rest. At rest, but with no visible cessation of its flowing:

Still glides the stream, and shall forever glide,
The Form remains; the Function never dies;
While we, the brave, the mighty and the wise,
We men, who in our morn of youth defied
The elements, must vanish; be it so.
Enough if something from our hands have power
To live and act and serve the future hour,
And if, as toward the silent tomb we go,
Through love, through hope, through faith's transcendent dower,
We feel that we are greater than we know.

The River Duddon reveals Wordsworth in a passive mood, his senses open to the light and color, the form and substance of earth and sky and water. But he knew moments of profounder imaginative insight when his soul became intensely responsive to the symbolic significance of nature, to the possible directness of its mediation between God and man as the ever-renewed hem of a garment in whose touch lay strength and healing. He had something of that cast of mind which prompted the ancient Greeks to believe that every lovely grove and blue-topped knoll in Hellas screened a presiding deity; something of that tendency to a mystical translation of things material which led Newman to conceive the cosmos as the unfolding of a divine schema through the activity of angelic intelligences. The latter thesis converts the so-called laws of nature into methods adopted by choirs invisible for the furthering of that "one divine far-off event towards which the whole creation moves." Such a point of view has doubtless some obscure association with those animistic and pan-psychic explanations of force and matter which crop out from time to time in ancient philosophies and modern heresies under titles as various as the fantasies of their framers. It vivifies the inanimate and brings it nearer to man. So near, indeed, that for Wordsworth the dividing line between his perceptive powers and the perceived world at times fades out completely, leaving him to dream dimly of mortal life as swinging between two eternities—æons of existence prior to this earthly one and cycles sempiternal beyond the lotus-crowned portals of the Ivory Gate. As for the informing spirit of the universe, he could imagine it only as an omnipresent principle of motion, a world-soul, multiple-mooded as life, invariable and irrevocable as the tomb. These are "the obstinate questionings, failings from us, vanishings, blank misgivings of a creature moving about in worlds not realized" which inspire a song of thanks and praise in the "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality." For these vague stirrings of unrest are the shadowy recollections of that life before life when the soul stood winged before the archetypal truth which is one with all beauty and goodness. Through these fugitive moments of vivid reminiscence he regains his vision of nature as an ideal personality, a conserver of golden arcana for the elect, an angel with a flaming sword pacing the shores "of that immortal sea which brought us hither." And youth, he tells us, is the time for these high visionings, these illuminating remembrances of the divine perfections; solitary study, intense desire and meditative peace are the inspiring conditions. He recalls how in his own early days, turning the mind in upon herself, he "pored, watched, expected, listened, spread his thoughts;" how he experienced "visitings of the upholder of the tranquil soul;" and how he was as sensitive to these visitings as waters to skyey influences, as obedient as an Æolian harp to the magic touchings of the wind. And at last when the years had rolled round, when the orient light of youth had faded into the gray of common day, though nothing could bring back his boyhood's sense of splendor in the grass, of glory in the flower, still he concludes:

We shall grieve not, rather find
Strength in what remains behind;
In the primal sympathy
Which, having been, must ever be;
In the soothing thoughts that spring
Out of human suffering;
In the faith that looks through death;
In years that bring the philosophic mind.

His sympathy with nature was, as he tells us himself, "a passion, a rapture often, an immediate love ever at hand." And yet he is not, as we so often read, simply a poet of nature. His theme is that of all great singers—the soul of man. And there is nothing finer or sweeter, nothing better worth singing about in all the world. His delight in solitude is largely delight in introspective contemplation of his own unuttered yearnings, his airy imaginations, the creative energy of his own volitional powers. He glorified both soul and body. The picture of the shepherd in "The Prelude" "beyond the boundary line of a hill-shadow," standing with arms upraised against the setting sun, "like an aerial cross stationed alone upon a spiry rock of the Chartreuse for worship" is unforgettable. "Thus," the poet continues,

"was man
Ennobled outwardly before my sight,
And thus my heart was early introduced
To an unconscious love and reverence
Of human nature; hence the human form
To me became an index of delight,
Of grace and honor, power and worthiness."

While his primary impulses may have been as social as "The Prelude" proclaims, it is evident that his knowledge of the heart of man is the product of solitary speculation rather than the residue of experimental contact with the world of human kind. Only a right beautiful soul can rejoice and be glad in its own society. We may forego self-approval in a crowd, but we must have it in a hermitage. There was no narrow egotism in Wordsworth's reverent faith in his own soul. Never did he forget that solemn matin hour when, after a night spent in dancing, gayety and mirth, he walked home alone through the coolness of the wind-swept mountain paths. While his senses were drinking in the beauty of the dawn-drenched peaks his heart was accepting a call to the transcendent service of poethood. "I made no vows," he writes in all simplicity, "but vows were made for me; bond unknown to me was given, that I should be, else sinning greatly, a dedicated spirit." This ordination as an hierophant of the beautiful was preceded by a novitiate of solitude. When a boy at Cambridge he had "relaxed the bonds of indolent society" at times to live his own life in his own way. An overfondness for freedom made him turn from all restraints and conventions, even from regulations of his own making. He reveled in a "luxurious gloom of choice," in "pensive skies, sad days, twilight rather than dawn, autumn than spring." And he dreamed of noble aims and worthy deeds, dreams which came true at last, as dreams always do in the end. He aspired even to the stars. He recognized his own wistful longings as fit themes for harmonies that should endure; his own soul as worthy of fellowship with the immortals.

> Those were the days
> Which also first emboldened me to trust
> With firmness, hitherto but slightly touched
> By such a daring thought, that I might leave
> Some monument behind me which pure hearts
> Should reverence.

From nature, through man to God; this is the Platonic ladder of the ascent of love. And this is the order of its awakening in the calm placidities of Wordsworth's soul. Solitude for him is, as the neo-Platonist Plotinus would have phrased it, "a flight of the alone to the Alone." For him the end of life is not action, but impassioned contemplation; not having or doing, but a certain attitude of mind born of the soul's exultation as it gazes upon "the colorless, formless, intangible essence" of the Phaedrus. To those experiencing this rapture earth and man become palpable revelations of the Unseen; the meanest flower that blows is linked with all that is best in the universe; and the stars with their marshaled mazes of light point to order, purpose, even love, as the basic explanation of things. The stars fill his being with

A pleasure quiet and profound, a sense
Of permanent and universal sway
And paramount belief; there, recognized
A type, for finite natures, of the *one*
Supreme Existence, the surpassing life
Which to the boundaries of space and time,
Of melancholy space and doleful time,
Superior and incapable of exchange,
Nor touched by welterings of passion, is
And hath the name of—God.

But being a mystic, he is not satisfied with any disclosure of the divine nature short of an actual unveiling. He seeks immediate experience of God. He is familiar with those ecstasies

In which the burden of the mystery,
In which the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world
Is lightened; that serene and blessed mood
In which the affections gently lead us on,
Until the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul,
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things.

No wonder he loves solitude when it brings him such visions beatific. No wonder the words recluse, alone, seclusion, hermitage and others of kindred connotation are more numerous than any others in his treasury of favorites. No wonder that his heart went out to monks and monasteries; that "the silence visible and perpetual calm" of the Grand Chartreuse should have appealed to him so strongly. He never experienced a sense of loneliness. His hours apart from men were filled with the silences of nature and of God—silences more soul-satisfying than the most haunting melodies of human love, when love attempts utterance.

Thus the Wordsworthian theory of solitude is thoroughly social in its implications. It has nothing in common with the diseased agoraphobia of a churlish Diogenes, a pessimistic Calvin or a self-centred Thoreau. The aspects of solitude cannot be studied to advantage in these azotic forms. The social solitaries set the norm for all those not especially called to the heights of a purely contemplative life. This norm requires rhythmic alternations of solitude and society in about equal proportions. Noble souls are as sensitive to the harmonies of social life as they are to the melodies of individual life. It is perfectly natural at times to desire isolation. One cannot live forever before the crowd; there are moments and aspirations that are unsharable. Even the genial author of the "Biglow Papers" complains of "the times when he's unsocial as a stone, and sort of suffocates to be alone." It is also perfectly natural to desire sympathy and companionship. Love and friendship are holy things. "For fate," we read in one of the "Aristoclean

Dialogues," "which has decreed that there shall be no friendship among the evil, has also ordained that there shall be friendship among the good." Wordsworth was of those who can love and be loved. To his sister and to his wife he opened his soul without reservation; to Coleridge he gave the one deep friendship of his life. Coleridge was a frequent caller at Dove Cottage. Dorothy writes in her journal delightful records of these delightful visits. On one such occasion, she tells us, "we paced the gardens until moonrise, at 1 o'clock, brother, Coleridge and I. Then I read Spenser to them, and we had a midnight tea." To this same small white house came Southey, De Quincey, Humphry Davy, Walter Scott, with his wife, and many another notable. They were always sure of a cordial welcome, of Dorothy's warm hospitality and the sursum corda of Wordsworth's lofty soul. But in addition to this life with men, the soul of the singer at Grasmere led another and a deeper one, a life "retired as noontide dew, or fountain in a noontide grove." Alone with nature and with God he set himself the task of working out a theory of Beauty which should be all inclusive—a rainbow arc with Truth and Goodness for its limiting points. This was to be his cenotaph, his monument that should merit the admiring reverence of the pure of heart. And he accomplished his purpose. The world is richer for his days at Cambridge, for his "leanings to the throng," his "unprofitable talks at morning" and the desultory reading done in "hours of idleness and joy;" richer, too, for the long years at Grasmere when the small spaces of Dove Cottage or the larger ones in the house on Rydal Mount echoed with the converse of good friends and true; but richest, no doubt, in the harvest of those quiet moods, when he gave himself up to "independent musings;" when he escaped the world of sense and ventured forth into the deeps of the spiritual universe. In those moments of vision he never knew whether he was in the body or out of the body, but only that some mighty joy had overshadowed his soul, and that it gladdened him to be alone.

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BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH PROTESTANTISM.*

THE appearance of the third volume of Professor Gairdner's great historical work, "Lollardy and the Reformation in England," shows that that distinguished writer is determined to persevere with the task to which he has devoted the remaining years of his life, that, namely, of tracing the story of the origin of English Protestantism. In his earlier volumes Mr. Gairdner showed in the clearest possible manner that the first of the so-called English Reformers were the natural successors of the earlier Lollards, whose wild, blasphemous and immoral doctrines closely resembled in many respects those of the latter-day Modernists. The Professor is himself a Protestant, but he is an honest searcher after truth, and although his inherited prejudices still hamper him in some degree, his sincere desire to maintain absolute impartiality generally enables him to keep them under control. It was, of course, as impossible for him as it is impossible for any trustworthy Catholic historian to ignore the existence of certain grave scandals in ecclesiastical administration and in the management of certain religious houses, but he never seeks to confer on these an exaggerated importance or to misrepresent them as indicating the defectiveness of the doctrinal teaching of the Church. So far from this being the case, he labors constantly to make plain that the religious theories promulgated by the Lollards and their successors were rightly condemned as heresies when first advanced, that those who thus condemned them were necessarily the best judges of what did and what did not accord with Catholic orthodoxy, and that, if they were heresies when first broached, nothing which has since occurred can have made them less heretical than they then were. From this standpoint Professor Gairdner refuses to allow himself to be moved by the angry expostulations of several Anglican writers of note, who realize that his line of argument completely knocks the bottom out of what is known as the theory of continuity, claiming as it does for the present Established or State Church of England lineal or continuous descent from the ancient Catholic Church which existed within that realm. If it were only for the steadfastness with which Mr. Gairdner upholds this view, Catholics would owe him a debt of gratitude, best repaid by fervent prayers that Almighty God may yet, in His infinite love and mercy, grant him grace and light sufficient to enable him to accept the true faith. The fact that he is not yet able to do this only makes it the more clear to him that Catholicity is a creed separate and distinct in itself and that, whatever else it may be, it can never be and never has been either Lollardism or Protestantism. Therefore, he recognizes that to the true Catholic any system of religious teaching not Catholicism never has been and never can be anything but heretical and, therefore, un-Catholic. The truth of this proposition is as self-evident as any ever formulated by Euclid and proportionately deep is the chagrin of the Professor's Anglican critics.

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* "Lollardy and the Reformation in England," by James Gairdner, C. B., LL. D., D. Litt. London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., Vol. III.

The decrees of the Council of Trent, like the condemnation of Modernism by our present Holy Father, Pope Pius X., are alone sufficient to make clear to even the least well-informed Catholic that in both epochs certain manifestations of indiscipline and unbelief were visible, but it would be as palpably absurd at one period, as at the other, to argue that the upholders of the errors condemned, whether of conduct or of creed, were in accordance with Catholic discipline or doctrine. It is, unhappily, true that both Lollardism and Protestantism owed their foundation and propagation mainly to recreant clerics, acting in unison with avaricious and insubordinate laics. The actual difference between the modern Socialist and Wat Tyler and his brother Lollards was not so very great after all. So far as Protestantism—of the Reformation type—is concerned, after Elizabeth and James I. had moulded it to their own liking, it is abundantly evident that it became, as it still remains, a kind of hermaphrodite combination of heresy and Catholicism. The most cursory examination of the creed of the English Established Church will make plain to every one who cares to investigate it that it consists simply of a series of rejections of Catholic beliefs and of a series of acceptances of certain remnants of such beliefs. The resulting patchwork is alone sufficient to show that Anglicanism is merely a nondescript conglomeration or compromise which under no circumstances can ever have been entitled to be called Catholicism. Under such circumstances the continuity theory is something worse than ridiculous, and most reasonable folk will agree with Professor Gairdner when he says: "We shall never appreciate truly the ideas of our ancestors if we do not weigh their words; and I do not see how we are to understand their words if we presume that they continually misapplied them. They surely had some reason for calling heresy that which they did call heresy. And though, of course, as compared with ourselves, they were very ignorant in many things, yet on the whole they knew what they meant by the words they used just as well as we do." The contention is surely a valid one. Moreover, the mediæval Church—just as the Church of to-day—has had ample warrant and justification in the counsels of St. Paul for banning and excluding heretics. Indeed, it was precisely on the principles laid down by the great Apostle that the Church has always acted in the past and still continues to act. The Professor says that the rulers of the Catholic Church "avoided the company of men marked as heretics whenever it was found that they could not be affected by admonitions; and the Church, when it failed to reconcile them, cast them off by excommunication, that they might not contaminate others. That was the utmost that the Church could do to them; and no one could treat another as an irreclaimable heretic until the Church had pronounced judgment upon him to that effect." No doubt, then, a great many very cruel and terrible things not seldom followed, but the mere fact that they did is the best possible proof that the secular body fully approved the decision of the spiritual. In connection with these we are reminded that: "Heresy being accounted a social danger, the penalty was a question concerning civil order rather than ecclesiastical. Burning for heresy, in truth, was not instituted by the Church, though the odium of it, in later times, was generally thrown upon the Bishops. Bishops may, no doubt, have approved of it as a painful necessity, just as at the present day they may approve of capital punishment for murder." The comparison seems quite natural and obvious, because heresy, if it is anything, is assuredly a murdering of the soul through the poisoning of conscience. From the days of the Lollards to our own time that which is now styled Protestantism has been undergoing a constant process of change, continuously disintegrating and ever drifting further and further away from the original basis of errors which was its first foundation. Lollardism begot Protestantism, but what has not Protestantism conceived and produced? Even now, after so many centuries, Modernism—the latest child of Protestantism—is only Lollardism revived—Lollardism with all its blasphemy, foulness and paganism. Progress is impossible for heresy unless it be progress of the kind which the reeling wanderer makes in the trackless and destroying sands of the desert in which he is doomed to perish. When Henry VIII. came to die he thought he was leaving England a stable religion. He had got rid of the Pope and substituted himself, but he had no mind for chaos. He had enriched himself and most of his subordinates by the plunder of the Church and of God's altars, but he clung to the Mass and the Most Holy Sacrament with a confidence unsurpassable when he came to die. The belief and practices he bequeathed to his Church of England are as completely banned to-day by the Parliament of Westminster as if they never existed. We are reminded that "The King himself, apart from declining physical health, was probably worn out before he died by the constant strain put upon him by circumstances which were largely of his own creation. He must keep out the jurisdiction of 'the Bishop of Rome,' and even the use of the name by which other Christians called him." His other anxieties, domestic, international and financial, were tremendous, while, if he thought at all, his spiritual outlook must have been appalling. In the midst of his manifold perplexities he made his will, and in this testament proclaimed his faith in the Most Holy Sacrament—"left here with us in His Church militant"—and invoked the prayers of the Blessed Virgin Mary and all the holy company of heaven at the hour of his death and through eternity. Moreover, he ordained that Mass should be celebrated at his funeral, while the deans and canons of Windsor were bequeathed lands worth £600 yearly to provide two priests to say Masses in perpetuity at "the altar to be made where we have before appointed our tomb to be made." A sermon was to be preached at Windsor every Sunday in the year to invoke prayers for his soul, while four solemn "obits," or requiems, were to be sung. This was the "Reformation" as it started. Professor Gairdner tells us what it became. It is well worth while following his narrative.

There can be no reasonable doubt that when Henry VIII. came to die and was making his will, invoking the intercession of the saints, as well as ordering the offering of the Most Holy Sacrifice of the Mass for the benefit of his soul, he desired to leave the religion of England—so far as doctrine was concerned—practically intact, save as regards the headship of the Church. Of his sin of schism he seems to have died unrepentant—he certainly offered no reparation for his rejection of the authority of the Holy See—but he shrank from the guilt of formal heresy in sacramental matters. As Dr. Gairdner says: "As regards the future of religion and government, it does not appear that the dying King, however penitent for his past evil ways, had any thought of giving up royal supremacy for his son, or of anything that looked like going backwards. The will, it is true, is silent upon this subject, but silence could only mean continuance of an existing rule. All the executors were already committed to the repudiation of Papal supremacy, and the only man who would have brought it back was purposely left out of the King's will." This was Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, who had long been one of the most capable, and certainly not the most scrupulous of Henry's advisers and instruments. In the old days of the divorce proceedings this prelate had been Wolsey's facile agent in carrying on the negotiations in Rome which resulted in the sad severance of England from the Papacy. Created Bishop of Winchester before this took place, he was ready enough, when it became an accomplished fact, to write and labor in defense of the new prerogative assumed by the tyrannous King, and to argue that to him, and not to the successor of St. Peter, belonged the supreme rulership of the Church in England. Nevertheless, he stood manfully for the preservation of the olden creed and practices in other respects, and seems to have generally been able to secure the countenance and support of Henry. To him was mainly due the enactment of the famous statute of the Six Articles which formally conferred the approval of Parliament on all the principal rules and beliefs of the Catholic Church in matters disciplinary and sacramental, denouncing against all who transgressed or renounced them penalties both tremendous and sanguinary. On the accession of Mary he was appointed Lord High Chancellor of England, and appears to have died fully repentant of the opportunism and subserviency which led him to forsake his sworn allegiance to the Holy See. On his deathbed he is said to have cried out: "I have denied with Peter, I have gone out with Peter, but I have not wept with Peter." Obviously, the omission of Gardiner's name from the roll of Henry's executors seems to indicate that his royal master was more indifferent as to the future of religion than his directions concerning his own funeral rites would at first glance indicate. The Tudor King was no fool, and he must have known perfectly well that the men to whom he specifically confided the guardianship of his boy son, Edward VI., as well as the practical rulership of his realm, were all imbued with the spirit of Lollardism and hostile to the olden teaching of the Church. It says something for Gardiner that, despite his initial fault, he opposed them persistently and suffered much rather than abandon sacred principles. Indeed, his acceptance of the royal supremacy may not inconceivably have been the outcome of a mistaken notion that by thus pandering to Henry's ambition and anger he might secure the defense and permanence of the majority of those essential articles of the Catholic faith which he knew to be in danger at the hands of the Lollardist faction. If this was his idea, it was marvellously well fulfilled so long as the King lived, simply because the latter trusted him and was generally content to accept his advice. When Henry died, however, chaos was inevitable. Those placed in office simply hated Gardiner and the teachings he upheld. The Bishop of Winchester only then realized how fatal to the authority, dignity and influence of the prelates of the Church in England had been the readiness displayed by him and others of their number to abandon their loyalty to the Vicar of Christ. If the successor of St. Peter was no longer head of the Church, what degree of respect or immunity from secular control could the Bishop of Winchester, whom he had appointed, hope to preserve? If one layman, in the person of Henry VIII., could lawfully rule the Church, why should not a group of two ecclesiastics and fourteen laymen—the King's executors—rule it equally lawfully? There really was not, nor is there now, any logical negative reply to these questions. One of the ecclesiastics was Cranmer, the other Bishop Tunstall, of Durham, a faithful copyist of Gardiner's time-serving tactics—willing to abandon the Pope if he could only purchase security for the sacraments. Personally, however, he was much less able and influential than the Bishop of Winchester, who possessed something approaching a European reputation.

Gardiner was soon to learn with the demise of Henry had come the end of any seeming usefulness of the new Catholicity separate from the Papacy. As promptly as possible he ordered a Solemn High Mass for Henry VIII. to be offered at Southwark; but certain players fixed the precise day, hour and locality for a burlesque performance in order to see which function would be most largely attended, as they themselves averred. These ribald folk were retainers of Lord Oxford's. Gardiner sent an urgent protest to Secretary Paget—one of the executors—urging him to prevent the outrage; but Dr. Gairdner has not been able to discover that his remonstrance was vouchsafed any real attention. One of the first acts of the late King's executors was to issue to all the Bishops of the kingdom new licenses to exercise episcopal jurisdiction in renewal of those granted unto them by Henry. Paget had the issuing of these licenses, and when Gardiner objected that they were unnecessary, replied expressing the satirical hope that he "could have such pliable will as could bear the reformation that should be thought meet for the quiet of the realm." Clearly, the spirit of Lollardism was about to assert itself, and Paget knew that he could with impunity jeer even at the Bishop of Winchester. Shortly after this certain divines were appointed to preach Lenten sermons in the presence of the boy King. They were all favorers of the "New Learning," as it was the fashion to style Lollardism or Protestantism, and their discourses were so redolent of heresy that Gardiner felt compelled to send a solemn protest to the Lord Protector Somerset, urging him to have a care how far he ventured to allow the essentials of religion to be assailed, at any rate while the King was still only a minor. Dr. Gairdner points out that in taking this line Gardiner maintained his consistency. He "had accepted royal supremacy under Henry VIII. as a virtual necessity, and had even defended it to an extent which he afterwards regretted; for, being required to write, he had gone the length of palliating, if not actually vindicating, the executions of saintly men like Fisher and More." On all sides were evidences of impending change—everywhere demands for what was called "reform." Clearest proof of all! Archbishop Cranmer himself—in the words of the contemporary chronicler—"this year did eat meat openly in Lent in the hall of Lambeth, the like of which was never seen since England was a Christian country." The opportunist attitude so successfully kept up by Gardiner for years could not be maintained much longer. The extremists, the Lollardists, were determined to carry to the uttermost their carefully planned campaign for the destruction of Catholicity, and part of their scheme to this end involved the promotion of riots throughout the country. These outbreaks were ostensibly movements of the lower classes, whose theological scruples had been suddenly stirred by realization that images of our Lord, our Lady and the saints were unscriptural. The device was a shallow one, but it was intended to show the need for further and immediate alterations in the religion bequeathed to the nation by Henry VIII.

The Bishop was now fully realizing the folly of the course he had adopted and that a policy of mean opportunism could not possibly preserve the standards of religion. Henceforth he maintained a different attitude and one which reflected much more credit on him. He had already protested strongly against some of Ridley's sermons and against the preaching of most of the divines appointed by the Protector, in the name of the boy King, to deliver a series of Lenten addresses. Several of these orators openly and wantonly assailed Catholic teaching and in a special manner the observance of the holy season of Lent by fasting and penance. The whole thing, of course, was the outcome of a huge conspiracy. On the 3d of May, 1547, he was compelled to make further complaint regarding outrages which were being committed at Portsmouth, within his own Diocese of Winchester, which were merely typical of what was being witnessed in many other places. This protest was addressed to one Captain Vaughan, who appears to have been placed in a position of authority in that town by Somerset. Gardiner said that he had been informed of "a great and detestable innovation" therein, the images of our Saviour and the saints having been pulled down and destroyed. He declared that he wrote to both the Captain and the Mayor, because he regarded them as the King's chief ministers in the locality, and added that if things had not gone too far and the so-called Reformers, or as he rightly styled them, the Lollards, were not entirely beyond admonition, he would send a special preacher on the following Sunday to see what he could do to bring them to repentance, while he would never either preach himself or ask any other priest to preach to a crowd bent on the destruction of the sacred images; "for, as Scripture willeth us, we should cast no precious stones before hogs." He declared that those engaged in the iconoclastic campaign were hogs and worse than hogs, pointing out that: "In England they were called Lollards, who, denying images, thought there withal the crafts of painting and graving to be generally superfluous and naught, and against God's laws." Further, he declared that in Germany those who maintained that opinion were accounted the dregs of Luther's brewings, and Luther himself had written a book against them. When in Germany he had seen with his own eyes the images standing in all the churches wherein Luther was held in estimation. Still further, he pointed out that images were documents which even the unlettered could read.

Vaughan's method of treating this communication was to send it on to the Protector, to whom Gardiner had also written. Somerset dealt with the remonstrance in very leisurely fashion, and there can be no doubt that he desired the removal of the crucifixes and other holy figures. When his reply was sent at last it was a very elaborate document, and Mr. Gairdner expresses the theory that it was drafted by Cranmer. It opened with a suggestion that the Bishop was too easily alarmed and flurried and that the best way of preserving the statues from more widespread destruction was to display no anxiety when any of them were demolished. It was admitted that Henry had not desired the destruction of all images, but only of "such as did adulterate God's glory," and it was asked how could it be worse to burn a statue than a copy of the Bible, which was often done when certain people objected to a particular translation. Somerset, it will be seen, was merely jibing at Gardiner. Finally it was pretty plainly declared that wherever images became a cause of contention they were better removed than retained, and that had Gardiner acted on this principal there would have been no mob violence at Portsmouth. Before, however, this elaborate piece of insolence had reached Gardiner the latter had again written Somerset complaining that he was allowing various unorthodox books to be put into circulation. Two of the worst of these were from the pen of Bale, afterwards to become one of the Reformed Bishops. One of these eulogized Anne Askew, whom Henry VIII. burned because she denied the Real Presence, and the other offered equally extravagant homage to Luther, whose errors the late King had taken particular pleasure in confuting. On all sides there was a wild license in the matter of writing, and the most fantastic doctrines were being offered to the people, as if the Protector and his colleagues were bent on subverting all definite religion, although it was quite certain that Henry had desired nothing of the kind. Abominable songs and doggerel rhymes ridiculing the sacraments were being chanted in the streets, without effort to stay the scandal.

To this remonstrance Somerset replied in terms very similar to those in which he had answered the previous one. He declared that he conceived it originated mainly in the Bishop's great fear of innovations—a fear which he did not blame. He went on, however, to point out that the world was never so quiet or united that printers, players and preachers would not set forth somewhat of their own heads of which the magistrates were unaware. Gardiner had seen more than he had of those objectionable rhymes; but he must not lay them to the Protector's charge. Even under the tyranny of Rome, Pasquin spoke freely, and during the late reign in England many such things were unpunished. It seemed that Gardiner had been very much dissatisfied with the recent alleged recantation of Dr. Richard Smith, which seems, however, to have been genuine enough. To the Bishop of Winchester he was "omnis homo mendax," but Somerset insisted that he was a learned man and his recantation voluntary. As for Lent, the Protector saw no reason for its absolute abolition, unless the King with his Council issued an order to this effect. Inasmuch as he dominated both King and Council, Gardiner was unlikely to attach undue weight to this assurance. Finally, the Bishop was reminded that quiet might be as easily broken by jealousy as by carelessness. It will be seen that Somerset was merely fencing and playing with his Lordship, who already realized what a fool he had been and that the remnants of the Catholic faith in England was in dire peril. Once more he wrote to the Protector, telling of the outrages he had witnessed at Portsmouth, of a figure of the crucified Saviour with an eye drilled out and a hole cut in its side, as well as of his failure to arrest the guilty persons because they had been helped across the seas. In the course of this letter he gave a very interesting account of his relations with Henry VIII., which showed that that choleric monarch could on occasion tolerate frank advice, although when first offered he might resent it. The picture he drew showed the licentious King in better case than might be expected from his usual behavior. The truth probably is that Henry, whose natural ability for statecraft was undeniable, realizing that the more of the canonically appointed Bishops he could retain by him after his breach with the Pope the better it would be for himself, was determined not to quarrel with Gardiner. At any rate, the latter told Somerset that:

"When I saw in my doings was no hurt, and sometimes, by the occasion thereof, the matter amended, I was not so coy as always to reverse my argument; nor, so that his affairs went well, did I ever trouble myself whether he made me a wanton or not. And when such as were privy to his letters directed unto me were afraid I had been in high displeasure (for the terms of the letters sounded so), yet I myself feared it nothing at all. I esteemed him, as he was, a wise prince; and whatsoever he wrote or said for the present, he would after consider the matter as wisely as any man, and neither hurt nor inwardly disfavor him that had been bold with him; whereof I serve for a proof, for no man could do me hurt during his life. And when he gave me the bishopric of Winchester he said he had often squared with me, but he loved me never the worse; and for a token thereof gave me the bishopric. And once, when he had been vehement with me in the presence of the Earl of Wiltshire, and saw me dismayed with it, he took me apart into his bed chamber and comforted me, and said that his displeasure was not so much to me as I did take it; but he misliked the matter, and he durst more boldly direct his speech to me than to the Earl of Wiltshire. And from that day forward he could not put me out of courage, but if any displeasant words passed from him, as they did sometimes, I folded them up in 'the matter;' which hindered me a little. For I was reported unto him that I stooped not and was stubborn, and he had commended unto me certain men's gentle nature (as he called it) that wept at every of his words; and methought that my nature was as gentle as theirs, for I was sorry when he was moved. But else I know when the displeasure was not justly grounded in me, I had no cause to take thought, nor was I at any time in all my life miscontent or grudging at anything done by him, I thank God for it."

It is quite evident that something like mutual affection united Henry VIII. and the Bishop of Winchester, but it must not be forgotten that the latter had secured the confidence of the tyrant by an unscrupulous subserviency to his purposes, involving a base violation of his episcopal oath of loyalty to the Vicar of Christ. Indeed, it is abundantly plain that even at the time now under review Gardiner was still far from having returned to his true allegiance and was still cherishing the dream which he had helped to nurture in the fevered brain of Henry, that, namely, of a national Church under the headship of a lay sovereign and a lay Parliament. The best evidence of this is that while he was protesting to Somerset any alteration in the ancient Catholic ritual, or in the doctrine or sacraments of the Church, he was pointing out that: "Nothing would serve the policy of the Bishop of Rome better than an alteration of religion during the King's minority, suggesting that whenever his authority was abolished religion would be changed with every change of government." This, of course, was the argument of a man who sought the perpetuation of schism.

At this precise moment, however, Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury, was pushing forward one of those schemes for the Lollardising of the Church in England to the accomplishment of which Gardiner so strongly objected and to the success of which his close association with Henry VIII. had been so long an obstacle. Two further letters from him to Somerset, both written in June, makes this plain. Cranmer was reviving a proposal for the use of certain homilies which had been the subject of discussion in convocation five years before (in 1542). Nothing had been done about them then, and Gardiner did not think it advisable, or even legitimate, to take action upon them now. It might even revive the "vain rumors" that had been stopped by the Protector's proclamation. The Archbishop's authority, however, prevailed, and the "First Book of Homilies" was issued on the 31st of July. The royal injunctions of Edward VI. were also issued on the same day. The Protector and the Archbishop had resolved to make some alterations in the King's name, even during his minority. Commenting on this development, Professor Gairdner says: "And thus began a new stage of the infant Reformation. A policy of innovation had triumphed, and royal supremacy was now to be the warrant even for acts done in a minority. Royal supremacy! Many men had been ill enough reconciled to that principle even in the days of Henry VIII. But it had been established in his days, not only by extraordinary skill and diplomacy in the first place, bringing about the submission of the clergy and the Act of Supremacy itself, but also by the ruthless way it was enforced against two or three small bands of martyrs, who could not be persuaded to give up allegiance to Rome. A few victims, brutally executed, were naturally quite enough; very few cared to follow them and merit death for the Pope's sake; and when Rome's authority was abolished there was no other authority in spiritual matters but the King's. Besides, in such things the majority of his subjects would naturally find it easier to trust a King who seemed so well versed in questions alike of Church and State. If this great, powerful, diplomatic sovereign knew his own ground in a controversy with the Pope, even though he did carry matters somewhat further than any of his predecessors had done, who among all his faithful liegemen was likely to take exception to his acts? But the authority of a boy stood quite on a different footing; and even in ordinary matters of government his father had attempted to guard against serious changes being made during any minority which might occur after his own day. For just after his marriage with Jane Seymour in 1536, the year before young Edward was born, Henry VIII. had procured an Act of Parliament to be passed, giving any of his successors who should come to the throne under age power to annul by letters patent any Acts of Parliament that had been passed during his earlier years as soon as he should reach the age of twenty-four. This statute, if it were allowed to remain in force, could not but act as a very serious restraint on unnecessary legislation during the minority; and it certainly seems to have been regarded by those who knew it as a provision that ought to have been respected. But of course no Act of Parliament could bind a future legislature, and as Somerset found it inconvenient he very soon got it repealed, as will presently be shown. Meanwhile, however, he was not to be restrained from doing precisely as he intended to do, even in matters concerning the Church." To the new "Homilies," Bonner, Bishop of London, refused to give more than a modified acceptance, while Gardiner refused to recognize them at all. Both were arrested and imprisoned in the Tower.

Gardiner had rejected the "Homilies" on the ground that they contained novel and heretical matter. Cranmer had him brought from the Tower to the house of the Dean of St. Paul's to discuss with him the "Homily on Salvation," but he could not accept the arguments with which he was sought to be convinced, and when the debate was over he wrote to Somerset: "Where Scripture and doctors want (fail) my Lord of Canterbury would fall to arguing and overcome me, that am called the sophister, by sophistry." A little later he wrote again: "I am charged that all the realm hath received these homilies without contradiction, save I; whereunto I answer, I think they have not read what I have read in these books." Even now, however, in the very midst of his battle for liberty, if not for life, he could not refrain from gibing at the Pope. Let us hear Professor Gairdner: "There was absolutely no justification for his cruel imprisonment except that he had an opinion of his own, for which he was prepared to give reasons. He was quite ready to yield to weightier reasons if they could be produced, and he had not been guilty of one act of disobedience. He pointed out that Cranmer's teaching on justification was, even by his own words, 'We be justified by faith without all works of the law: charity is a work of the law: *ergo,* we are justified without charity'—a conclusion which, even as a scholastic exercise, it would be difficult to defend; and Gardiner was ready to produce an answer made twelve hundred years before. But it was not necessary to import scholastic questions into 'the use and practice' of the Church of England. 'And it was a terrible matter to think on,' he adds, 'to see such a contention to rise upon a matter not necessary to be spoken of. Wherein, if my Lord of Canterbury will needs travail, my judgment is that he shall never persuade that faith excludeth charity in justification, unless he borrow of your Grace's authority prisons; and then he shall percase have some agree unto it, as poor men kneel at Rome when the Bishop there goeth by—that is to say, are knocked on the head with a halbert if they kneel not; for that is one piece of the office of the Bishop of Rome's guard.'" All this time the Bishop was very ill, suffering much from his close imprisonment in the noisome atmosphere of the Tower, but his confinement gave him ample leisure to study the "Homilies," with the result that he declared them, as a whole, to be an "abomination." By this time the mob of London had got into the habit of assaulting and generally misusing priests whom they met in the thoroughfares of the city. So gross was the conduct of the assailants of the clergy even Somerset felt obliged to put some check on it. Accordingly, the following proclamation was issued:

"Forasmuch as the misorders of the serving men and other young and light persons and apprentices in London towards priests and those that go in scholars' gowns like priests hath of late, both in Westminster Hall and in other places of the City of London, been so great that not only it hath offended many men, but also (might?) have given great occasion, if on the parts of the said priests more wisdom and discretion had not been showed than of the other, of sedition and murder, or, at the least, of such other inconveniences as are not to be suffered in a commonwealth; as to the King's Highness and his most entirely beloved uncle, the Duke of Somerset, Governor of his most Royal Person and Protector of all his realms, dominions and subjects and the rest of his Majesty's Council, hath been credibly and certainly reported and showed: For reformation whereof the King's Majesty, by the advice of his said most dear uncle and other his Majesty's Council, willeth and straitly commandeth that no serving man nor apprentice or any other person, whatsoever he or they be, shall use hereafter such insolency and evil demeanor towards priests as reveling, tossing of them, taking violently their caps and tippets from them without just title or cause, nor otherwise to use them than as becometh the King's most loving subjects, one to do towards another, upon pain that whosoever shall do the contrary, and be upon the same taken with the manner, or if he shall appear upon complaint made by sufficient trial of witness or otherwise before the King's Highness' Council, or the Mayor, Sheriffs or other sufficient judges to whom the complaint shall be made, the person thereof to be guilty; that then such offender or offenders, according to the quality of the fact for the time and place where it was committed, to suffer pain of imprisonment or other corporal pain to the example of all others, as to the discretion of the said Lord Protector, the King's Majesty's Council or of the judges before whom the same is proved, seem convenient, which shall be such that by the punishment of a few all others may be afraid to use such insolency, violency and ill demeanor against any of the King's Majesty's subjects.

"God Save the King."

The compliment paid to the clergy in this proclamation for refraining from reprisals against their assailants not improbably signifies that they had many sturdy sympathizers whom they restrained. Somerset did not want the streets of the English capital filled with brawling rioters. Moreover, the first Parliament of the young King's reign had just been opened by him in person on the 4th of November—the proclamation was issued on the 12th—and although that assembly was packed from stem to stern, the Protector wanted all the leisure he could find to devote to its management.

Simultaneously with the opening of Parliament the two Houses of Convocation had assembled, and it was well known that the minor clergy, at any rate, were mostly desirous of securing to the Church some share of the liberties of which it had been deprived under Henry VIII. Four petitions were presented, respectively as follows:

"First, that ecclesiastical laws may be made and established in this realm by thirty-two persons, or so many as shall please the King's Majesty to name or appoint, according to the effect of a late statute made in the thirty-fifth year of the most noble King and of the most famous memory, King Henry VIII., so that all judges ecclesiastical, proceeding after those laws, may be without danger and peril.

"Also, that according to the ancient customs of this realm, and the tenor of the King's writs for the summoning of the Parliament, which be now, and ever have been, directed to the Bishops of every diocese, the clergy of the Lower House of Convocation may be adjoined and associated with the Lower House of Parliament; or else that all such statutes and ordinances as shall be made concerning all matters of religion and causes ecclesiastical, may not pass without the sight and assent of the said clergy.

"Also, that whereas, by the commandment of King Henry VIII., certain prelates and other learned men were appointed to alter the service in the Church, and to devise other convenient and uniform order therein, who according to the same appointment did make certain books, as they be informed; their request is that the said books may be seen and perused by them, for a better expedition of divine service to be set forth accordingly.

"Also, that men being called to spiritual promotions or benefices may have some allowance for their necessary living and other charges, to be sustained and borne, concerning the said benefices, in the first year wherein they pay the first-fruits."

Cranmer, who presided, favored none of these proposals, and they eventually came to nothing. He insisted that what was wanted most of all was such a reform of the Church as would get rid of "the remaining Papal abuses." By these words he referred to most of the sacraments, as well as other things. No one, however, can tell the story of what actually happened better than Professor Gairdner. He says: "As early as the 12th of November a bill 'for the Sacrament of the Altar' was read in that house for the first time, and it obtained a second reading on the 15th. Moreover, on the 17th it was again read twice; but whether this particular bill went further is not clear. On the 26th a bill for receiving the sacrament under both kinds was read a first time. This was singular, for the proposal was not laid before Convocation till four days later. Then on the 3d of December a bill was introduced 'for the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ,' which was committed to the judges, Marvin and Portman. On the 7th it seems to have been read a second time, and on the 10th it passed, notwithstanding the opposition of Bishops Bonner, of London; Thirlby, of Norwich; Skyp, of Hereford; Heath, of Worcester, and Day, of Chichester. It then went down into the Commons, where it received four successive readings and passed on the 17th. How to interpret all these facts precisely we do not know; but the definite issue was an Act of Parliament (I. Edw. VI., cap. 1) punishing revilers of the sacrament and ordering that it should be hereafter administered in both kinds. And the reasons by which the former part of the Act was justified may undoubtedly be pondered with some profit historically. For in the preamble, among other things, we read as follows:

"The said sacrament . . . has been of late marvelously abused by such manner of men before rehearsed, who of wickedness, or else of ignorance and want of learning, for certain abuses heretofore committed of some in misusing thereof, having condemned in their hearts and speech the whole thing, and contemptuously depraved, despised or reasoned the same most holy and blessed sacrament, and not only disputed and received unreverently and ungodly of that most high mystery, but also, in their sermons, preachings, readings, lectures, communications, arguments, talks, rhymes, songs, plays or jests, name or call it by such vile and unseemly words as Christian ears do abhor to hear rehearsed."

It was not without difficulty this measure, changing the entire system of administration of the Most Holy Sacrament, was forced through the House of Commons, while still greater opposition had to be overcome in the House of Lords, wherein it was first introduced. Here Gardiner could not play the part he would undoubtedly have liked to take, while eleven of the Bishops, whose sympathies were with him, were prevented attending. The five, however, who were present fought the bill step by step, and when it was passed in their despite, entered a solemn protest in the journals of the House.

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CATHOLICISM AND ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

I.

WE PROPOSE in the following pages to examine the influence of Catholicism on three English Protestant authors of the eighteenth century, viz., the poet William Cowper; the author of "Robinson Crusoe," Daniel Defoe, and the novelist Samuel Richardson, premising that in Cowper's case the effect of intercourse with Catholics on his writings was almost entirely negative in its action, though on his private life it had a most salutary and happy influence. It was a ray of sunshine piercing the terrible gloom which overshadowed his soul from time to time, the gloom of religious mania, that most mysterious of all God's chastisements, into the direct presence of which we shrink from entering without due reverence, for we feel we are upon holy ground. It is with his life as expressed in his most delightful letters, rather than with his poetry, that we shall have to deal to illustrate the theme of this article.

William Cowper was born on November 26, 1731, at Great Berkhampstead, Hertfordshire, of which place his father was the rector; he was delicate from his infancy; he lost his mother, whose picture he has immortalized in one of his poems,[1] in 1737, and in 1741 was sent to Westminster School, where the gentle, sensitive boy suffered much from the tyranny and positive cruelty of his schoolfellows; on leaving school at eighteen he was articled for three years to a solicitor, a Mr. Chapman, and in 1748 entered the Middle Temple to finish his studies as a barrister. It was while living here that his first derangement attacked him in 1753. He recovered from this and did not have another attack of melancholia until ten years later. He then left London and went at first to St. Alban's, to be under the medical care of a Dr. Cotton, for whom he always retained a warm affection. He now gave up his profession, for which he never seems to have had any attraction, and on recovering from his mental trouble gradually gave himself up to the pursuit of literature, for which he had always had a strong liking, and in 1765 went to Huntingdon to live. While here he made the acquaintance of William Unwin, a celebrated Evangelical clergyman, and his wife, and became a convert to the strictest form of Evangelicalism.

The two great religious movements of the time were among dissenters in Methodism, with Whitfield and Wesley as the leaders, and in the Established Church, Evangelicalism, where a form of Quietism also prevailed. The Methodists were far the most numerous; to them belonged the lower middle classes, while the Evangelical party embraced the clergy and the upper middle classes, with Lady Huntingdon at the head.

The acquaintanceship with the Unwins soon ripened into friendship, and culminated in the poet going to live with them, till Mr. Unwin was killed, two years later. As Cowper's attacks of madness always took the form of religious mania, the life at Huntingdon must have been especially bad for him, for the greater part of their days was spent in reading the Bible and attending church services and prayer meetings.

Mrs. Unwin was much younger than her husband, and at this time was, even according to Lady Hesketh, Cowper's first cousin, who had no love for her, cheerful and blessed with a fund of quiet humor, though at the same time she was prim and extremely Puritanical. She seems to have been homely in her manner and tastes, rarely going into the little society the neighborhood offered and devoting herself to the care of Cowper, when his attacks of melancholia came on, with extraordinary devotion. After Mr. Unwin's death Cowper continued to live with his widow for the rest of her life; indeed, it was said that he contemplated marrying her, but this is denied by Southey in his life of Cowper, who says that their relations were always those of a son and a mother. In one of Lady Hesketh's letters[2] she says that the poet once told her that he had always looked upon Mrs. Unwin, who was seven years older than himself, as a mother. From the beginning of their acquaintance Cowper had been greatly drawn to her, and she for her part, being a woman of strong affections, lavished a mother's love and care upon the poet, whom she always addressed as Mr. Cowper, while he called her by her Christian name, Mary. His beautiful well-known lines "To Mary" are addressed to her.

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[1] "On the Receipt of My Mother's Picture," Cowper's poems.

In September, 1767, Mrs. Unwin and Cowper moved to Olney, into a dismal, prison-like, tumble-down old house near the worst part of Olney, which in its best locality is a most unattractive town, and the only person Cowper was on visiting terms with there was the curate, the celebrated John Newton, who was the magnet which drew Mrs. Unwin and the poet to Olney. The vicar was one Moses Brown, a pluralist and a non-resident parson, while John Newton was one of the most shining lights of the Evangelical Revival.

Mr. Newton acted as a sort of Protestant director to both Mrs. Unwin and Cowper, and showed his practical sense by making them move out of the damp, gloomy house they had chosen to one adjoining his in a better part of the town. His influence, however, had a disastrous effect on the sensitive, shy, delicate Cowper, whom he made pray aloud at public meetings and sent to visit the poor, and kept both him and Mrs. Unwin in a continual round of religious exercises, without allowing them any distractions, and as might have been foreseen, the unhappy poet was soon seized with another attack of melancholia. Seeing it coming on, Mr. Newton asked Cowper to contribute to the celebrated volume of Olney Hymns he was about to publish,[3] but about this time the only brother of William Cowper died, and another derangement was the result. He now believed himself cut off entirely from Almighty God, and his mental sufferings were acute. For sixteen months Mrs. Unwin attended him with unwearying devotion, when Cowper moved to the vicarage where Mr. Newton lived, and refused to leave until, after bearing it for several months, Mr. Newton sent for Dr. Cotton, and under his care the poet recovered. Soon after this Mr. Newton left Olney for St. Mary's, Woolnoth, in London, to which he had been promoted, and his departure was a very good thing for Cowper, whose soul he left to the care of a dissenting minister named Bull, who introduced the poet to the writings of

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[2] "Letters of Lady Hesketh."

[3] Cowper's best hymns in this collection were "Hark, My Soul, It Is the Lord;" "God Moves in a Mysterious Way," "There Is a Fountain Filled With Blood" and "Jesus, Where'er Thy People Meet."

Madame Guyon, the Quietist, and set him to translate them, and the result was some of his most beautiful poems, breathing as they do a most passionate love for God and showing an intimate knowledge of the interior life, and its heights and depths, its lights and shadows, expressed in exquisitely musical verse.

The following verses, taken from a long poem "On the Vicissitudes Experienced in the Christian Life,"[4] will exemplify this:

> My peace of heart is fled; I know not where
>   My happy hours, like shadows, pass'd away;
> Their sweet remembrance doubles all my care,
>   Night darker seems succeeding such a day.
>
> Has hell a pain I would not gladly bear,
>   So Thy severe displeasure might subside?
> Hopeless of ease, I seem already there,
>   My life extinguished and yet death denied.
>
> . . . .
>
> When Love departs, a chaos wide and vast
>   And dark as hell is opened in the soul.
> When love returns, the gloomy scene is past;
>   No tempests shake her, and no fears control
>
> . . . .
>
> Live Thou and reign forever, dearest Lord!
>   My last, least offering I present Thee now.
> Renounce me, leave me, and be still adored;
>   Slay me, my God, and I applaud the blow.

Cowper now gave himself up to various occupations, besides that of writing, of which the chief were drawing, gardening and carpentering, in all of which he excelled. He made a greenhouse in the garden, which they used as a summer house, in which he spent a good deal of time writing or drawing, with his favorite pets, some tame hares, at his feet.

Mrs. Unwin, now recognizing how necessary mental occupation was for him, if another attack of melancholia was to be warded off, suggested he should write a poem on "The Progress of Error." This he did, and followed it with "Truth, Hope, Expostulation, Charity," etc., which were published in book form. This first volume was badly reviewed, but the reviewer quoted the poet's own lines in criticism of it:

> The cold harangue, and cold as it is clear,
> Falls soporific on the listless ear.

Newton wrote a very serious preface to this first book, which, written under his influence and Mrs. Unwin's, would never have survived if it had not been followed by "The Task," suggested by a very different kind of person, Lady Austen, a young, beautiful, cultured, vivacious widow, who had seen a great deal of the world and traveled a good deal, and was almost too lively for Cowper. He was introduced to this charming woman in 1781, and she so fascinated the poet and Mrs. Unwin that she took up her abode close to them for some months. She told Cowper the story of

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[4] Cowper's poems.

John Gilpin one evening, and he lay awake most of the night laughing over it, and the next morning sat down and wrote his immortal verses[5] on this "citizen of credit and renown." She also suggested "The Sofa," which afterwards grew into "The Task," which was to Evangelicalism very much what "Paradise Lost" was to Puritanism, and had a great success.

Charming and lively a companion as Lady Austen was, her influence on Cowper's life was rather disturbing than restful or happy, for she unfortunately fell in love with him, and they quarreled. The first quarrel took place a year after their friendship began; they used to correspond, and in some of Lady Austen's letters she, who always idealized everybody, took such an exaggerated and sentimental view of his gifts, that he reproved her for it, and she took offense and sent him such an angry letter that the poet declared their friendship was at an end and could never be renewed. This quarrel was made up by the lady sending Cowper some ruffles she worked for him, and in return he laid his next volume of poems at her feet, and she took a house at Clifton large enough to enable her to entertain Cowper and Mrs. Unwin, as well as other visitors, and proposed to invite them to come and stay with her. But a final rupture took place between them in 1774, when the poet discovered, what was obvious to any one else at the time of their first quarrel, that the charming widow was in love with him, and he who did not reciprocate this feeling, but desired that their friendship should be on platonic lines, wrote her a letter, which is unfortunately not included in the four large volumes of his Letters,[6] since Lady Austen committed it to the flames as soon as read, and thus terminated what might perhaps have been a pleasant friendship for Cowper. He felt he owed too much to Mrs. Unwin to contemplate marriage with any one else, and no doubt he also felt that it would be very wrong of him to marry, subject as he was to these recurring fits of religious mania. Lady Austen recovered from this disappointment sufficiently to marry a Frenchman, named Tardiff, a year or two later; but she passed out of Cowper's life when she burned his offending letter.

There was one other person to whom he was much attached, and who also exercised a beneficial influence on him, before he made the acquaintance of the Throckmortons, and this was his first cousin, Lady Hesketh, a buxom, affectionate widow, to whom many of his letters are addressed, and who from time to time came to stay with him, but she cordially disliked Mrs. Unwin, though they managed to get on very well together, especially during the earlier years of their acquaintance, when Lady Hesketh was very grateful to her for her care of her cousin during his terrible attacks. Later, after Mrs. Unwin had had a stroke of paralysis, Lady Hesketh thought her very irritable and exacting and that the devotion poor Cowper then showed her was bad for him and aggravated his own malady, as it probably did.

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[5] "The History of John Gilpin," by W. Cowper.

[6] "Letters of William Cowper," four volumes.

About the time of his final rupture with Lady Austen his acquaintance with the Throckmortons, a Catholic family, began, and for the rest of his life this friendship was a most beneficial and happy element in it. Mr. and Mrs. Throckmorton, afterwards Sir John and Lady Throckmorton, lived at Weston Hall, about a mile from Cowper's house at Olney. John Throckmorton and his brother George were the sons of an old Catholic baronet, Sir Robert Throckmorton, of Buckland. They were both highly cultivated men and delightful companions for poor Cowper. The John Throckmortons were quite young married people when Cowper first knew them, and Mrs. John, as she was then called, is described as very charming, handsome, kind and cheerful. Ever since Mrs. Unwin and Cowper went to live at Olney they had had a key given them to the Throckmortons' delightful grounds, and enjoyed the privilege, which they greatly appreciated, of walking in them, and when the young couple came to settle down at Weston Underwood, they invited the poet and Mrs. Unwin to a garden party to see a balloon ascend, and they both went.

Another day they were caught in a storm while walking in the park and took shelter under a large elm. Mrs. John saw them and asked them into the house, and from that day a friendship sprang up between the two families, which was never interrupted and contributed some of the happiest years to the tragically sad life of the poet.

Terrible as the anguish of his attacks was, their severity was to some extent mitigated by the fact that Cowper was able to attribute them entirely to the hand of God, and to accept them as coming from Him. The awful mystery of insanity was no mystery to him, since it was so clear to his strong faith in Providence that the diseases of the mind were just as much a visitation from Almighty God as any bodily illness. After his second derangement he labored under the delusion that he was lost, and in one of his Letters says that for many years he never even ventured to ask so much as a blessing on his food. In another of his Letters he says: "A king may forbid a man to appear before him, and it were strange if the King of kings could not do the same. I know it to be His will that I should not enter into His presence now. When the prohibition is taken off I shall enter, but in the meantime I should neither please myself nor Him by entering." In a letter dated August 14, 1784, to William Unwin, Mrs. Unwin's son, a constant correspondent and a great friend of Cowper's, he says: "I hear that Mr. Throckmorton is making another balloon, a paper one, containing sixteen quires. It is to fly upon the wings of ignited spirits, and I hope to be invited to see it ascend."

In the next letter we read that he was invited, but that the ascent took place at 10 o'clock at night, and that it was too dark for them to go, but in the following letter it is recorded that they went and watched the ascent by daylight.

In the first book of "The Task" the following lines refer to John Throckmorton:

> Thanks to Benevolus, he spares me yet
> These chestnuts ranged in corresponding lines.

Frequent mention is made in the letters of presents of game and fish from the Throckmortons, showing the kindly relations existing between the two houses. In 1785 Mr. Throckmorton gave Cowper the key to his kitchen garden, with permission to eat the fruit when they liked, and this was a great favor, as this key had never been given to any one before, since this garden was the Throckmortons' own favorite walk. Mr. Throckmorton had just cut down a place called the Spinney, which had been Cowper's favorite resort, so admission to the kitchen garden atoned for this.

After first making the acquaintance of the Throckmortons, Cowper, writing to his friend, William Unwin, says: "They are Papists, but much more amiable than many Protestants." In a letter to Lady Hesketh in 1786 he says: "Nothing can be more obliging than the behavior of the Throckmortons has ever been to us." In this letter he describes how Mr. Throckmorton's bailiff had made a most annoying mistake, and instead of topping some shrubs as told, he had cut them all down in a certain charming serpentine walk in the grounds at Weston in his master's absence from home, and Mrs. Throckmorton told Cowper she had never seen her husband so angry in her life.

Trifling incidents like this form a large part of the matter of the letters, but they are told in so delightful a style that they never seem insignificant. The great charm of Cowper's letters was that they were so perfectly natural. He never wrote with any ulterior thought of future publication, but just for the sake of writing to please his friends, and to keep them "au courant" with all that happened in his daily life.

In 1786 Mrs. Unwin and Cowper moved into a house at Weston, belonging to the Throckmortons. It was large and convenient and in the middle of what the poet declared was one of the prettiest villages in England. It was the kind generosity of Lady Hesketh that enabled them to make this move. Here they were able to enjoy access daily to all the gardens and grounds belonging to the Throckmortons, and the intimacy between the two families increased.

Cowper writes: "The more I see of the 'Frogs,'" as he soon got to call the Throckmortons, "the more I like them. He is the most accomplished man of his years that I ever remember to have seen. She is cheerful and good-natured to the first degree, and is, as I suppose you know, a niece of Lord Petre's. His reserve and mine wear off, and he talks with great pleasure of the comfort he proposes to himself from our winter evening conversations. His purpose seems to be that we should spend them alternately with each other. Lady Hesketh transcribes for me now. When she is gone, Mrs. Throckmorton will take up that business, and will be my lady of the ink-bottle for the rest of the winter. She solicited herself that office."

The move from Olney to Weston Underwood did not please the bigoted Olney people at all, for at that time Catholics were looked upon with feelings of horror by Protestants, especially by Evangelicals, and Cowper, writing to Mr. Newton about this time, says that the Olney people have already reported that he has turned Papist. "You will know how to treat a lie like this, which proves nothing but the malignity of its author."

We are apt to forget in the twentieth century, when so much toleration is shown in England to the members of the Catholic Church, how bitter was the animosity borne against them in Cowper's day. We also forget another thing we should do well to remember, namely, that the bulk of the English people are still Protestant to the backbone. Outwardly they are more tolerant because more civilized, but inwardly their hatred of the Catholic religion is as deeply rooted as ever, except among a few Ritualists. In the eighteenth century Mass was said in London in what were called Mass-houses in the greatest secrecy, very often in a garret, but most frequently in public houses or small inns. A favorite Mass-house was the Ship, in Little Turnstile, Holborn, and another much frequented was in Cockpit Alley, Drury lane. Dr. Burton in his "Life of Bishop Challoner"[7] tells us that the Bishop used to preach to people in one of these public houses, where they sat round a table with a jug of beer in front of them, in case they were interrupted and arrested. The door was always carefully guarded and people were only admitted by a password. Sometimes the floor of the room above could be opened, so that persons in the upper story could also hear the sermon. Priests had to go about disguised as laymen, for their presence in England was forbidden.

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[7] "Life and Times of Bishop Challoner," by Edwin H. Burton. Longmans, 1909.

In private letters Catholics had to employ code words, lest their letters should fall into Protestant hands and they be betrayed. They also used aliases. Thus, the Pope was written of as Mr. Abraham, Bishop Petre as Mr. White and Dr. Challoner as Willard. There was no career for Catholics in England; they could not enter Parliament, nor were any of the professions open to them until the first Catholic Relief Acts of 1778 and 1791 were passed, which restored the elementary rights of inheritance and purchase of land and also made the presence of priests less dangerous. The second Act of Catholic Emancipation passed in 1829 made it lawful for Catholics to worship God in their own way, and removed other heavy civil disabilities. The passing of the first Acts led to the Lord George Gordon riots against Catholics in 1780, when the Bavarian and Sardinian Catholic chapels were wrecked by the Protestant mob and many houses of Catholics burned and the Bank of England and Newgate were attacked. Bishop Challoner was searched for with the intention of killing him, but he managed to escape, and died the following year.

All this being so, it will be seen that for Cowper, associated as he was with the vanguard of Evangelicalism, to be on intimate terms with such influential Catholics as the Throckmortons, required some courage on his part if he did not wish to lose his Protestant friends. At this time the chapels attached to the houses of Catholic noblemen and gentlemen were centres of Catholicism. There was always a priest and generally a congregation, even if a small one, on a Catholic estate; but these missions were precarious, for if the owner fell away from the faith or died, unless he was succeeded by a Catholic, the chapel was closed and the congregation dispersed. Even in London the only permanent chapels were those of the foreign embassies. Sir Robert Throckmorton's estate of Buckland, near Farringdon, was one on which the Mass had never died out since the Reformation. The Throckmortons had a resident chaplain, a Dr. Gregson, who became an intimate friend of our poet, and contributed much to lighten his unhappy lot, for when the Throckmortons were abroad or in London, Dr. Gregson remained at Weston Underwood in charge of the mission.

In one of his letters to Lady Hesketh, Cowper tells her that Dr. Gregson, whom he calls "the good-natured padre," had offered to transcribe for him during Mrs. Frog's absence in London, and that he had accepted the offer. The poet was at this time engaged in translating Homer, and he continues thus: "I have already invited the good padre in general terms, and he shall positively dine here next week, whether he will or not. I do not at all suspect that his kindness to Protestants has anything insidious in it, any more than I suspect that he transcribes Homer for me with a view for my conversion. He would find me a tough piece of business, I can tell him; for when I had no religion at all I had yet a terrible dread of the Pope. How much more now?"

In August, 1787, he writes "that Mr. George Throckmorton is now at the Hall. I thought I had known the brothers long enough to find out all their accomplishments, but I was mistaken." He now tells how they showed him a large portfolio filled with architectural drawings, executed by them both, in a most masterly manner, among others one of the Pantheon, in Rome."

Mr. John Throckmorton was an excellent landlord, and Cowper called him a "peerless neighbor," and writes that if he were asked who approached nearest to him in all his amiable qualities and qualifications, he should say his brother George.

In a letter to Lady Hesketh, Cowper mentions a queer but trifling little coincidence which happened as he was dining one evening with the Throckmortons. He had toothache badly and managed to draw his tooth in the middle of dinner, and discovered afterwards that Mrs. Throckmorton, who sat next him, being in a similar dilemma, drew hers also without either being aware what feats of amateur dentistry the other was performing. Cowper's tooth was so loose that he could neither eat nor speak till he had got rid of it. George Throckmorton and his youngest brother, Francis, and Mrs. Frog once played a practical joke upon Cowper. There was a curate at Weston named Canniford, whom the poet cordially hated, and one morning shortly after the curate had received a snubbing from the author of "The Task," the post brought Cowper a letter purporting to come from Mr. Canniford, who "presented his compliments to Mr. Cowper, and having heard that his friends from the Hall were going to dine with him the next day, he took the liberty to invite himself to eat a bit of mutton with him, being sure Mr. Cowper would be happy to introduce him to his friends."

Cowper was at first completely taken in, and said he knew the man was equal to it, and then he discovered that the envelope was directed by Mrs. Frog and the name Canniford spelled with a K.

In 1788 George Throckmorton became Cowper's transcriber, and pleased the poet very much by telling him that, having compared his fourth book of the "Iliad" with Pope's, he verily believes that Cowper will beat him, and is convinced that Pope spoiled his version by using rhyme. Cowper spent five years on his translation of Homer, which was published by subscription. He says of him in one of his letters "that Homer inculcates constantly the belief in a Providence; that he insists much on the duty of charity towards the poor and the stranger, and on the respect that is due to superiors and especially to our seniors, and dwells on the expediency and necessity of prayer and piety towards the gods, a piety mistaken, indeed, in its object, but exemplary for the punctuality of its performance. Thousands who will not learn from Scripture to ask a blessing either on their actions or their food may learn it if they please from Homer."

In one of his lighter moods Cowper, writing to his friend, the Presbyterian minister, William Bull, says he "supposes Homer was a Presbyterian, as he understands that the Church of England will have nothing to do with him; as for himself, he wishes he were a Hottentot or even a dissenter, so that his views of a hereafter were more comfortable.

Cowper was very shy, and also in a lighter mood he wrote in one of his letters these couplets:

> Here sit I
> Calling myself shy,
> Yet have just published, by-the-by,
> Two great volumes of poetry.

At Olney he lived the life of a hermit because he had no neighbors with whom he could associate, but at Weston he was visited by all round him and went out also. He was very fond of children, and when the Throckmortons were away the little Giffords, who lived with them, were left at Weston, and Cowper often mentions them in his letters to Mrs. Frog; he made a point of seeing them every day in the Throckmortons' absence and tells her anecdotes about them. One day the little boy, Tom Gifford, sent him a sprig of box, which Cowper acknowledged thus:

> Dear Tom, my muse this moment sounds your praise,
> And turns at once your sprig of box to bays.

All the poet's letters to Mrs. Frog and also all those to Mrs. George Throckmorton or Courtenay, for George Throckmorton took that name on his marriage, were in a light and happy vein. The congregation at the chapel at Weston Underwood in Cowper's time, including dependents and servants, numbered about two hundred. The chapel was formed out of one of the attics on the west side of the house. When the house was rebuilt in the nineteenth century two or three hiding holes were found, one of which was under the chapel communicating with it by a trap door.

Sir John Throckmorton was a member of the Catholic Committee and an opponent of Bishop Milner, who was at the head of those Bishops and Catholics who were not favorable to the Catholic application to Parliament for relief from some of their disabilities which the Catholic Committee were about to present. Cowper, writing to a friend in 1779, says apropos to this opposition: "I find from Mr. Throckmorton, who has just returned from London, that the Catholic application to Parliament is not likely to speed at present. The Bishop of London is not favorable to it, and he leads all the other Bishops, and the Bishops all together lead Mr. Pitt (then Prime Minister). The Chancellor is much their friend." Writing to his dear Mrs. Frog on March 21, this same year, he tells her he has just produced the poem on his mother's picture, and adds: "I am glad that your bill is not likely to come on this year. It will be introduced with much more probability of success when the present heat has somewhat abated. That our present episcopacy should carry things with so high a hand and that you should have to pay double price for living in your own country are two grievances that I cannot bear."

John Throckmorton took a very active part in the passing of the Acts of relief and in the great Catholic Emancipation Act, and Cowper, who was a strong Whig, thoroughly sympathized with these bills, in spite of his equally strong Protestantism. Writing in March, 1791, to Mrs. Frog, who had returned home sooner than her husband, who was detained by this business in London, Cowper says: "Tell Mr. Frog with my love that my charity for his religion will be all exhausted if it prove the occasion of keeping him in town all the summer. I have none even now for those who have thrown impediments in your way, though of your own persuasion. The doctor (Gregson) dines with us to-day, and I shall endeavor to learn from him what can possibly be their motives, for they are out of the reach of our most ingenious conjecture. I hope, however, that, maugre all such opposition, you will soon hold your lands on the same terms as others and be as rich as Providence designed you should be."

In this year two odes by Horace were recently discovered in Rome, and Mrs. Throckmorton transcribed them there for Cowper, and he wrote some verses to her on her transcript beginning:[8]

Maria, could Horace have guessed
  What honour awaited his ode,
To his own little volume addressed
  The honour which you have bestowed,
Who have traced it in characters here,
  So elegant, even and neat,
He had laughed at the critical sneer
  Which he seems to have trembled to meet.

Cowper suppressed a very bitter passage about Catholics in "The

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[8] Cowper's poems.

Task" on account of his friendship with the Throckmortons, but this was the only direct influence on his writing their acquaintance ever had. His letters show how bitterly anti-Catholic he was; nevertheless, his Whigism made him averse to all illiberality of treatment of Catholics. Thus, writing to his friend, Mr. Hill, he says: "The dissenters, I think, Catholics and others, have a right to the privileges of all other Englishmen, because to deprive them is persecution, and persecution on any account, but especially on a religious one, is an abomination."

Cowper was a very strict Sabbatarian, and in his "Progress of Error" attacked Charles Wesley because he sometimes fished on Sunday, saying that when he had prayed and preached the Sabbath down he concluded the day with wire and catgut, and asked:

> If apostolic gravity be free
> To play the fool on Sundays, why not we?
> If he the tinkling harpsichord regards
> As inoffensive, why not cards?[9]

Wesley once shocked Cowper by telling Lady Austen that it was quite lawful to allow young people to go to Ranelagh or Vauxhall, that there was nothing wrong in them, and that, in fact, the denial would be unreasonable, and therefore wrong.

He was most Puritanical in many of his ideas and had a horror of what he erroneously considered to savor of idolatry, as the following passage in one of his letters will show: "He that kneels before a picture of Christ is an idolator, but he whose heart the sight of such a picture kindles a warm remembrance of the Saviour's suffering must be a Christian. To love Christ is the greatest dignity of man, be that affection wrought in him how it may."

In 1791 the series of letters to a schoolmaster of a very ignorant type, named Samuel Teedon, began. This man, whom Goldwin Smith calls a charlatan, for the next few years exercised a most detrimental influence over Cowper, who at first looked upon him as rather a bore, but afterwards got to look up to him as an oracle. Teedon pretended to have revelations, which he and Cowper both called "notices," and he professed to interpret the visions and dreams which Cowper told him he had seen and dreamt. For two years and a half a most voluminous correspondence took place between the two, who sometimes wrote more than once a day to each other, for Teedon lived near Cowper.

During this period Cowper did nothing without consulting Teedon, who after praying would write and say he had received such and such a "notice" from heaven on the subject in question, and Cowper would then act upon it, whether the "notice" concerned a visit to his new friend, the poet Hayley, or whether it referred to writing or not writing on such and such a subject. Teedon thought himself to be a special favorite of Providence, and Cowper got to think so, too, while he always thought himself the object of God's abhorrence. From the year 1791 to 1794 Teedon and Cowper saw or wrote to each other every day.

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[9] "Progress of Error," Cowper's poems.

The darkest part of the poet's life dates from this time. In December, 1791, Mrs. Unwin had her first stroke of paralysis, and from this time the relations between the two were so far changed that from henceforth it was Cowper who devoted himself to the care of his former attendant, giving up the greater part of his time to amusing and waiting upon his old friend with the tenderness of a son. From now his mental suffering was more or less constant, gradually as time went on deepening into profound melancholia and ending in actual madness, but this was not yet.

In 1792 old Sir Robert Throckmorton died, and John Throckmorton succeeded to the title, and he and Lady Throckmorton now left Weston Underwood and went to Buckland to live, but Cowper missed them less than he would otherwise have done, because their place at Weston was taken by George Throckmorton, now George Courtenay, and his wife, Catherina, neé Stapleton, a great favorite of the poet, to whom he addressed several poems. In May, 1792, Mrs. Unwin had a second stroke of paralysis, much worse than the first. It happened while the poet Hayley was staying with them, and he was a great comfort to both of them in this trial, which was a terrible blow to poor Cowper, who watched and nursed her and administered the electrical operation which was tried, but ineffectually, to restore her. From this time poor Mrs. Unwin seems to have been a great object and a very trying and exacting patient, but that cannot excuse Lady Hesketh of great want of charity in writing of her as she did as "the enchantress" and chafing against poor Cowper's unwearying devotion to her, who had in former days been such a blessing to him when plunged in melancholia. Writing to a friend in 1792 he says: "My nocturnal experiences are of the most terrible kind. I live a life of terror." Mrs. Unwin's illness took from him all power to study; all thoughts of Homer and Milton were driven to a distance.

There is nothing in any of Cowper's correspondence to suggest that he ever discussed religion with either the Throckmortons or their chaplain, Dr. Gregson, who seems to have been a medical man as well as a priest, since he attended Mrs. Unwin in her illness, as we gather from some of the Letters. In July, 1792, the Courtenays returned to Weston from their honeymoon, and Cowper, writing to Lady Throckmorton, says of his first visit to them:

"George flew into the court to meet me, and Catharina sprang into my arms." There was always a playful tone in all his letters to Lady Throckmorton and Catharina, even when Mrs. Unwin was very ill and he suffering from mental depression. His last letter to Lady Throckmorton was in 1792, but he continued to correspond with Mrs. Courtenay for some years before the final shadow enveloped him.

In the early autumn of 1792 he and Mrs. Unwin went to stay for six weeks with the poet Hayley at his beautiful place, Eartham, and Cowper, writing to Catharina, says he had no conception that a poet could be the owner of such a paradise, but hastens to add that she must not think that amid all these beauties he will forget the peaceful but less splendid Weston, which he assures her will be as dear as ever to him on his return. In another letter to Catharina, from Eartham, he congratulates her on Sir John and Lady Throckmorton having departed from Paris two days before the terrible 10th of August, when the people of Paris rose armed and forced the Tuilleries and cut the Swiss Guards to pieces. Cowper's sympathies were all with the Parisians, and he wished them liberty, but he had the grace to be shocked by their sanguinary conduct. His daily toast for them was Sobriety and Freedom. In this letter he sends his love to Dr. Gregson and begs Catharina to let him know how his patient, Mrs. Unwin, is getting on.

In his letters to Catharina there is not a word of despondency, while all those to Teedon, written at the same date, teem with melancholy reflections and despairing thoughts, and in his correspondence with his friend, Mr. Rose, and the poet Hayley he constantly refers to his mental and spiritual sufferings. The Olney doctors wasted his strength with their drastic remedies, such as bleeding, emetics and other methods of the time, when he was suffering from an attack of melancholia.

In 1794 he and Mrs. Unwin were moved to Norfolk, where they lived the rest of their lives with a relative of the poet's, the Rev. John Johnson, and his pleasant friendship with the Throckmortons and Courtenays was thus interrupted and never renewed, and after a while poor Cowper was too ill to correspond with his beloved Catharina. Mrs. Unwin died two years after their move to Norfolk at East Dereham, and Cowper survived her four years, during which time Sir John Throckmorton paid him a visit, having had a fall from his horse on his way, and this is the last we hear of these Catholic friends who contributed so many happy hours to one of the saddest of lives.

After Mrs. Unwin's death he continued to work again at his away," one of his best minor poems, was written, in which he alludes to his own misery in the two concluding lines:

> But I, beneath a rougher sea,
> Am 'whelmed in deeper gulfs than he.

He died at East Dereham on April 25, 1800, and is buried in the churchyard there.

When we recall how bitter and deep were the feelings with which Catholics and the Catholic religion were regarded in England in the eighteenth century we cannot help speculating on what the many admirers of Cowper would have said and felt had they known that the great Evangelical poet was for many years on terms of great intimacy with some "Papists," whom he counted among his greatest friends. Their feelings of horror can only be imagined by those who have experienced the intense bitterness of Protestants of the type then so common in England against Catholics, a bitterness increased as it is even to-day by their hopeless ignorance and misapprehension of Catholic dogmas and practice.

II.

The influence of Catholicity upon the great pamphleteer of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was more extraordinary than upon William Cowper, first because he lived much earlier, dying the very year poor Cowper was born, consequently before any of the disabilities under which Catholics lived were removed; secondly, because this influence was shown in the most popular book that has perhaps ever been written in the English language, a book written for and read by a public plunged in the deepest depths of Protestantism, and yet presenting, apparently in spite of the author, a picture of a Catholic priest who realized the writer's highest ideal not only of morality, but of Christianity.

We wonder how many readers of "Robinson Crusoe," be they Catholic or Protestant, remember that the finest, the noblest, the most Christian character in the book, the man with the highest ideals, is not Crusoe, nor Friday, but the Catholic priest, a young French Benedictine monk, who was rescued from shipwreck by the captain of Crusoe's ship, in which he was returning in the second part of the story to visit his island and the Spaniards he had left there. Daniel Defoe was an audacious man, but that he should have had the audacity to paint such a picture and present it to his readers at that particular time of day is amazing. It is in the presumption that many admirers of that most delightful romance, the parent of the modern novel, have forgotten the finished portrait of a holy Catholic priest which Defoe has painted that we propose to pause a few minutes before the picture and examine its beauty.

Daniel Defoe, who was born in 1661, was the son of a butcher, an influential Nonconformist, and was himself intended for a Nonconformist minister; but this career was abandoned, and Defoe set up as a hosier in Cheapside. Upon the death of Charles II. in 1685 the great controversy which had been raging for several years as to whether the King's brother, the Duke of York, who was a Catholic, should on that account be excluded from the throne, ended in his accession under the title of James II., but Defoe felt so strongly on the subject that he joined Monmouth's rebellion and fought against the King at Sedgmoor, and to avoid being hanged by Judge Jeffreys, he absented himself from England and went to Spain and Portugal, ostensibly on business. On his return he began his career as a pamphleteer. At that time the form English literature preferred to assume was the pamphlet, which frequently was as long as a moderate-sized volume. The occasion was the King's Declaration for Liberty of Conscience in England, in which he as King set aside the penal laws against Catholics for the sake of their religion, and also against all dissenters from the Established Church.

Upon this Defoe published three pamphlets explaining to Dissenters, who had expressed their thanks to the King, that there was no need to thank a king for setting himself above the laws, though the laws might be some they would fain see abolished. Defoe was a born pamphleteer; he wrote tersely and naturally and drove his arguments home with great force, and he became immensely popular in this line, until in 1702 he landed himself in Newgate and the pillory. William III. died from a fall from his horse on March 8, 1702, and the accession of Queen Anne led to a renewal of petty spite, if not actual persecution, against Nonconformists, which prompted Defoe to write his celebrated pamphlet, called "The Shortest Way With Dissenters," in which he advocated that whosoever should be found in a conventicle should be banished and the preacher hanged. Commentators differ as to the interpretation to be put upon this pamphlet, some maintaining that he was satirizing the proposals of the day and writing with fine irony, while more modern critics maintain that he was not ironical at all, but was expressing his own opinion as to the best way to deal with Dissenters.

He was sentenced to stand three days in the pillory and thrown into Newgate Gaol by the Tory Government then in power on a charge of seditious libel. He now became a popular hero, till

Harley released him and employed him in Edinburgh as a Government spy or secret agent. Here he was instrumental in promoting the Union of England and Scotland, for which he enjoyed a small pension for a time, but he got into trouble again at the close of Queen Anne's reign by his writing, and was once more sent to Newgate, till the Queen released him in 1713. He now found his enemies were so bitter against him that his health broke down, and on his recovery he thought it better to give up political fireworks and take to fiction, and in 1719 produced his masterpiece, "Robinson Crusoe," which was followed by his other great work of imagination, "The Journal of the Plague," and that by other fiction. Perhaps Defoe, who had been abused by Whigs and Tories, High churchmen and Dissenters in turn, and had suffered at the hands of both political parties, wished to be revenged on his Protestant persecutors by presenting his readers with the picture of a Catholic priest as the embodiment of the highest virtue. Perhaps a nobler motive actuated him and truth compelled him to give us the portrait we will now examine.

There were two priests who were rescued in the story from shipwreck, an old man who nearly went mad with joy and this young Benedictine who on being taken on board Crusoe's vessel "threw himself flat on his face, prostrating himself in thankfulness for his deliverance, in which I unhappily and unseasonably disturbed him, really thinking he had been in a swoon; but he spake calmly; thanked me; told me he was giving God thanks for his deliverance; begged me to leave him for a few moments, and that next to his Maker he would give me thanks, and continued in that posture about three minutes."[10] This is the way in which the priest is introduced to us. Crusoe is surprised, but greatly edified, and the Benedictine, whom Defoe also calls the Abbé, now endeavors to modify the transports of his companions, who are beside themselves with joy.

Defoe, by making the priest prostrate himself, recognizes that Catholics worship God with their bodies as well as with their souls and spirits. In describing him he thinks it necessary to apologize to his readers for his virtues, which he does in the following terms: "It is true that this man was a Roman, and perhaps it may give offense to some hereafter if I leave anything extraordinary upon record of a man, whom before I begin I must set him out in just colors and represent in terms very much to his disadvantage in the account of Protestants; first, as that he was a Papist; secondly, a Popish priest; and thirdly, a French Popish priest. But justice demands of me to give him a due character, and I must say he was a grave, sober, pious and most religious person, exact in his life, extensive in his charity and exemplary in almost everything that he did. What, then, can any one say against my being very sensible of the value of such a man, notwithstanding his profession, though it may be my opinion as well as the opinion of others who shall read this that he was mistaken?"

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[10] "Robinson Crusoe," Part II.

Defoe evidently recognized that he was running grave risks in venturing to put a true portrait of a good Catholic priest before his readers, but he does not shrink from the task, and goes on to describe his first conversation with the Abbé on religion.

The priest says that although it is doubtless his duty to use his utmost endeavors to bring all the souls he can to the knowledge of the truth and to embrace the Catholic doctrine, still as he is there under Crusoe's permission and in his family, he is bound in justice to his kindness as well as in decency and good manners to be under his government, so he shall not enter into any debates on religion without Crusoe's leave.

Crusoe says he is not the first Catholic he has conversed with without falling into any inconvenience, and the Benedictine then says that though perhaps they would not join with him in prayer, yet he hopes that he may pray for them, and will do so also for a safe voyage. When they reach the island, after staying there for a few days, the priest goes to Crusoe and tells him with a very grave face and after a long preamble that there are three obstacles to God's blessing on his island which he would gladly see removed. Crusoe is very much astonished and inquires what these obstacles are, and in the answer we see the high moral principles by which the priest is governed.

"First," says the priest, "you have four Englishmen here who have taken women from among the savages and had children by them and are living with them without being married in any way, as the laws of God and man demand." He then goes on to explain to Crusoe that although he had no clergyman there to marry these people, yet that "the sacrament of matrimony consists not only in the mutual consent of the parties to take one another as man and wife, but in the formal and legal obligation that there is in the contract to compel the man and woman at all times to acknowledge and own each other. Now, these men may when they please abandon these women, disown their children, leave them to perish and take other women and marry them while these are living. How can God be honored in this unlawful liberty?"

For the first time this formal contract seems to have struck Crusoe, and he confesses to himself that he had been guilty of great neglect, but he tries to excuse himself by saying that it took place in his absence; but the priest won't listen to this, and says that he can put an end to the scandal at once by legally and effectually marrying them now by a written contract, signed and witnessed.

He then brings his second complaint against Crusoe, which is that these men had lived with these women for seven years, taught them to speak English and even to read it, yet had never said one word to them about the Christian religion, nor even taught them that there is a God or a worship, or that their own religion was false. He concludes by saying that although he and Crusoe do not acknowledge each other's religion, yet that they should both be glad to see these poor heathen taught the general principles of the Christian religion.

Crusoe, far from being offended, is so pleased that he takes the priest in his arms and embraces him, confessing that he himself till now has scarcely known what it is to be a Christian, and that he has missed the most essential part of the Christian religion, namely, to love the interest of the Christian Church and the good of other men's souls.

Here we pause for a moment to ask if it was not extraordinary that Defoe, a most bigoted Dissenter, himself writing at a time when no Catholic priest dared to show himself openly in England, when it was criminal to say or hear Mass, when the very name of Catholic was a reproach, should have dared to represent his ideal Christian as a Catholic priest, better versed in the true knowledge of Christian principles than himself? Is not it extraordinary, too, that the book in which he did this should have had a larger circulation and enjoyed a greater popularity than almost any other work of fiction and that among all sorts and conditions of Protestants? Surely this is one of the greater ironies of life.

The young monk then asks permission to teach these savages the fundamental truths of the Christian religion, and receives permission to do so. He then goes on to say that it is a maxim that ought to be received among all Christians, that the Christian religion ought to be propagated by all possible means, and that on this account the Catholic Church sends missionaries at the risk of their lives into all countries, and suggests that Crusoe should embrace the opportunity of converting the thirty-six souls on his island. Crusoe excuses himself from undertaking the task, as he is leaving shortly, but suggests that the Benedictine should remain and accomplish it. The priest says he will willingly undertake the work and thanks God for giving him such a call.

Defoe now testifies to his belief in the supernatural graces of this young monk by making Crusoe say: "I discovered a kind of rapture on his face as he spoke thus to me, his eyes sparkled like fire, his face glowed, his color went and came as if he had been fainting as he answered:

"Yes, sir; I would give Christ and the Blessed Virgin thanks all my days if I could be made the least happy instrument in saving the souls of these poor men, though I was never more to set foot off this island or see my native country." All that he asks is that Crusoe will leave Friday with him to interpret, but Crusoe objects to this, because he has made Friday a Protestant, so he agrees to leave Friday's father, who can speak Spanish. Robinson Crusoe sets to work himself and succeeds in converting the worst vagabond on the island, Will Atkins, and his savage wife to Christianity, and was amazed at the priest's joy at this conversion, seeing it was not to Catholicism, and questions him about it.

"Sir," says the young priest, "I am a Catholic of the Roman Church and a priest of the Order of St. Benedict, and I embrace all the principles of the Roman faith, yet, if you will believe me, I do not look upon you who are reformed without some charity. I dare not say, though I know it is our opinion, that you cannot be saved. I will by no means limit the mercy of Christ so far as to think that He cannot receive you into the bosom of His Church in a way to us unperceivable, and I hope you may have the same charity for us." He then goes on to explain that there is a great difference between a Protestant and a pagan who knows not God and says that he would rejoice if all the savages in America were to be brought to pray to God, though as Protestants at first, firmly believing that God would bring them into the pale of the true Church when He should see good.

Crusoe is represented as astounded at the priest's charity, and reflects that if such a temper were universal we might all be brought to be Catholics, whatever Church we belonged to; but he spoils this admission by saying that if all the members of his own persuasion were endowed with the same moderation they might soon all be Protestants, a climax his Benedictine friend could not have echoed.

Crusoe then gets the priest to talk to Will Atkins' wife, and thus comments on his discourse: "Surely, never was such a sermon preached by a Popish priest in these latter ages of the world, and as I told him I thought that he had all the knowledge, all the sincerity of a Christian without the errors of a Roman Catholic, and that I took him to be such a clergyman as the Roman Bishops were before the Church of Rome assumed spiritual sovereignty over the consciences of men."

Crusoe then gets the Benedictine to baptize the woman, and afterwards to marry her and Atkins, and Defoe then makes him, after resisting for a long time, consent to marry the three other couples on the island before the women have been baptized.

It is difficult to see why this young, enthusiastic priest did not remain on the island to minister to the Spanish Catholics there, instead of which he leaves with Crusoe, who first exacts a promise from Catholics and Protestants that they will all agree to live together in peace, Catholics on one side of the island and Protestants on the other side.

We are never told that the Spaniards ever availed themselves of the presence of this priest, during his stay on the island, to obtain the sacraments, but probably Defoe knew his public too well to venture upon describing this, so we must rest content in feeling sure that so religious a man as this French priest is represented to be would never have remained on the island three weeks without ministering to the spiritual wants of the members of his own communion, and probably arranged with them before he left either to return himself or send another priest to take charge of their souls, or at least to visit them periodically.

This, however, Defoe did not venture to record; the marvelous thing is that he dared to immortalize such a charming portrait of an ideal Catholic priest in a book intended for and read by millions of Protestants.

III.

Samuel Richardson, the originator of the English novel as distinguished from romance, was born in 1689 and died in 1761. He, therefore, was a contemporary of both Defoe and William Cowper, being born just as Defoe was beginning his career as a pamphleteer, and dying when Cowper was still living in Chambers in the Temple. It was a skeptical age, but Richardson, though a Protestant, was a deeply religious man, and his novels all have a high moral and religious tone, so much so that his first work of fiction, "Pamela," which attained an immense sale, was recommended from the pulpit. This was published in 1740, and was followed by his greatest work, "Clarissa Harlowe," in 1748, and then in 1753 appeared the book which concerns us, "The History of Sir Charles Grandison."

This, like all Richardson's novels, was written in the form of letters. To us of the twentieth century it appears a highly sentimental work, dealing as it does largely with the passion of love and depending for its main interest on the minute and subtle analysis of the human heart which it displays. Compared with a present-day novel it is as a miniature painting to an impressionist portrait. It is its excess of detail which gives it its sense of reality.

We are, however, not here concerned with its merits or demerits;

it is not the dramatic skill, nor the genius for pathos, nor the power of graphic description of the author that we wish to point out, but it is to call attention to the noble portrait of a Catholic girl, ready to sacrifice the lover to whom she was so passionately attached, that the effort cost her a temporary loss of reason for the sake of her religion. It will perhaps be remembered by those who have read "The History of Sir Charles Grandison"[11] that there are two sets of characters in the book, about thirty-five English Protestants and fourteen Italians, all of whom are, of course, Catholics, and these last the hero, Sir Charles Grandison, who is a very Admirable Crichton of perfection, makes acquaintance with during his travels in Italy. Clementina, the unfortunate heroine of this most melancholy episode in Sir Charles Grandison's life, is the daughter of the Marchese and Marchesa della Porretta, an Italian family of almost princely rank, with whom Grandison becomes acquainted at Bologna, and is soon on very intimate terms, especially with Clementina, to whom he acts as tutor, teaching her English, and the youngest son, Jeronymo, whose life he saved.

The Porrettas intend Clementina to marry the Count of Belvedere, a handsome, gallant, sensible man with a large fortune and a Catholic, but unfortunately Clementina falls desperately in love with Sir Charles Grandison, who to some extent reciprocates her affection, but the Porretta family oppose the match on account of the difference in religion. Clementina is a very devout girl, and so steadfast in her faith that we are told it was with great difficulty that her parents could prevent her "from assuming the veil."

This was the time of the rebellion of young Charles Stuart, and in Italy it was confidently believed that he would be successful and that the restoration of Catholicism in England would be the result, and poor Clementina flattered herself that her "heretic lover would take refuge in the bosom of his holy mother the Church." But this does not come off, and to cut a very long story very short, Clementina is so madly in love that her reason is in danger, and at the same time she is at first determined not to marry a heretic. She then falls into the deepest melancholy, and her parents discover her passion for their friend, Sir Charles Grandison, and negotiations are entered into with him, to see if any satisfactory arrangement can be arrived at, but they find that Grandison is as much attached to his faith as Clementina is to hers and as much convinced of its truth.

Sir Charles now offers to live one year in Italy and one in England by turns if Clementina will marry him and live with him, and would even be content to pass only three months in his own country, while as to religious difficulties he proposed to leave her entire liberty to follow her religion, and in case of children by the marriage he agreed that the daughters should be brought up Catholics, the sons Protestants, which it was presumed the Pope would sanction, as there were precedents for it. Clementina would have consented to this, but the whole Porretta family, except Jeronymo, violently opposed it, mainly on religious grounds, but also because they thought it derogatory to their own honor, as they considered Sir Charles an obscure man. Richardson was blamed by some of his critics for making Sir Charles agree to allow the daughters of his proposed union to be brought up as Catholics. After Sir Charles Grandison had left Bologna, which does not happen till some terribly painful scenes have taken place with Clementina and her family, the poor girl loses her reason and is placed with an aunt and cousins, who treat her with great severity and unkindness, putting her into a strait-waistcoat as a punishment, and through three or four volumes of this tremendously long novel, which was originally published in seven volumes, Clementina is a victim to melancholia. She recovers before the end of the book, and finally, after Sir Charles is married to Miss Byron, she, moved more by duty to her parents than by love, consents to become the wife of her faithful lover, the Count of Belvedere, with whom, being of the same faith, she will suffer from no religious complications. But she previously elopes from her parents' house to escape the persuasions to marry the Count. Possibly Richardson could not bring himself to overcome his Protestant prejudices against the religious life sufficiently to make her a nun, which in real life would most likely have been her fate and which Clementina renounced in deference to the wishes of her family, so he did the next best thing for her happiness by marrying her to one of her own religion. He has drawn a most attractive portrait of poor Clementina and depicted the mental struggle she went through with elaborate detail as well as graphic power. Her religion amounted to a passion, scarcely less strong than her love for Sir Charles Grandison, and if she brought herself to consent to marrying a heretic, it was in the hope of his ultimate conversion that she did so.

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[11] "The History of Sir Charles Grandison and the Honorable Miss Byron," by Samuel Richardson. Hoff, 1793.

The author has been just to his Catholic characters and has shown how deep and strong and uncompromising was their faith, while at the same time he made it very clear that Grandison had not the smallest inclination to abandon his own religion, but was equally steadfast. He has credited Clementina with the very highest motives and principles and insisted upon her devotion and piety, representing her as "struggling nobly with her own heart because of her duty and her religion and resolved to die rather than encourage a wish that was not warranted by both." We know no character in English fiction touched with a deeper pathos than the beautiful, delicate, deeply religious Clementina, whose concern for the soul of the man she loved runs through the whole of her delirium, while the accounts of the way her aunt and cousins treat her when suffering from melancholia, produced by the mental suffering to which she has been subjected, are heartrending, and the author, with his love of detail, spares us nothing. Clementina is no mere lovesick maiden, but a noble woman, whose deep faith and constancy to the Catholic religion place insuperable obstacles in the way of what she firmly believes to be her only earthly happiness, since she loves Grandison with all the warmth of her southern nature.

The tragedy of the story is based upon the irreconilable differences between the two religions of Catholicism and Protestantism. These differences constitute the great interest of the novel and lift it on to a higher plane of literature than a mere love-story, for they deal with the realities of life. Written as it was at the time when Bonnie Prince Charlie was fighting for the throne and published a few years after his defeat at Culloden, when all hopes of the restoration of the Catholic religion were at an end, it is small wonder that the book caused such a sensation as it did and had such a large circulation, for the very fair picture it gives of Catholics must have made it read among them, as well as among Richardson's co-religionists.

The story would appeal to Catholics and Protestants alike, for doubtless there were many instances in the real life of the day of lovers separated by their respective creeds, though we will hope not many who took it to heart so disastrously as poor Clementina.

There can be little doubt that it was the fact that the Stuart cause was trembling in the balance when Richardson was writing this book that suggested the subject and also gave him the courage to publish it, for it was ticklish work in those days, to say a word in favor of a religion so hated in England as was the Catholic faith, and had there not been a chance of the Young Pretender succeeding, we doubt whether we should ever have sighed over the sorrows of the brave and beautiful Clementina, whose steadfastness to her religion may well be an example to all Catholic girls with Protestant lovers.

It is noteworthy that while all Clementina's objections to Grandison are the difference in their religion, Richardson makes the other members of her family take a lower ground also, for their objections are partly based upon considerations of position, wealth and family. He makes Clementina's second brother, the Bishop, a most zealous Catholic and most uncompromising in his judgments of Protestants, allowing no salvation to any outside the pale of Holy Church. In his arguments with Grandison the Bishop gets very warm and says the author does his cause no good thereby; but he makes it pretty clear that it is the soul of his sister's lover that he desires to capture, far more than to secure him as Clementina's husband.

Father Marescotti, Clementina's confessor, is described as taking a very harsh view of the poor girl's infatuation for Grandison. Writing to her Protestant friend, Mrs. Beaumont, she says: "Father Marescotti, though he now loves *the man,* suggests that my late disorder might be a judgment upon me for suffering my heart to be engaged by *the heretic.*"

Nevertheless, Father Marescotti is said to have been a very worthy priest, certain to obtain promotion for his merits, and after Clementina's elopement to escape marrying the Count of Belvedere he takes a much gentler view of this escapade and sets aside her self-accusations and forgives her as freely as her adoring parents have done when she offers to submit to any penance he may inflict.

One of the remarkable features of this novel is the charity with which the various Protestant characters treat those of the Catholic faith. The author has not only dealt fairly with the Catholics in his story himself, but he has made his Protestant characters respect them and recognize their high principles and other good points, while at the same time they never for a moment swerve from their own religious standpoint. Indeed, one of the great lessons to be learned from this novel, eminently didactic in tone, is charity to those who are of another faith.

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CRITICISMS IN KANT.

KANT AND THE CATEGORIES.

AMONG the arguments which we have used to expose the impotency of Kant's objections against the proofs for the existence of God, the *retorsio argumenti,* it may be noticed, holds the chief place. We have shown that if Kant's contention be valid when he argues that the absolutely necessary being which reason postulates as the cause of the contingent, has no objective validity—inasmuch as we can never meet with this necessary being in experience, and consequently its existence can never be empirically demonstrated—the same argument applies with even greater force to our empirical knowledge, as far at least as it rests on the principles of causality and contradiction; both of which Kant accepts in their fullness, and both of which he admits as the partial foundation at least of our empirical knowledge. Kant, too, admits that these principles are not borrowed either from experience or from reflection on experience; that they are *a priori* principles which exist in the mind wholly independent of experience; and that on the truth of these principles, as on a foundation, the truth of much of experience, and consequently of much of our empirical knowledge, rests. Yet the objective validity of these *a priori* principles, much as we all prize them, can never be empirically demonstrated, and the underlying reality can never be met with in experience. Consequently if Kant's objections to the proofs for the existence of the necessary being have any weight or value, they have a still greater force against the objective validity of the truth of the principles of contradiction and causality, and consequently expose our empirical knowledge to the charge of being mere deceitful illusion. Nay, more; the proofs for the existence of the necessary being as the cause of the contingent have claims on objective validity which the principles of contradiction and causality by no means possess; for the existence of the necessary being as the cause of the contingent is demanded by reason as an absolute logical necessity. Hence Kant's objections to our possession of any knowledge of the Supreme Being rebounds with redoubled force against the validity of our empirical knowledge.

It is not, however, merely against the principles of causality and contradiction that Kant's objections can be retorted. They apply with equal force against all the Kantian categories; and as these categories, according to Kant, are the very foundation of *all* our empirical knowledge, so that without them experience itself is impossible, it follows that if these categories possess no more objective validity than Kant will admit for the existence of the Supreme Being, then all experience and all empirical knowledge is open to the same objection which Kant urges so strongly against the existence of God. All our empirical knowledge in that case would be mere illusion. The object of this article will be to show this; that is, that Kant cannot claim for his categories objective validity of any kind, according to his own principles; for they can never be met with in experience, and we can never have any empirical knowledge whatever regarding them. Consequently, all our empirical knowledge is open to precisely the same objections which Kant urges against the existence of God.

The value and importance of the categories in the Kantian system of metaphysics can hardly be overrated. Not only is this true, but it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the part which these same categories have played, ever since Kant's day, in the realm of philosophy. We may go even further still, and yet be within the limits of truth, if we say that, since Kant's time, no other factor has been so predominant in determining human opinion in its estimate of the value of man's knowledge, or in determining the extent of that knowledge, as have these same categories. Hence a word of exposition of their meaning and importance may not be out of place before we come to determine the real value of them.

The categories constitute the great central fortress in the Kantian metaphysics. They are regarded as the invincible stronghold of the great Kantian system. They are at once the boasted pride and vaunted strength of Kant's entire philosophy. They are even the mighty bulwarks which guard the entire realm of modern philosophical error. They have done for Kant what the discovery of gravitation has done for Newton, what the discovery of the earth's motion has done for Copernicus and Galileo, what the discovery of electricity has done for Franklin—they have blazoned Kant's name on the eternal scroll of fame. It is the categories which constitute Kant's chief claim to glory and immortality. Neither the "transcendental æsthetic" with its new notions of space and time, nor his bizarre and spectacular "antinomies," nor his elaborate "paralogisms of reason," nor his ingenious but transparent "ideal of pure reason" could ever have brought him fame. We may eliminate all these—important though he regarded them—from his system and his name will still shine with undiminished lustre; but if we remove the categories, the light of Kant's glory is immediately extinguished. It is to the categories that Kant's worshippers will point when they want to prove to you his incontrovertible claims to greatness. It is to them Kant himself turns when he wishes to impress us with the inestimable, untold, and priceless value "of the treasure left to posterity"—as he himself does not hesitate to designate it. It is to the categories Ludwig Noiré refers when, in a fit of Kantian ecstasy, he tells us: "The palm of valor belongs to the hero of thought who has plunged into the obscurest abysses of the human mind and, with almost superhuman calm, has succeeded in emerging with the key to the mystery in his hand." The "key to the mystery" is the categories. The categories are Kant's great discovery. Their discovery revolutionized all philosophy and gave a new meaning to the term *knowledge*. It set bounds to the limits of man's knowledge which had hitherto been regarded as boundless in its possibilities. With the discovery of the categories Kant was enabled to say to knowledge: Thus far shalt thou go and no farther. At least, so men thought; and so to-day tens of thousands of men who have adopted Kant's categories as marking the limit line of human knowledge, think. It is to them that even so staid and sober a philosopher as was the late illustrious philologist, Max Müller, referred, when he called them "a central thought which forms a real rest and entrenched ground on the onward march of human intellect," and, when again he said, we have to thank Kant "that we know now all that can be known about the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God." The categories, he believed, marked the boundary line beyond which human reason cannot pass. Or, to quote Noiré again: "It was reserved for Kant to sound the furthest depths of human reason, and so forever to disperse the anxious doubts by which it was beset, to establish its just and inalienable claims, as well as to determine for all time the boundaries beyond which it must not venture, under penalty of losing itself upon the shoreless ocean of vain imaginations and wild and empty speculation." Kant himself was troubled by no false modesty regarding the merits of his belauded discovery. He had no hesitation in boldly proclaiming his own praise and did not shrink through any false notions of modesty from attempting to place his own discovery alongside of that of Copernicus. He swaggeringly assures us: "We have here the same case as with the first thought of Copernicus, who, not being able to get on in the explanation of the movements of the heavenly bodies, as long as he assumed that all the stars turned around the spectator, tried whether he could not succeed better by assuming the spectator to be turning and the stars to be at rest. A similar experiment may be tried in metaphysics, as far as the *intuition* of objects is concerned." And again he tells us: "I also propose in this preface my own view of metaphysics, which has so many analogies with the Copernican hypothesis." The categories are "the heavenly bodies" in Kant's theory, the transfer of which from a state of motion to a state of fixedness and rest effected a complete revolution in the world of metaphysics. They are the axis on which all modern philosophy revolves; and their discovery by Kant—as he supposed—has revolutionized our notions of knowledge as completely as the Copernican discovery revolutionized men's knowledge of the heavenly bodies. Nay, more; it is not merely the world of philosophy or of metaphysics that the so-called discovery of the categories has affected; the transformation reaches out to the ultimate limit of our world of knowledge. The categories, then, are at once the foundation and the crown of all Kant's greatness and glory. In the construction of the vast and imposing philosophical edifice which he has given the world, and which is supposed to last for all time, the categories are to be met with everywhere. They are the foundation. They are the keystone of the triumphal arch of entry. They support the entire edifice. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that Kant's twelve categories are the twelve pillars which support the gigantic nave of the great philosophical cathedral with all its massive weight and strength, and that all the aisles, and wings, and dimly lighted chapels, and strange corridors, and curious dormers, with their new outlook on the field of knowledge, borrow all their light, their strength, their false beauty, their symmetry, from the main structure of which the categories are the majestic columns. Certain it is that if the categories fall, all the rest of the structure falls with them. The huge philosophical temple of knowledge is constructed around the categories which form a lofty, extensive, gigantic middle court which opens into all the others, and gives light, and color, and character to the remaining portions of the edifice. It is on the categories—and on the categories only—that Kant's claim to glory and immortality rests. Once more; it is to the categories Noiré alludes when again he tells us of Kant: "He was to show why all earlier speculation had broken down, and must have broken down; he alone succeeded in solving all the contradictions and paradoxes in which the reason was entangled and explaining them completely in accordance with their own nature, as he dropped the sounding line into depths which as yet no mortal mind had dared to fathom, and brought from thence to the light of day news of the primary conditions and eternal postulates of reason." All this extravagant language and exaggeration of values applies to the categories, and to them alone. They constitute the essence of the vaunted treasure and are the rich bullion of the boasted capital which Kant so posterity has complacently taken "the treasure" at its donor's which posterity has complacently taken "the treasure" at its donor's valuation and hoarded it away among the world's archives of learning, without ever stopping to question whether it may not be, after all, hoarding a mere treasure of gold bricks.

It is not a little singular that, in spite of the fundamental position which the categories hold in the Kantian system, and in spite of the overmastering influence which they possess in determining the modern meaning of the term knowledge, not one reader in a thousand seems to understand the meaning, and not one in ten thousand seems to question the validity, of the categories as Kant interprets them. Much as the Kantian values these possessions, we find but few of the critics of the Kantian philosophy who seem to have grasped at all the significance of the part played by the categories not only in the Kantian theories, but even in the whole system of Kantian philosophy, while fewer still comprehend their determining power in deciding what is and what is not to be regarded as real knowledge in the present age of the world. Yet *nearly all* the present day errors both in philosophy and religion, and *absolutely all* the errors in the present day theory of knowledge. are traceable directly to Kant—and, in Kant, directly to his theory of the categories. The exclusion of God and the supernatural from the realm of knowledge, so loftily insisted on in latter-day systems, is the direct result of the categories—indeed was the avowed purpose of Kant's theory regarding them. Agnosticism in its various forms springs from one root, and that root is the Kantian category. The entire philosophy of the unknowable of Herbert Spencer is but the accommodation of the Kantian category to English-speaking thought. Even those who reject Kant's philosophy on other points seem to be spellbound by his manipulation of the categories, and cling to them, while they utterly reject the transcendental æsthetic and the antinomies. Acute philosophers seem to overlook the point at which reasoning runs into sophistry and to miss the fallacy in the category altogether. Doubtless it is due to the difficulty of following Kant through the tortuous and obscure path—as he himself called it—that so many reject all else in Kant as unsound, and yet accept the categories as the discovery of the ages. Catholic philosophy seems to have passed the categories over entirely as a *terra incognita* or a darkest Africa, where attempts at exploration were useless, because of the tangle and brush; so trackless was the region and impenetrable the forest in which the leader himself admitted that the path was difficult to find. Even our own American philosopher—the only one amongst us who professedly undertook to refute all the Kantian errors, the late Dr. Brownson—seems, with all his acuteness, to have missed completely the true significance of the Kantian category, its relation to the Kantian system of philosophy, and especially its relation to the modern theory of human knowledge. This last he, indeed, misses so utterly that he seems to think that all that is necessary is to dispute, merely as a scholastic question, whether the categories are objective or subjective. He does not seem to have even remotely apprehended the vast and momentous consequences which result from their subjectivity, or to have at all suspected that Kant's sole and primary object in elaborating his categories as forms of the subject was to bring about these momentous consequences and amazing results. Indeed, there are few even of Kant's followers who seem to grasp the full meaning of the Kantian category, or, grasping it, who are never unmindful—when treating of it—of its vast scope and sweeping consequences. For this reason we shall try to explain the Kantian category, so that even the most ordinary understanding may be able to grasp its meaning and the wayfaring man understand the peculiarity of its nature.

Aristotle it was who first discovered that human knowledge has the tendency to run in certain grooves; and to run thus spontaneously. In other words, all human knowledge lends itself to classification under certain heads, of which Aristotle at first picked up ten. Aristotle's categories were substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, time, place, situation and habit. To these he added five others a little later. We have, for example, the notion of substance running through entire classes of thought and knowledge almost without consciousness of the fact on our part. For instance, we see water in the liquid state; to-night's frost will change into a solid form; in the tea kettle and steam engine it assumes the form of vapor. Here under the various forms we have change, but underlying each form we realize there is one and the same something which is permanent and does not change, and this we call substance. It is the same with the substance of the wood which we see under different forms—now as a growing tree, now as a piece of furniture, now as a dwelling place for man, now as a ship that sails upon the ocean. Beneath all the appearances or forms we recognize the substance of wood. A close scrutiny of our knowledge will disclose the interesting fact that certain and numerous facts of our knowledge include this category of permanent substance that remains underneath all changes. And thus in certain forms of knowledge we look for the category of substance. Again, when we come upon an unusual object—or even an unusual situation—the question arises spontaneously in the mind: Why is this thus? In other words, we find that the category of cause lies in the mind unconsciously and that another class of facts within our knowledge range themselves under the head of cause. Thus we have the category of cause. Or again, we look at the world in its extent and variety, and we also know that in spite of its extent and variety it is one. By close attention to nature or even to art we find confronting us everywhere quantity which is divisible into its component parts, and again we perceive that an extensive province of our knowledge falls under the head of quantity, another under the head of unity, another under the head of number or plurality, and so on. Now, substance, quantity, unity, plurality, cause, etc., etc., are what are called the categories; and the question naturally arises: Whence come the categories? Where do we get these concepts which arise spontaneously in the mind? Aristotle attributed them to the objects perceived; or, perhaps, better still, thought that they have their foundation in the object perceived, and thus impressed themselves on the mind perceiving. Hence, according to Aristotle, they belong, properly speaking, to the objects of which we predicate them. Locke, on the other hand, regarded them as abstractions from experience. These abstract notions or categories arose from experience or reflection on experience; and David Hume was of the same opinion. Since Kant's time Victor Cousin reduced the number of the categories to two. Brownson seemed to lean to Cousin's enumeration, though he intimated that, in his opinion, the number could be increased to four. Thus we see that all our thinking and all our knowledge falls quite naturally under certain heads or classes, and these heads or classes into which knowledge naturally falls, Aristotle called categories or predicaments. Hence, speaking in a general way, the general notions of cause and effect, of substance and accident, of unity and plurality, of existence and non-existence, of reality, negation, etc., etc., are what philosophers term categories. We might call them abstract notions, but in so close a scrutiny the term might be misleading, for Kant flatly denies that they are abstractions. The general notion or concept, then, under which the understanding places each separate particle of knowledge is called the category. The category is then the furrow or the channel of thought into which knowledge naturally and spontaneously runs. The category is general. For example, we do not say that the rotation of the earth on its axis causing day and night is a category, or that gravitation which causes the falling of bodies is a category. These are particular instances of the category of cause, but they are not the category itself. The category—of cause, for example—is the general notion or concept of causality which compels us to look for a cause for everything; and so on of the other categories. The category in each instance is the general notion or concept.

Now, Kant's notion of the categories was entirely different from that of Aristotle on the one hand and that of Locke and Hume on the other; and under Kant's hand they become endowed with the most tremendous importance and the most momentous significance. Kant's theory is that the categories do not belong to the object at all, as Aristotle believed; neither are they abstractions from experience and from reflection on experience, as Locke and Hume thought. They are, according to Kant's opinion, forms that exist in the mind, and in the mind only. Thus, when I look at a house, a ship, an automobile, a commonwealth, the universe, and behold the unity and at the same time the divisibility of any of these into their component parts, this unity or this divisibility does not belong to the objects—the house, ship, automobile, state, universe; this unity, this divisibility, is a form existing in my own mind prior to all experience of objects; and when the mind comes into contact with the objects, these objects are forced to take the form or mould previously existing in my understanding and lying there prepared for the objects of experience with which my mind may come in contact. Consequently all my knowledge and all my experience must shape itself in accordance with these forms of thought which have existed in my mind from the very beginning. The categories, then, according to Kant, are nothing more or less than mental moulds of knowledge. Our experience of objects—indeed our entire empirical knowledge—must therefore conform to these moulds or forms of the understanding, just as the molten metal must take the form of the mould into which it is poured. The categories of cause, unity, quantity, divisibility, substance, etc., etc., are forms existing in the mind; and the objects with which the mind comes in contact, if they are to become part of our knowledge, must assume these forms already existing and prepared in the mind. But unity, divisibility, quantity, substance, cause, etc., do not belong to the objects at all. The objects have these forms pressed upon them by the mind in which only they exist. These forms may be likened to the die or the inscription on the seal. They impress their forms on the objects which we meet with in experience; but the unity, divisibility, quantity, etc., no more belong to the objects of which we predicate them than the impression on the die belongs to the sheet-metal for which it is intended or than the inscription on the seal belongs to the wax. These forms are indeed intended for objects as we meet them in experience; but they belong wholly to, and are part, of the mind. As the die is intended for the sheet-metal and as the inscription on the seal is intended for the wax, so these forms in the mind are intended for the objects to be met with in experience, and they "lie prepared" in the mind for this purpose. Hence Kant's categories belong wholly to the mind of which they are forms. This is the essential difference between the Kantian categories and the Aristotelian predicaments. And it is here that the Copernican parallel appears. As the motion was transferred by Copernicus from the heavenly bodies to the spectator, so the forms or categories are transferred by Kant from objects to the mind in which they lie prepared ready for experience. Moreover, the Kantian categories are real and actual. That is, they have an actual existence—not an imaginary one—in the mind or human understanding. They are actual forms. It is the failure to comprehend the real meaning of the categories that lies at the bottom of all the errors which have proceeded from the Kantian philosophy.

Perhaps some may be inclined to think that we have placed too much emphasis on the fact that Kant's categories are mental moulds. But the fact is that they are this and nothing else; and those who have failed to thus interpret them have missed Kant's meaning completely. Indeed, we are of opinion that Kant stands till this day unrefuted for the simple reason that philosophers have failed to grasp the full meaning of the Kantian categories or to understand the important part which they play in the Kantian system of knowledge. That the view we have given of them here is the true one does not admit of question. Kant himself leaves no room for doubt upon this point. The categories, according to Kant, are the "fundamental concepts"—the "primary concepts" which make experience possible. The concept of cause is the Kantian category of cause. The concept of unity is the Kantian category of unity. The concept of substance is the Kantian category of substance. These notions or ideas or concepts of cause in general, number in general, quantity in general, substance in general, etc., etc., are what Kant calls the categories, and in speaking of the categories he uses interchangeably the terms concept and category. Everywhere he treats of the categories as the primary concepts and calls them now categories, now concepts indiscriminately. Possibly, it is owing to this interchange of terms—category and concept—that so many have failed to grasp the meaning of the Kantian categories. Of course, Kant also uses the term *concept* for concepts, or ideas; but he also uses it for "the concepts of the understanding" over and over again; that is, for the categories. Now, regarding these categories—or concepts—he tells us at the outset:

"By analytic of concepts I do not understand their analysis, or the ordinary process in philosophical disquisitions of dissecting any given concepts according to their contents, and thus rendering them more distinct; but a hitherto seldom attempted dissection of the faculty of the understanding itself, with the sole object of discovering the possibility of concepts *a priori,* by looking for them nowhere but in the understanding itself as their birthplace, and analyzing the pure use of the understanding."

Here, it will be observed, Kant attempts a "dissection of the faculty of the understanding" for the purpose of "discovering the possibility of concepts *a priori*;" that is, of the categories, and he expects to discover them "by looking for them nowhere but in the understanding itself as their birthplace." And he adds:

"We shall follow up the pure concepts to their first germs and beginnings in the human understanding, in which they lie prepared, till at last, on the occasion of experience, they become developed and are represented by the same understanding in their full purity, freed from all inherent empirical conditions."

Kant here lays down his programme and tells us that his object is to trace the categories (the pure concepts) to their origin in the human understanding. In this understanding "they lie prepared." There they have their "first germ and beginnings." There they are prepared and lie waiting in anticipation of experience, and Kant's object is to exhibit them as thus lying prepared for usage in experience; and, before this usage in experience, as "freed from all inherent empirical conditions."

Here, then, Kant plainly shows that he regards the concepts of quantity, quality, cause, substance, etc., etc., as something which have a real, actual, positive existence in the mind. They are not merely imaginary or possible. They are not to be derived from experience. Much less are they to be attributed to the object. They belong to the mind and to the mind only. In the mind they lie prepared; and they have been prepared there for use in experience. He adds:

"When we watch any faculty of knowledge, different concepts characteristic of that faculty, manifest themselves according to different circumstances, which, as the observation has been carried on for a longer or shorter time, or with more or less accuracy, may be gathered up into a more or less complete collection."

It is therefore by watching this faculty of knowledge we discover the categories, and Kant assures us that:

"Transcendental philosophy has this advantage, but also the duty of discovering its concepts according to a fixed principle. As they spring pure and unmixed from the understanding as an absolute unity, they must be connected with each other, according to *one* concept or idea. This connection supplies us at the same time with a rule, according to which the place of each pure concept of the understanding and the systematical completeness of all of them can be determined *a priori,* instead of being dependent on arbitrary choice or chance."

Here we have them declared as belonging solely to the understanding; and not only that, but the number of the categories and their places in the understanding arise, we are told, from their connection in the understanding. And again he likens them—sparing though he is of illustration—to moulds or compartments in the understanding. He tells us:

"The compartments exist; they have only to be filled, and with a systematic topic like the present the proper place to which each concept belongs cannot easily be missed, nor compartments be passed over which are still empty."

Thus we see that Kant regards these categories or fundamental concepts of the understanding as real, as having real objective validity, and as independent of and prior to all experience. They are moulds in the understanding, formed and prepared there for the purpose of having experience poured into them. Experience takes these forms; and thus all our knowledge takes on the form of the categories. Without these categories or forms of the understanding we could have no experience and consequently no knowledge; and to these categories all experience and all knowledge must conform; that is, all our knowledge and all our experience must assume the form of those categories which have preëxisted in the mind and which were already prepared there for the purpose in anticipation of experience. That this is also Kant's notion admits of no question. Having explained that "all phenomena must conform to that formal condition of sensibility, because it is through it alone that they appear, that is, that they are given and empirically seen," he asks:

"Now the question arises whether there are not also antecedent concepts *a priori,* forming conditions under which alone something can be, if not seen, yet thought as an object in general (that is, as a category); for in that case all empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily conform to such concepts, it being impossible that anything should become an object of experience without them?" And he answers this question later in this fashion:

"Now, I maintain that the categories of which we are speaking are nothing but the conditions of thought in any possible experience, as much as space and time contain the conditions of the intuitions which form experience. These categories, therefore, are fundamental concepts by which we think objects of all phenomena in general, and have therefore *a priori* objective validity."

And again after leading his readers through the dark valley he thus concludes:

"It must be admitted, therefore, that there exist in the understanding pure forms of knowledge *a priori,* which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in reference to all possible phenomena. These are the categories, that is, the pure concepts of the understanding. The empirical knowledge of man contains, therefore, by necessity an understanding which refers to all objects of the senses, though by intuition only and by its synthesis through imagination, and all phenomena, as data of a possible experience, must conform to these categories."

We could go on multiplying quotations indefinitely to show what, in Kant's system, is the true meaning and scope of the categories. *Sed sat sufficit.* From what we have seen it is quite evident that, according to Kant's view, the categories belong not to objects at all. They belong wholly to the understanding. They are forms of the understanding—mental moulds into which experience is poured and whose form experience, and consequently all our empirical knowledge, must assume. To them all objects, all phenomena, all experience must conform. Without them we can have no experience and no knowledge. It is the categories that make experience possible. It is the categories, therefore, which make all knowledge possible. They are intended for use only in experience. And lastly, they can never be applied to objects outside experience. Kant's theory of knowledge therefore includes: (1) That the categories are mental moulds of thought; (2) that through them—and through them only—can human knowledge be acquired; (3) that they are intended for experience, consequently the only knowledge we can have is empirical knowledge; (4) that being intended for use only in experience, everything that is outside of experience is excluded from knowledge. Now, this is a very ambitious programme. Kant's categories, it is plain, have an exceedingly wide scope and sweep the entire field of experience and of knowledge. They are of far-reaching import; and for humanity tremendous issues hang upon their truth or falsity. They should, therefore, admit of no shadow of doubt. They should carry with them from the very first the assurance of apodictic certainty. There should be no manner of question about their objective validity, which should be clear beyond all question. Unless they can be shown to have a real existence in the mind—as Kant claims they have—all our empirical knowledge is but mere illusion, since, according to Kant, all our experience and all our knowledge rest upon their truth. Should Kant's first hypothesis be false (and it is nothing more than a hypothesis which he claims to have demonstrated as true) all our empirical knowledge sinks into the abyss, according to Kant's metaphysic. In other words, if these forms of the understanding be not actualities—if these mental moulds in the understanding possess not objective reality—either we know nothing at all or Kant's entire system of philosophy is the purest quintessence of philosophical humbug. The question then arises: Have Kant's categories a real existence? Do they possess objective validity? Has Kant been able to prove that the categories are what he claims them to be? Are they actual forms existing in the mind and to which experience must conform? Have they no application in speculative inquiries outside experience? Granted that his theory of the purely subjective character of the categories be true, do the astonishing consequences, which Kant claims, follow from his theory? These are the questions on which the entire value of the entire Kantian system of philosophy hinges. If all these questions can be answered affirmatively, then is Kant the chief among all philosophers. If even some of them must be answered negatively, Kant must take his place among the great impostors who have earned the contempt of mankind. If they cannot be answered at all, the presumption and assurance of Kant in claiming that he has answered them affirmatively must be estimated at its true worth, and the value of all our empirical knowledge, which, Kant tells us, rests upon the objective validity of the categories, becomes uncertain and fluctuating, and we are unable to say whether we know anything.

Now, if the true meaning of the Kantian categories, as forms of the mind or moulds of the understanding, be kept steadily in view, it will become at once evident that to answer these questions becomes an utter impossibility. According to Kant's own reasoning, these concepts of the understanding which he calls the categories become at once—according to his explanation—what he calls "concepts of pure reason" as well as concepts of the understanding. Now, the concepts of pure reason are, according to the Kantian canons, contraband of knowledge. They are the cosmological problem, the psychological problem and the theological problem. And Kant calls these "concepts of pure reason" or "transcendental ideas," for the simple reason that he wishes to put them outside the pale of knowledge altogether; the pretext under which he claims that he is forced to thus exclude them from knowledge being that the objects of these pure concepts of reason —or transcendental ideas—"can never be given empirically, and therefore lie entirely outside the domain of the pure understanding." Now, it is certain that the categories, as Kant represents them, are nothing else but deduced concepts "arising from pure reason," that they, too, never can be given "empirically" and that "they, too, lie entirely outside the domain of the pure understanding." But Kant ejects from the realm of knowledge the unity of it is without objective reality. He does the same with the immortality of the soul. Kant places these questions outside the realm of knowl- pirical knowledge of the soul's immortality; but he never dreams that in his categories he has, as far as empirical knowledge is concerned, precisely the same problem as in the soul's unity and immortality. Whether the soul is one and immortal presents no more difficulty to the intellect than the question whether the categories of cause, substance, unity, etc., are forms of the mind or moulds existing in the human understanding. These forms of the mind—or categories—"can never be given empirically," any more than can the unity and immortality of the soul; and these forms of the understanding—although it is claimed that they have existence in the understanding—"lie entirely outside the domain of the pure understanding" as completely as the notions of the soul's unity and immortality. According to Kant's own principles of knowledge, then, it is an utter impossibility to show that these categories have objective reality. Let us go into this question a little further, so that even the most prejudiced Kantian cannot fail to grasp it.

Now, in order to refute Kant's entire claims for his categories, it is not by any means necessary to show that these categories are not forms of the understanding. We may concede that they are actual mental moulds wholly independent of all experience and purely subjective, and yet Kant's momentous conclusions will hardly follow from them. It is not with his Copernican theory of the categories—their transfer from object to subject—that we here take issue. It is to the use to which Kant applies them that we wish here to direct attention. He uses them as a lever to overthrow the proofs for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. It was for this purpose he invented them. All, then, that is necessary in order to completely discredit them is to show that for this very laudable purpose they are entirely ineffectual. In this case his Copernican theory is not disproved—nor is any disproof attempted; it is merely rendered harmless and powerless. But in showing that the categories are ineffectual to discredit the existence of God and the immortality of the soul or to exclude them from all title to the name of knowledge, there incidentally arises a new question, the answer to which is disastrous to Kant's entire philosophy, and which completely erases from the chart of knowledge all knowledge that is empirical; and this is the exact reversal of the end for which Kant invented his theory of the categories. Kant claims that nothing can be knowledge which does not come to us through the categories. But whence comes Kant's knowledge of the categories? This single question overturns Kant's theory of knowledge. Does it come through the categories? And if it does not, according to Kant's theory, it cannot be knowledge at all. Yet, according to Kant, on this no-knowledge-at-all of the categories all our empirical knowledge is based.

Kant's objections against the proofs for the existence of God, the unity and immortality of the soul, etc., etc., are that they cannot be shown to have objective reality. The concepts of these are empty concepts, we are told. And they are empty concepts, because their objects can never be given empirically. These objects lie entirely outside the domain of the pure understanding. There can be no proof of the existence of God and therefore no certainty of it, we are told, because we cannot show that His existence—although postulated by reason as an absolute necessity—has objective validity. For in order to show that this existence has any objective validity it would be necessary, Kant says, that we should have an empirical knowledge of it; in other words, it is necessary that we be able to meet with it in experience. But this existence can never be met with in the course of any possible experience—Kant means any mundane experience—and consequently can never be empirically known. These are Kant's arguments. Now, it is remarkable that these selfsame objections can be urged with even greater force against Kant's own categories. Not all the labors of Kant, or all his ingenuity—genius, if you will—has been able to show that these categories of Kant possess objective validity or that they can ever be met with in the course of any human experience. To show that they can be met with in the course of experience is an utter and absolute impossibility. To say that we can ever meet with these mental moulds of knowledge in experience would be to utter an absurdity. In his most extraordinary "Deduction of the Categories" Kant's whole effort has been directed to show that these categories possess objective validity. In this impossible task he, of course, ignominiously fails. Kant's absolute and necessary failure here has never been recognized by the critics—whether disciples or adversaries; partly owing to the obscurity in which he shrouded the process of his labors, and partly owing to the gigantic bluff in which he had the audacity to claim that he had proved what is, according to his own principles, impossible of proof. We never can have any empirical knowledge that the categories exist in the understanding as forms of the mind or moulds for experience. And we never can meet with those forms or moulds in experience any more than we can meet in experience with the unity and immortality of the soul. Yet Kant maintains that without this empirical knowledge and unless we can meet with them in experience we can never have knowledge of things, while he at the same time maintains that he has proved that these categories exist as forms in the human understanding. Audacity of this kind becomes too overwhelming for speech. And people have been satisfied in so abstruse a study to accept Kant's conclusions on the authority of his own word. Let us see whether Kant has succeeded in proving that these Kantian concepts or categories have objective validity, or whether they can ever be met with in the course of any experience. We are, of course, speaking here of the categories in the Kantian sense; that is, as forms of the mind or mental moulds of the understanding.

Now, we must not for a moment confound—as Kant continually does—the Kantian categories with the application of the categories in experience. We have seen the meaning of the categories in the ordinary acceptation of philosophers; and we have also seen their meaning in the Kantian system. We must, above all, keep before our minds the true meaning of the categories in the Kantian metaphysics—something which Kant himself egregiously failed to do. Kant's categories are primary concepts—fundamental concepts—which are in the mind independent of all experience and before all experience. They are in the mind for use in experience. They make experience possible; and without them there can be no experience at all. Nevertheless, their existence is wholly independent of experience. Now, there is no doubt that of the twelve categories, which Kant enumerates as the only forms which our knowledge can assume, we over and over again make particular application in experience; that is, we use the categories in experience. In other words, we apply, in experience, the general concept or category. For example, when we speak of the attraction of gravitation as the *cause* of falling bodies, we are applying in a particular instance, in experience, our general concept of cause, or the category of cause. This, however, is by no means meeting with the object corresponding to the concept of cause in general, or in other words, with the object which corresponds to the category of cause, in experience. It is but the particular application to an object in experience of the general concept—or the category—of cause. This distinction must be determinedly insisted upon; otherwise we shall fall into confusion, and, as Kant has so frequently done, confound things which are essentially different. It is, however, quite manifest that from the various causes with which we meet in daily experience we can rise to the notion of cause in general; and the question arises, what is this notion of cause in general? The cause of the seasons, the cause of day and night, the cause of illness, the cause of happiness, the cause of fluctuations in stocks—all are but particular applications of the notion or concept of cause in general. These particular applications of the notion of cause in general always take place in experience; but the object of the notion of cause in general is never in experience. The object which corresponds with our notion of cause in general—or our general notion of cause—even if we grant that the notion has objective validity, can never be met with in any experience. Or let us take the category of substance. We perceive that under the appearances of clouds, water, ice, snow, etc., there is a permanent substance which always remains. This is a particular application, in experience, of the concept of substance in general. That is, we meet with a particular substance in experience. But what is this concept of substance in general? It is quite plain that from our notions of the substance in water, in wood, in wine, in clay, etc., we can rise to the concept of substance in general, or the general concept of substance. But what is this general concept of substance? Can this general concept ever be met with in experience? Is there an object that corresponds to this general concept of substance? That is, can the object which it represents—if it really represents an object—ever be met with in any experience? And so of all the other categories; for the categories are nothing else than these concepts in general or general concepts, the particular application of which we daily encounter in our common experience. Now, it is quite manifest that there is the widest possible difference, therefore, between the concept of cause in general—or the category of cause—and the application of this general idea in a particular instance. The object corresponding to the general concept of cause we never meet with in experience, if indeed there be at all such an object; while particular causes are of daily and hourly occurrence in experience. The categories are here on precisely the same plane—as far as experience is concerned—as our abstract notions, such as goodness or sweetness or whiteness, etc. We meet daily with particular instances of goodness and sweetness and whiteness; that is, with objects which are good and sweet, etc.; but who has ever encountered in experience the objective reality of these notions; that is, with the objects corresponding to the abstract notions of goodness or sweetness? It is precisely the same with the categories. Now, it is the confounding of these two essentially different concepts, the notion of cause in general and the notion of some cause in particular, that has been the source of endless error and confusion, and which has led Kant to so successfully deceive himself and dupe his disciples. He is eternally confounding these two widely different concepts. We have mentioned merely the categories of cause and substance; but the same is true of all the other categories; for the category is merely the general notion or concept to which we refer each particular instance as we meet with it in experience. It is quite evident, however, that the general concept is never met with in any experience and never can be met with (we do not even know what it is) in any experience. Now, this general concept is nothing else but the category, for which it is only another name; and it is quite manifest that the particular application of the category in experience is widely different from the category or general concept itself. We know that the cause of a railroad holocaust is a broken rail. There we have the particular cause and we meet with it in experience. But what is the meaning of the concept, cause in general, which causes us to look for particular causes in every incident as well as in every accident of experience? The answer is: we do not know. But certain it is that this answer—which we do not even know—can never become the object of any experience. Hence while we have particular causes in almost every moment of experience, that which constitutes the objective reality of the notion of cause in general—if it have objective reality—in other words, of the category of cause, can never be met with in any experience. The same is true of all the other categories. From the very nature of the case this is so. We do not know what this objective reality is. And what is more, we do not know whether there is such an objective reality at all. Now, this is true of the categories in the Aristotelian sense, and in the sense of Locke and Hume. But it is doubly true of Kant's categories, which are forms of the mind or mental moulds, and which therefore can never be given in experience.

Now, Kant maintains that while he cannot define the categories or concepts in general, he at least knows what they are collectively. And he tells us they are forms of the understanding prepared for the reception of experience—mental moulds into which experience is poured. And he further maintains that as such; that is, as forms of the understanding or mental moulds of knowledge, they not only have objective validity, but they can be met with in experience. Now, whether these forms of the mind have objective validity, that is, whether they exist at all, is an open question, which, if true, should be susceptible of demonstration, and Kant thinks that he has demonstrated it to be true in his deduction of the categories; while the question whether these forms of the mind can ever be met with in the course of any experience is so wild and extravagant that merely to formulate it is to answer it conclusively in the negative. It needs no argument whatever to show its utter impossibility. Nevertheless, Kant confuses the particular application in experience of the general concept—or category—with the general concept or category itself, and thinks that he has thus at once both proved the objective validity of his categories and demonstrated that these same categories can be met with in experience. If, however, we only keep in mind the distinction between the meaning of the general concept; that is, of the concept in general, or the category, and the particular application of that term in any particular instance in experience—we shall avoid Kant's ridiculous mistake. The abstract concept, then, of cause cannot be shown to have objective validity; and if it has objective validity, the object of that abstract concept can never be met with in any experience; while in any particular or concrete cause the objective validity is immediately apparent and is also part of experience. Now, Kant's blunder consists in claiming that the objective validity in any particular concrete cause, together with the fact that we meet with this object in experience, is a sufficient proof of the objective validity of the abstract concept of cause, or cause in general—and hence of the category of cause; and that it also proves that the object of cause in general can be met with in experience. But it is quite evident that if we show the objective validity in any particular cause, we do not thereby show also the objective validity of the general concept of cause. And it is equally evident that, when we show that the object of any particular concrete cause can be met with in experience, we do not thereby prove that the objective validity of cause in general may also be met with in experience. Yet this is the only proof that Kant gives that his categories or mental forms of the understanding possess objective validity, and that they can be met with in experience. Whether there be any object to correspond to the abstract notion or concept of cause is not proven, and, moreover, is a problem which does not admit of proof. And the same is true of the entire list of the categories. Whether or not they possess objective reality; and, if they do, what is the nature of that reality, are problems which hardly admit of solution in the present state of man's intellectual equipment. If Aristotle regarded the categories as belonging entirely to the object; if others regard them as the joint product of the mind and the object; if Locke and Hume regarded them as mere mental abstractions derived from experience and reflection on experience; and if, finally, Kant regarded them as belonging solely to the mind, it is easy to see that the question whether they possess objective validity at all does not admit of an easy answer; while the question: what is the nature of that reality? is wholly impossible of answer. Kant has brought forward no proof whatever to warrant us in following him in the belief that the categories belong wholly and solely to the understanding; and, from the nature of his claim, it is also impossible for him to bring forward any proof by which he can show that they at all exist as forms of the mind, or moulds of the understanding to which objects must conform. He cannot reach such a conclusion by any process of ratiocination. And he cannot show it from experience; for the simple reason that they can never come into experience. Kant's audacious attempt to prove by a deduction from principles of reason, or of the understanding, that his categories possess objective validity is merely another attempt at an Icarian flight. We have not the space here to follow him in his attempted deduction of the categories. This must be reserved for another article. All that we can do here is to emphasize the fact that Kant has quite unconsciously prepared beforehand the grave for all his contentions, and that his doctrine of the categories cancels completely everything that he has said by way of disparagement of the proofs for the existence of God and the unity and immortality of the soul. His great objections to the admission of these to the rank and title of knowledge applies with still greater force to his own categories. Kant maintains that these doctrines, both of philosophy and religion, cannot be shown to possess objective validity. The objects of them can never be met with in the course of any experience. They can never attain to the dignity of empirical knowledge, for they can never be empirically known. This is his grand indictment of these doctrines. And then with serene self-complacency he proceeds to elaborate his theory of the categories and leaves them even more openly exposed to the very objections which he urges against the proscribed dogmas than are the philosophical and theological doctrines which he has labored so hard to discredit. He prepared with much ingenuity and labor a trap which he thought could not fail to prove fatal to the doomed doctrines. And then with eyes wide open and mind intently fixed on the intellectual victims whose funeral pyre he has already prepared, he walks directly into the trap he had arranged for the fated dogmas. What could be more certain than that the existence of God can never be experimentally shown? What escape was there when the challenge came: produce your First Cause in experience? Who could dare to answer in the affirmative when asked whether the unity or immortality of the human soul could be empirically demonstrated? There was certainly no escape left for the fated problems when Kant, the master genius, manipulated the device by which the value of knowledge was to be henceforth and forever tested, and then stepped forward with his peremptory challenge. The pretentious dogmas had run their course. At least, such was Kant's fond belief. Empirical reality became the slogan of knowledge, and these truths could never be empirically known. What wonder that the empirical test of truth was applauded as the most masterful intellectual achievement of the ages? Men were so dazzled by the brilliancy of the exploit which "held up the key to the mystery" of human knowledge that they forgot to examine the nature of the key or to scrutinize it closely. But, alas! for the vanity of all human triumphs—even in the realm of transcendental ideas. The key itself will be found on close investigation to be tainted with the very illegitimacy in knowledge against which it was to close the door; and all Kant's ingenuity and deep-laid plot are worse than vain. His triumph becomes worse than ignominious failure; it is fatuity. He was so intent in invalidating as knowledge the esteem of God and the immortality of the soul, and establishing empirical knowledge as the only true kind of knowledge, that he failed to see that in the attempt he had completely shattered beyond hope of repair the very foundations of his empirical knowledge. Indeed, his fatuity here may be justly compared to that of a man seated on the branch of a tree who industriously saws away at the branch—between himself and the trunk. He built his vast and ambitious edifice on the quicksand of the categories, and the entire metaphysical edifice, and with it the entire edifice of human knowledge sinks into the abyss. For if the existence of God be excluded from recognition as knowledge for the sole reason that we can never have an empirical demonstration of its truth, and that we can never meet with the First and necessary cause of the universe in the course of any experience, what shall be said of the categories—those forms of the understanding—those mental moulds of knowledge—on which the truth of all our empirical knowledge, according to the teaching of Kant, must rest? Who has shown that these categories, as mental moulds of knowledge, can ever be met with in any experience? Who can give an empirical demonstration that they at all exist? And yet all our empirical knowledge, according to Kant, rests on these and these alone. And if the test of truth be, as Kant puts it, whether we may be able to meet with a reality in the course of a possible experience; and if these categories or mental forms of knowledge can never be met with in any experience; and if, furthermore, the entire universe of empirical knowledge rests, as on a foundation, on those categories which we can never meet with in any possible experience, what, then, becomes of the value of our empirical knowledge? We can never prove that these categories in the Kantian sense exist at all. We have no means of ascertaining whether Kant's theory of the categories is true or false. What, then, becomes of the knowledge that is based upon them? The affinity, however, between the Kantian categories as mental moulds of knowledge and the unity and immortality of the soul is much closer than the affinity between the Kantian categories and the existence of God. Now, if Kant claims that we must reject the doctrines of the soul's unity and immortality because we can never meet with these in experience—because "their object can never be given empirically," as Kant puts it—how can we be seriously asked to build up the entire empire of empirical knowledge on mental moulds or forms of the understanding, since these forms "can never be given empirically?" Are these forms of the understanding ever likely to be given empirically? Can we hope that they will ever come into any experience? Are they not precisely in the same relation to experience as are the soul's unity and immortality? The unity and immortality of the soul are conditions or characters of the soul, it is true, and as such can never be empirically known—they can never come into experience; but the categories or forms of the understanding or mental moulds belong to the soul also and to the soul exclusively; for the understanding is nothing else but a faculty of the soul. Consequently there is no more probability—or possibility, if you will—that the categories can ever be given in experience than that the immortality of the soul can ever be thus given. What Kant completely overlooked was: to test his own formula—to test his own ingeniously constructed device for determining what was and what was not to be admitted as knowledge—to test his own categories as forms of the mind by the same rigidness which he applied to the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. These must be excluded from knowledge because they can never be empirically known, for they can never come into any human experience. But can the categories ever be empirically known? Can they ever come into experience? This question Kant forgot to ask. The philosophers since Kant's day have forgotten to ask it, and it is now asked, we believe, for the first time.

Nor can it be said that in his deduction of the categories Kant has shown that they are given empirically. It is a fact that the soul's immortality can never be empirically known; but it is an equally certain fact that the categories as forms of the understanding can never be empirically given. Consequently Kant's categories are lamentably wanting in what Kant himself claims to be the essentials of legitimate knowledge. But should any enthusiastic Kantian undertake to claim that Kant's so-called deduction of the categories establishes them as empirical knowledge, in spite of the fact that it is impossible to have them empirically given, it will be only necessary to remind him that Kant has peremptorily excluded from experience—and consequently from knowledge—the unity and immortality of the soul, in spite of the cogent arguments in favor of these doctrines; and that in the case of the existence of God or the First and necessary cause, Kant sets his face like flint against the admission of it as knowledge—in spite of the fact that reason demands this necessary cause, in spite of the fact that the existence of the necessary first cause is an absolute logical necessity, in spite of the fact that reason is so peremptory on this point that the existence of God becomes an apodictic conclusion of reason compelling unquestioning assent, and in spite of the fact that notwithstanding his rejection of the existence of the necessary being, Kant himself is compelled to make believe that this necessary being exists and constrains reason to prevaricate and counterfeit an existence which he finds himself forced to accept while he persistently denies it. Now, why does Kant fly in the face of all logic? Why does he take up arms against reason on this point? Why does he trebly stultify himself by first proving with an apodictic certainty the existence of God, then rejecting that existence, and finally bringing back this existence which he has rejected, taking a negative picture of it, and setting up this shadow of the reality as an absolutely necessary regulative principle of reason? For the simple reason that, as he tells us, we can never meet with the object which corresponds to the existence of God in experience. It can never be given empirically. Now, if the invincible proofs for the existence of God with all their overwhelming cogency and apodictic certainty must count for nothing against the fact that the object of all this absolute logical necessity can never be given in the course of any experience, we cannot see how the mass of obscurity—with all its mists and fogs—which Kant has given us for argument in his deduction of the categories, should stand for a single instant against the palpable fact that these categories can never be met with in the course of any experience. There is no escape from this argument. It is Kant's own argument turned against himself; and Kant is hoist with his own petard.

But possibly some Kantian may say that the categories are given in experience, that we have empirical knowledge of them, and this is precisely what Kant himself, with his extraordinary capacity for juggling, has himself maintained. The Kantian will say that, for example, when we meet with a particular cause in experience we have the category of cause empirically given. If we say that a man's intemperance is the cause of his misery we meet with the category of cause in experience; and so of all the other categories.

Now, Kant has so confused matters here that nothing but clear thinking can give us the true state of the case. It was for this reason that at the very outset we insisted on the wide difference between the meaning of the category—or the concept in general—and the particular application of this concept in experience. Now, it requires only a moment's reflection for any clear mind, unbiased by theories, to understand that when we meet with a particular cause in experience we do not thereby meet with the objective reality which corresponds with the concept of cause in general. For, as we have just seen, we meet only with one particular cause, and the empirical reality in one particular cause can never be the objective reality of the concept of cause in general. Neither can the aggregate of reality in all particular causes ever be the objective reality of the notion of cause in general, or the category. Consequently, when we meet with particular instances of cause we are by no means meeting in experience with the objective reality which corresponds with our notion of cause in general, and therefore we have not thereby given to us empirically the objective reality of the category. So true is this that it is a debatable question whether there be an objective reality at all which corresponds with our notion of cause in general—the general concept of cause—the abstract notion of cause—or the category; under all of which names is known the general concept of cause. And if perchance this general concept of cause has objective reality, no philosopher, not even Kant, claims to know what it is. And what is true of cause is true also of all the other categories—substance, quantity, unity, quality, etc., etc. It is therefore perfectly clear that when in experience we meet with particular instances of the category we are by no means meeting with the category itself, any more than when we meet with one man we are meeting with all humanity. And this is true whether we regard the categories in the Aristotelian sense or in the sense in which Locke interpreted them. Consquently, there can be no claim whatever that when we meet with particular instances of the category in experience we are thereby meeting with the category itself.

Now, when we come to the categories of Kant what, in this regard was improbable, in others becomes at once impossible. For according to Kant, the categories are forms existing in the understanding—mental moulds—"compartments"—which actually "exist" in the mind; and nothing could be much more absurd than to claim that, for instance, when we meet with a particular instance of cause, we were thereby meeting in experience with the mental "compartments" of cause, and that the existence of this mental compartment is thereby proved. We do not even know that these "compartments," or moulds, or forms of the understanding, exist at all. Kant gratuitously asserts that they exist; but he by no means proves it. Nothing could well be more absurd, however, than to maintain that when we met with a case of cause, for instance, where intemperance had caused poverty, we should proceed to maintain that we had met in experience a case of the mental mould of cause in our mind or the mental compartment of cause which existed there. All that we have met with is a case where the cause of poverty was intemperance. The cause that we met with was intemperance, and it would be the height of folly to claim that we had met with in experience a piece of Kant's psychological mechanism. We would have, in such a case, the objective effort of poverty following upon the objective cause of intemperance, with a more or less distinct notion of the former being produced by the latter, or with a vague notion of cause and effect; but who shall say that we have here met in experience the indefinite and indeterminate object which corresponds to the abstract notion of cause in general; and who above all will assert that we have made an empirical acquaintance with Kant's category of cause; or, in other words, with the mental "compartment" which Kant would have us believe exists in the understanding, and which moulds certain portions of our experience into the form of cause? Hence it would be the height of absurdity to maintain that we can meet with in experience those mental moulds of knowledge which Kant calls the categories. Hence his categories can never be empirically given. The categories of Kant, then, can never be met with in experience any more than the unity and immortality of the soul can be met with in experience or than the existence of the necessary cause can be met with in experience. There can be no manner of appeal from this conclusion. No more than the immortality of the soul or than the existence of God can these forms of the mind or understanding ever be given in any human experience. Thus we see that Kant is again hoist with his own petard. He invented the categories—or, more properly speaking, his interpretation of them—for the purpose of excluding the whole transcendental ideal; that is, the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and the future life—from the realm of knowledge, and forgot that the key by which he locked the door that excluded them was, by his own very terms of uncompromising exclusion debarred as effectually as the transcendental ideal itself.

Let us understand this clearly. The Kantian categories were invented to explain the meaning of human knowledge and also its extent. In other words, Kant undertook to explain what is unexplainable in human knowledge; and he does it by means of the categories. His novel and bizarre application of these peculiarities in human knowledge confined all knowledge to human experience. We could have no knowledge of what could not be met with in experience. Mere ratiocination—even when it carried apodictic certainty—was inconcluisve. Induction from facts and deduction from principles nowhere led to knowledge, unless their conclusions bore the seal of empiricism. Nothing could be known unless known empirically. His explanation of the unexplainable is, as we have seen, that the categories exist in the mind as forms of the understanding or mental moulds into which experience is poured, and whose form experience—and consequently knowledge—takes. These categories or forms of the understanding are placed in the mind for the purpose of receiving experience. Without them experience would be impossible. They make experience possible for us. What is more, they exist only for experience. It is only the objects in experience that are received into these forms of the understanding or mental moulds, and that can assume the forms of the categories. But inasmuch as it is the categories only which can give us knowledge —for all knowledge must assume their forms—and inasmuch as they are for use only for objects in experience, and inasmuch as the transcendental ideas (the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and a future life) can never come into experience, it therefore follows that the transcendental ideas can never be touched by the categories which are intended only for objects in experience and for use in relation to the things of experience. This is, in brief, Kant's theory. It therefore follows—if Kant's philosophy be flawless—that we can have no knowledge whatever of the transcendental ideas; for being wholly outside experience and unattainable by it, they are out of the reach of the categories—and only by the categories can we acquire knowledge. This is the foundation of the entire Kantian system and it is also the basis of all modern agnosticism.

Now, where is the flaw in Kant's reasoning? The answer is that Kant has cut the ground completely from beneath his own feet when he tells us that all knowledge must come through the categories and through these from experience. But, if so, whence comes the knowledge of the categories? What assurance have we that this foundation of all knowledge is reliable? They can never be given in any experience. We can never meet with these forms in the understanding in any experience. They can never be empirically known. The transcendental ideas themselves are not more hopelessly outside the domain of experience than are these categories. For who shall dare to maintain that he can have empirical knowledge of these forms of the understanding or mental moulds of knowledge? They may exist in the mind, it is true, but who would undertake to guarantee that he could ever produce them in experience? Consequently, the great flaw in Kant's philosophy is that the categories cannot, according to his own canons, ever enter into knowledge at all; for they can never enter into experience. Consequently, if Kant's reasoning be correct, they cannot be admitted into the realm of knowledge at all, any more than we can admit the immortality of the soul or the existence of God into experience.

But, according to Kant, all our empirical knowledge rests on the truth of his categories. Now, if all our empirical knowledge rests upon the categories as its only foundation; and if the categories cannot be known at all, what becomes of the certainty of our empirical knowledge? We have here precisely the old pagan theory of the universe paralleled in modern philosophy. The ancients believed that the universe rested on the shoulders of a man; that the man stood on the back of an elephant; that the elephant was supported by a tortoise; but—what supported the tortoise? It is precisely the same with Kant's ingenious discovery of the categories. All our knowledge, according to the Kantian philosophy, rests for its truth on the truth of experience; but the truth of experience rests on the truth of Kant's theory of the categories; but who will guarantee the truth of the categories, or the fact of their existence at all as forms in the understanding, as Kant explains them? Who will show that they have objective validity as mental moulds of knowledge? They absolutely fail to meet Kant's own test of knowledge; that is, they can never be given in the course of any experience. Kant's own theory, therefore, assumes the form of a destructive boomerang which returns upon his own philosophy and leaves it maimed, broken and helpless among the philosophical wrecks of time. He thus leaves us without knowledge of any kind; for Kant's claim is that our only knowledge is empirical knowledge. But we have just shown that all our empirical knowledge rests on knowledge that is not empirical, that can never become empirical, and that has no other guarantee of any kind that is knowledge at all. What, then, if all our knowledge must be empirical?

Now, it is remarkable that this result never accrues in any other interpretation of the categories whether we take the Aristotelian, the Lockian, the Humean or any other explanation of these curious phenomena of human knowledge. It would be remarkable if Kant himself had never perceived this suicidal tendency of his own metaphysic. Our notion is that Kant did perceive the fatal flaw in his own work. We are of opinion that at the outset, before his mental processes became clear to himself, he saw this vaguely, but argued stoutly against it, and possibly succeeded in blinding himself to the truth. Indeed, he seems to combat it indirectly. But that when he came to prepare the second edition of his work the distasteful truth dawned clearly upon him can, we think, be sustained by evidence. There is a remarkable fact which has puzzled the critics, namely, that when the famous second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason" appeared there was found missing the entire section on rational psychology which had appeared boldly and openly in the first. Its disappearance in the second edition drew upon Kant's devoted head the wrath of many critics, but especially of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer, angry because Kant's onslaught on rational psychology had been suppressed in the second edition, furiously assails Kant's memory and attributes the suppression to "fear of man, produced by the weakness of old age, which not only affects the head, but sometimes deprives the heart also of . . . firmness." He rightly compares the second edition thus maimed to "a man who has had one leg amputated and replaced by a wooden one;" and while we smile at the comparison, we must admit its justice; for in the section on rational psychology in which Kant assailed the simplicity of the soul, we have simply Kant's onslaught on the first of three transcendental ideas, as he calls them—the immortality of the soul, the existence of God and a future life; and that this portion of his artillery should be drawn off from the field altogether, while the continuous discharge of musketry on the other two fields should remain in all their unabated fury, is a very curious and unexplained problem. Schopenhauer's explanation that it was done through fear of the orthodox Prussian Government can hardly be accepted as satisfactory; for Kant's warfare on the two remaining transcendental ideas is retained in all its unmitigated fury in the second edition, and must have been just as objectionable to the orthodox Prussian rulers as the section in which he assails the simplicity of the soul. We are strongly of opinion that the omission of this section from the second edition was for a totally different reason. As we have already pointed out in this article, there is a very close affinity between the simplicity—or unity—or immortality—of the soul and the categories or forms of the understanding—as Kant explains them. Indeed, there is but a single step from the one to the other. Kant doubtless perceived this at last, and perceived also that the grounds on which he tried to discredit the simplicity of the soul could be made equally destructive to the forms of the understanding, or *his* categories, inasmuch as to meet with the categories as forms of the understanding in experience is quite as difficult as to meet with the simplicity of the soul. Kant was doubtless astute enough to perceive that his species of warfare on the simplicity of the soul would be likely to suggest a similar warfare on his theory of the categories; and that if his warfare were well grounded, it would be equally destructive to his own theories; while if it were ill founded his theories would be valueless; so that whichever horn of the dilemma he took his contention against the transcendental ideas became completely discredited. Kant was no dunce. There are other indications that he was well aware of the unpleasant fact that his categories were exposed to this objection; and as the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light, it was the part of wisdom to suppress anything that would suggest to his adversaries so fatal a weapon. We are strongly of opinion that herein lies the true reason why the "Parabolisms of Pure Reason" were omitted altogether from the second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason."

To sum up briefly, what has been said in this article: We have shown beyond all possibility of contradiction that if Kant's arguments against the existence of God and the immortality of the soul possess any validity whatever, the same arguments can be turned with even more deadly effect against his own theory of the categories. If the former are to be rejected and placed outside the limits of legitimate knowledge, *a fortiori* are the categories to be rejected for a similar, and even for a stronger reason. If the object corresponding to the idea of the First necessary cause or corresponding to the simplicity of the soul is to be rejected because it can never come into any experience, the same logic compels us to summarily reject Kant's categories as forms of the understanding or mental moulds of knowledge; for neither can they ever come into any experience. And since, according to Kant, all our empirical knowledge rests on the categories for its foundation and certainty, it follows that all our empirical knowledge is less deserving of the title of knowledge than our knowledge of the existence of the First necessary cause. For the existence of the First necessary cause comes to us with all the certainty of an irresistible conclusion of reason which an absolute logical necessity forces upon us, whereas the categories, as forms of the understanding only, can produce nothing but conjecture to show that they possess any kind of objective validity whatever.

It will be seen that so far we have made no attempt to disprove Kant's theory of the categories. For our purpose here that is wholly unnecessary. The conclusions we have drawn do not depend on either the truth or falsity of Kant's theory of the categories. What we have shown is that, even if Kant's theory of the categories be true, the fangs of the serpent have been extracted. They become wholly ineffectual for the purpose for which they were invented. The great feat of engineering skill against the doctrines of Christianity becomes worthless in the very moment of its triumph. It cannot be moved against the enemy without shattering itself to pieces. This is all that was necessary for the complete overthrow of the Kantian theory of knowledge; for the end and object of the Kantian philosophy was to show what should be regarded as knowledge and what should be excluded from the title. The categories possessed the mysterious power—no one knew how, or why, or where—of deciding all this. We have exposed the mystery and unveiled the charm, so that even the untrained philosopher can hardly fail to understand wherein the secret lay and how utterly futile were all the pretensions which accompanied it. And thus falls the mighty Jericho of the categories. They are the last citadel in the Kantian realm. They gave life and strength and energy to the whole system. Without them the Kantian system would not have lived a decade. We have unmasked their pretensions and discovered their weakness. But their weakness is the whole strength of Kant.

We think, however, that in addition to being powerless, Kant's theory of the categories—as forms of the understanding—is absolutely false; and this we shall examine in another article. But whether it be true or false is a matter of indifference. We have shown beyond power of reply that as an engine of destruction it is useless. Should any one be inclined to dispute our claim, we can only ask them to point out wherein our contention has failed. There are in reality but two points in our whole argument—although, on account of the obscurity in which Kant had wrapped the problem, a lengthy exposition of the subject was necessary—the first being that Kant's theory of the categories is that they are *actual forms* of the understanding. No one can deny this. We have quoted Kant's own words at length to show that there can be no mistake about the matter. The second point is that, as such; that is, as forms of the understanding, these categories can never be met with in experience—a proposition which no man in his senses will undertake to dispute. According to Kant's doctrine, then, they can never be empirically known; and, according to the same authority, nothing can become knowledge unless known empirically. The conclusion is that, this being the case, the categories can lay no more claim to being knowledge—to say nothing of being the foundation of all empirical knowledge—than can the transcendental ideas of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, for the utter exclusion of which Kant drew from his inner consciousness the doctrine of the categories. And thus ignominiously falls the great Copernican discovery of Kant. Thus crumbles the last stronghold in the vaunted citadel. Of the conclusions we have no manner of doubt. That we have made these conclusions plain to our readers we would fain hope. If we have not, the fault is ours; for of the conclusion itself there can be no doubt. We have been obliged to write hastily and hurriedly, without time to weigh our words, and amid a thousand distractions and interruptions incidental to the work of a priest on the mission; whereas, the subject matter called for not only sustained and concentrated thought, but careful choice of expression. For the latter we have had no time. Our only regret is that we have not the leisure to present this argument as forcibly and irresistibly as we should like. Of its overwhelming and unanswerable conclusiveness we have not even the shadow of a doubt. The problem for solution which confronts the earnest Kantian may be put in a very few words. It is: If all our knowledge must be empirical knowledge, and if all our empirical knowledge must rest on knowledge that is not and never can be empirical, what is to be thought of our empirical knowledge? Making bricks without straw were an easy task compared with the solution. This brief summary is a true appraisal of "the treasure" which Kant left to posterity.

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SOME RECENT WORKS ON THE REFORMATION.

Denifle, "Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Entwickelung." Second edition. Mainz, 1904-1906.

Baudrillart, "The Catholic Church, the Renaissance and Protestantism." Translated by Mrs. Philip Gibbs. London, 1908.

Cristiani, "Luther et le Luthéranisme." Paris, 1909.

Köstlin, "Martin Luther, sein Leben und seine Schriften." Fifth edition. Berlin, 1903.

IS IT possible to get an exact representation of historical events and personages? No doubt both the writer and the reader of history bring to it their preconceived notions, the bias of their taste and temperament. We must allow for the personal factor, as we should allow for the moist atmosphere that colors the distant hills purple—nay, more; on occasion we must thankfully admire the glamour of color on the hill and in the history, while not forgetting its nature. This is not the real difficulty. The real difficulty is that often both writer and reader approach their task without having any clear idea of the meaning of words. Some fundamental question may be begged in every sentence. For instance, what is "greatness?" What is "independence?" What constitutes the "religious" character? Is it more religious to be swayed by alternate emotions of exaltation and depression than to control and measure both by intellect and will? Is revolt really always more independent than voluntary submission? Is it greater to impersonate and therefore lead a widespread trend of thought than to resist it by force of conviction in a minority?

A page of definitions at the head of many books and articles would make marvelously for clearness.

These thoughts have arisen out of some articles on Luther appearing in the "Spectator"[1] and the "Contemporary Review"[2] some time ago. The following pages have, however, been written without any such immediate reference; indeed, without any other impulse than the intense interest and importance for all thoughtful minds of the questions discussed.

Denifle's monumental work is an investigation, with abundant references and quotations, into certain of Luther's writings; an analysis of some doctrines and his attitude towards them; an exposition of his principles and methods; and, through all, an elucidation of his character. In his powerful personality is the key to his doctrine and his influence.

Father Denifle had been many years studying "the two currents which are observable from the fourteenth century onwards, at least in France and Germany: that of decline and decay in a great part of the secular and regular clergy and the current of moral renewal and recovery in the remaining part."[3] "The mark and token of the decline was absence of self-control, aversion from every effort and the confession in act: I cannot resist. The law was felt to be a burden and a limit—and people acted accordingly."[4] "The representatives of the other tendency, which corresponds to the higher part of man, are those circles of the secular and regular clergy, who, corresponding with their vocation and living in the following of Christ, longed for a reform of Christendom, and by word, writing and example, sometimes with all their power, sought to arrest the decay."[5]

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[1] *Spectator*, 25 Jan., 1908; Art., "The Apocalypse."

[2] *Contemporary Review*, April, 1908; Literary Supplement.

Their efforts were largely unavailing, and corruption often gained in one place the ground lost in another. "The satires of the Italian and German humanists against the corrupt clergy of their time did harm instead of good, and did not contribute in the least towards reform: for in their lives the authors were mostly still more tainted with the moral decay. It was different with some of the French humanists."[6]

The situation develops suddenly and rapidly from about 1520, from the time, that is, when the nature and bearing of Luther's principles begin to be unmistakable. "From this time one meets at every step bands of ex-religious, renegade priests, who as if at a watchword have thrown overboard everything that hitherto was sacred to Christians and to them—who vie with each other in exposing to contempt the Mother Church, Mass, breviary, confessional, fasting—in short, every ecclesiastical institution—and with word and pen abuse the Pope as Antichrist, Bishops and churchmen as the children of the devil."[7] They talk of priests' marriage, monks' marriage and defy opinion in the spirit of the words of their leader: 'A fig for scandal; necessity knows no law and gives no scandal.' " They emancipate themselves from restraint of every kind and erect the gratification of all natural impulses into a new law, invoking the name of Christ in self-justification: "Christ has made us free from all laws when they are contrary to God's commandments."[8] "All those who want to lead an unrestrained life join the evangelicals," says a contemporary.[9]

Luther at first belonged rather to those who earnestly desired a real reform. The problem was, therefore, how he came to stand, as he did, at the head of the group just described. The solution is found in his character. Denifle had to determine when and by what stages, extremely gradual as they were, Luther departed from Catholic teaching. "The sources of information themselves (for the most part Luther's own utterances) give completely different accounts of his development—writings contemporary with events in one sense, later writings in another, the Table Talk in a third."[10] This variation, in itself a psychological indication of the highest importance, had hitherto not been taken into account.

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[3] Denifle, p. 1.

[4] Denifle, p. 1.

[5] *Ibid*, p. 2.

[6] *Ibid*, p. 4.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 6.

[8] *Ibid*, p. 7.

[9] *Ibid*, p. 332; Barth. von Usingen.

Luther's earliest childhood was passed in poverty in Mansfeld. He was severely treated both at home and at school, and grew repressed and timid. The religious environment[11] was very similar to that of many places in our own day which lie away from the current of life in the big world. "Of ecclesiastical or anti-ecclesiastical movements there was no trace among the population. The traditional customs and conceptions of mediæval Catholicism reigned undisturbed."[12] "The Mansfeld clergy seem to have kept free from the moral scandals that in other places became a chief cause of disaffection to the clergy"—so the biographer infers from the impression made on the boy Luther, though he quotes also some evidence to the contrary. He notes further that "Luther often dwelt in after years on the importance for children of the sight of religious pictures—very probably from his own experience. There were processions and religious plays to be seen, notably in the Mansfeld district. Nor were the Church and the children she had to educate so entirely destitute of true Christian teaching as is often thought. The Our Father, the Apostles' Creed and the Ten Commandments at least were thoroughly learned. Moreover, some short hymns in German had long been sung. Luther himself speaks of such fine old hymns and developed some of them for the use of the evangelical community.[13]

At the age of fourteen he went to school to Magdeburg, where he stayed only a year, and thence to Eisenach, where he lived for the first time in happy conditions and had kind friends. "At last he enjoyed connected and thorough teaching in the school attached to the parish church of St. George." The head master was "a learned man of some distinction and a poet,"[14] that is to say, in this connection, a humanist.

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[10] Denifle, p. 423.

[11] Most of what follows is taken from Köstlin, whose book is one of the standard Protestant biographies.

[12] Köstlin, I., pp. 21-22.

[13] We find Luther in the very flush of his success as a reformer and of his zeal for the Bible only, falling back on the Our Father, the Creed and the Commandments, to which he adds the Hail Mary as a kind of irreducible minimum for the instruction of the ignorant and simple. V. Köstlin, I., pp. 292, 544, 574.

In 1501 Luther went to the University of Erfurt. His father wished him to be a jurist, and family circumstances had so far improved that it was possible to provide the means of study. Luther took his bachelor's degree in philosophy in 1502, being the thirtieth of fifty-seven candidates, and that of master in 1505 as the second of seventeen. Logic, rhetoric and philosophy taught by scholastic professors did not then seem incompatible with humane learning. The two most distinguished professors of philosophy were Trutvetter and Usingen, who appear to have avoided the more extreme subtleties of decadent scholasticism, but to have followed the school of Occam rather than the older and sounder teachers.[15] There was a real enthusiasm for classical studies at the University, and Luther read the chief Latin authors, though without distinguishing himself like some of his companions. He passed among his friends the "poets" rather as a learned philosopher.

"As to Luther's tendency and position with regard to the Church, there were not at the University any influences calculated to affect him very strongly either way—either in those philosophical studies which so far did not touch the purely theological domain or in his share in humanistic exercises and efforts."[16] "Erfurt undeniably gave more scope for and impetus to a free movement of mind at that time than other universities. But even if one kept to strict Church views, one could share in humanistic studies there and have personal intercourse with the enthusiasts, without being shaken or molested in one's religious tenets."[17] In fact, religion seems to have been taken for granted and not made a subject for study or discussion among the students. Luther says in his Table Talk (suspect, it is true, as a source of information) that he did not see a Bible until his twentieth year. Whether that be literally true or not—they were, of course, in every theological library—he knew the extensive extracts in the Missal and loved the Psalms from his youth.[18] He eventually found a copy of the Bible in the University library, but even then did not feel impelled to study it or any of the numerous commentaries that were in the library collection.

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[14] Köstlin, I., p. 28.

[15] Luther writes in 1520 that he is "of the Occamist party," and again that he has "thoroughly drunk in" the views of that sect. V. Denifle, p. 595. Denifle shows that the ground for Luther's doctrine of the externality of the work of salvation and the mere imputation of justification was laid in his training in Occamist theology.

[16] Köstlin, I., p. 40.

[17] *Ibid*, I., p. 43.

[18] *Ibid*, I., p. 105.

He is described as "by nature a lively and merry young fellow."[19] He delighted his companions with his singing and playing. On the other hand, such evidence as exists shows that he was the victim of morbid fits of gloom and terror. His determination to become a religious was quite sudden. He had finished his philosophy and just begun his law course. According to the best supported account, he vowed to enter a convent if his life were spared during a terrific thunder storm; and carried out his purpose within a fortnight. The convent he chose "belonged to the Augustinian Order, to the congregation known as Observants, who had united for more regular discipline and observance of the venerable old rules."[20] Reforms had been successfully carried through under the Vicars General Proles and Staupitz. Staupitz took this office in 1503 and visited Erfurt in 1504. "The regulations of the order for external life and religious exercises were moderately framed; they had been revised under Staupitz's direction." "Most of the preaching in Erfurt was done by these Augustinians and in a popular style, even in the town churches." There was in the convent a *studium generale* for the order. Luther on entering it turned his back on his legal studies, but he took his Plautus and Virgil with him. "Staupitz's constitutions prescribed eager reading, devout hearing and assiduous learning of the Scriptures."[21] "Staupitz exhorted him personally above all things to make himself accurately familiar with the biblical text, that he might become a good theologian."[22]

Luther entered the convent in 1505, at the age of twenty-two, and was in charge of the novice master until his ordination in 1507. To this man he pays a remarkable tribute at a time when any such is enhanced by his general tone.[23] This "excellent man" and "true Christian" recognized exceptional possibilities in Luther and, according to another valuable testimony of the year 1530, knew so well how to console him in his temptations that he was restored to peace of mind.

After this he passed directly under the prior's authority. In 1508 he was sent to the University of Wittenberg to teach philosophy, returned to Erfurt in 1509, made a journey to Rome probably in 1511 and went back to Wittenberg, where he became sub-prior in 1512 and regent of studies in the convent in 1515.

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[19] Köstlin, I., p. 46.

[20] *Ibid*, p. 49.

[21] *Ibid*, p. 55.

[22] *Ibid*, p. 56. Köstlin attributes to Staupitz (p. 68) the, to his mind, supreme credit of moulding "the future reformer." He more than once puts this construction on utterances of Luther's advisers, which to a Catholic are the simplest expression of Catholic custom and common sense.

[23] Denifle, p. 384.

One side of his religious experience—for Luther all through his life appears in a twofold aspect, and with conflicting, even violently conflicting, impulses—may conveniently be summed up in Janssen's words: "Simple, unquestioning obedience to the rules of the order became distasteful to him. It was his duty to say his 'Horæ' daily, but, carried away by his passion for study, he often let weeks go by without taking his breviary in his hand; then he would try to make up all at once for past omissions, would shut himself up in his cell, touch neither food nor drink for several weeks, go without sleep and torture himself to such an extent that he was once nearly losing his senses. The prescribed rules of ascetic practice did not satisfy him. 'I imposed on myself additional penances,' he writes; 'I devised a special plan of discipline for myself. The seniors in my rule objected strongly to this irregularity, and they were right. I was a criminal self-torturer and self-destroyer, for I imposed on myself fastings, vigils and prayers beyond my powers of endurance. I wore myself out with self-mortifications, which is nothing less than self-murder.' "[24] Still, in the earlier years Luther describes his state as a happy one. In 1507 he finds in monastic life something "exquisitely peaceful and divine."[25] In 1512 he writes of it in glowing terms to his former teacher, Usingen. "When I was a candidate for the Augustinian Order," Usingen reminds him in 1529, "you could not sufficiently commend it to me. But now you are a derider and destroyer of it."[26] In various writings he explains the religious life and dwells on its excellence. And so late as 1515 he says (the passage may serve as a specimen of many): "Wherefore I believe that it is better now to be a religious than for two hundred years back; for this reason, that until now monks went aside from the cross and it was a distinction to be a religious. Now once more they begin to displease men, even the good, because of the folly of the habit. For this is to be a religious, to be hateful and foolish to the world. But I know them to be most happy, if they had charity [sic] and more blessed than the hermits; because they are exposed to the cross and daily ignominy."[27]

But inward weakness and outward circumstances combined to Luther's undoing. We have seen his liability to gloom. He was also restless in his studies. He writes from Wittenberg in March, 1509: "If you wish to know how I am, thank God, I am well. The study is severe, especially of philosophy, which from the beginning I would gladly have exchanged for theology; yes, for theology, which searches out the kernel of the nut, the pith of the wheat, the marrow of the bone."[28] Moreover, he was intensely obstinate, a defect of which he frequently admits both the existence and the danger. He early gave signs of a headstrong determination to have his own way.[29] One who attended his lectures at Wittenberg writes that when he was sent thither "those at Erfurt were not particularly sorry, for Martin would insist that he was right in all disputations and loved to quarrel." The same chronicler records that he was a "clever man," but "by nature arrogant,"[30] and this arrogance grew apace. Nothing is written so large on Luther's life as a self-protecting and self-regarding violence of word and act which are the direct opposite of the qualities that we associate with the success of good principles and wise projects. Such, however, was the unruliness of his temperament that a modern psychological critic asks whether in his gravest outbreaks "he was more unfortunate or more guilty."[31] In the event he could brook no contradiction. Melanchthon[32] began to experience this in 1526, and writes in 1538: "You remember what a slavery it was when you were there. And yet you must know that he is becoming harsher than ever now." And again in 1548, after Luther's death: "I bore formerly also an almost odious slavery, inasmuch as Luther often yielded to his nature, in which contentiousness was not slight, more than was useful for himself or the common good."

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[24] Janssen, "History of the German People," London, 1900, Vol. III., p. 83. The quotation is not furnished with a reference in the English edition.

[25] Denifle, p. 387.

[26] *Ibid*, p. 792.

[27] *Ibid*, p. 36.

The life at Wittenberg was anything but regular, which "explains much in Luther's career and that of his Wittenberg companions, especially Zwilling, notorious for his attacks on convents. He and others like him were later on the first to throw off the habit, storm convents, desecrate altars and so on."[33] Even in 1509 during his first stay there Luther was entirely absorbed in business and in study. But in 1516 he wrote to Lang in Erfurt:

"I should want two secretaries, for the whole day long I do hardly anything but write letters; and so I do not know whether I do not continually repeat the same thing. I am community and table preacher; every day I am wanted to preach in the parish church; I am regent of studies, vicar of the district and therefore eleven times a prior. I am in charge of the fish pond at Leitzkau, advocate in the negotiations about the Herzberg parish church, lecturer on St. Paul, co-lecturer on the Psalter. I seldom have full time to read the Hours and to celebrate; and there are in addition the personal temptations with the world, the flesh and the devil."[34] Another letter[35] of the year 1519 puts the effects of this mental and moral dissipation very clearly, and an utterance of 1535 gives a confirmatory testimony: "I myself in my day recited many of these canonical hours, alas! so that the psalm or the Hour was over before I noticed whether I was in the beginning or the middle."[36] The letter of 1516 is of extreme significance, especially as Luther was then (1515-1516) engaged on his "Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans," in which his later heresies are clearly reflected.[37]

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[28] *Ibid*, p. 388.

[29] This seems to have been a family characteristic. Köstlin (*op. cit.*, I., 11) says that "members and relatives of the Luther family appear most often among those inhabitants of Mohra who were brought to account for violently taking the law into their own hands."

[30] Denifle, pp. 764, 454.

[31] Cristiani, p. 119.

[32] *Ibid*, pp. 180-181.

[33] Denifle, p. 33.

At a time when he was still (1515-1516) upholding the principle of authority in his letters, lectures and writings and had not yet openly attacked any dogma of the Church, he shows an independent spirit of criticism. In the "Commentary on Romans" he sets up an exaggerated idea of Christian liberty, and advocates the abolition of fast days and a decrease in the number of festivals, "because the ignorant observe them so scrupulously as not to believe that there is any salvation without them." "So also it would be useful," he continues, "to purify and change almost the whole decree and to lessen the number of processions; nay, more, the ceremonies of prayers and ornaments, because these grow daily, and so, that faith and charity decrease by them, and avarice, pride, vainglory are nourished; nay, what is worse, that men hope to be saved by them, caring nothing for the inner life."[38] The criticism came, as such criticisms most often come, from one whose own inner life was at variance with it.

The absence of recollection and the vice of overweening self-assertion undermined it and destroyed the availability of all external helps to it. His utterances about the passions run the gamut from struggle through helpless remorse to acquiescence. He came to regard man's innate tendency to evil as irresistible; nay, as universal and overwhelming. He identified it with original sin, which, he asserted, is never remitted, but vitiates a man's whole nature and life, inevitably causes his actual sins and makes "justification" in the sense of a change and purification impossible. In accordance with this he put a new interpretation on certain texts of St. Paul. He "discovered" the Gospel to be "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth" and "the justice of God revealed therein from faith unto faith."[39] He states in 1540[40]—many years after the event, it is true, but we are in a sense as much concerned with Luther's impressions about facts as with the facts themselves—that he had always learned that God's anger and His justice in punishing was revealed in the Gospel. "As often as I read the text I always wished that God had never revealed the Gospel. For who could love the God that is always angry, judging and condemning?" And yet in 1515 he had himself explained the text in accordance with tradition.[41] But at last he "came through the enlightenment of the Holy Ghost to the joyous discovery that in that text there was no question of the punitive justice of God, but of passive justice, through which the merciful God justifies us through faith. Then the whole Scripture, nay, heaven itself, was opened to me."[42]

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[34] Denifle, p. 33.

[35] *Ibid*, p. 99.

[36] *Ibid*, p. 462.

[37] P. H. Grisar, S. J., comes, independently of Denifle, to the same conclusions in an article in the literary supplement of the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, 29 Oct., 1903: "Luther gradually lost the spirit of his order and the zeal of his earlier time; he became the spokesman of an apparently religious and even mystic tendency, which, however, was really lax. . . . The chief point is that, instead of the previously assumed peculiar fervor, it can be shown that there was a falling off in his ecclesiastical life and his observance of the rule *before* his estrangement from dogma."

[38] Denifle, p. 34.

At the crucial time, about 1515, he explains pretty clearly in a sermon the connection in his mind between the impossibility of resisting concupiscence and the justification nevertheless possible for the sinner." God has imposed on us things impossible and above our strength. Because the law is spiritual and the wisdom of the flesh carnal, it cannot do anything towards fulfilling the law. Christ alone came to fulfill that which we cannot discharge. But Christ imparts to us his fulfillment by making Himself our hen, that we may fly under His wings and that by His fulfillment we also may fulfill the law."[43] The passage is too long to quote, but it illustrates a use of current Catholic terminology without the corresponding ideas which is very characteristic and helped for years to confuse the issues. Much that Luther wrote in his beginnings was more or less susceptible of orthodox interpretation. But his studies in scholastic philosophy and theology are proved not to have been thorough.[44] Consequently, in default of a personal realization of the principles underlying the ordinary practice of the Church, it was all the easier to misconceive and falsify her fundamental teaching.

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[39] Rom. i., 16-17.

[40] Denifle, p. 395.

[41] Denifle, p. 448. In view of Protestant ignorance of this tradition, Denifle has made a laborious collection of testimonies to it in a separately published appendix to his Volume I., and has proved it also by a beautiful and suggestive chapter on the prayers in the missal and breviary (pp. 400-422).

[42] *Ibid*, p. 395.

[43] *Ibid*, p. 433.

That there was this default is abundantly clear. Much has been made of Luther's late statements to the effect that he was for twenty years a fervent, even an extravagantly fervent, religious. The note of extravagance is self-condemnatory, and we have seen that by 1516, after only eleven years of religious life, he could no longer be described as fervent. At best he labored and tormented himself to acquire an assurance of God's favor on the strength of his works of penance, a practice which he afterwards scathingly attributed to religious in general. Indeed he seems to have conceived "our justice"[45] as something absolutely natural—to have made no allowance for divine help in the fulfillment of the law. In those agonizing crises already referred to he did not, at least on his own showing, exercise the virtues of faith and hope,[46] which at a later period he confounded in one under the name of justifying faith; and set up as a discovery of his own and a substitute for all the virtues that, in the Catholic system, characterize the soul in its relation to God.

It would not be possible in a short space to follow Denifle in his exposure of Luther's fallacies and inconsistencies. Luther was necessarily entangled in difficulties when he sought to evolve a theological system different from the harmonious and mentally satisfying system of the Church. Nothing could be more untrue to fact than the conception of him as the champion of liberty and reason, against mediæval superstition and obscurantism. He attacked Church authority, it is true, but only to substitute his own wisdom. He aimed at supplanting scientific theology by common sense and a modicum of humane learning applied to the Scriptures.[47] He arrogantly dismissed recognized teachers: "I would nearly swear that none of the scholastic theologians understands one chapter of the Gospel and the Bible; nay, not even one chapter of the philosopher Aristotle."[48] In a sense he stood on rationalistic ground, and this germ, too, has had its natural growth; but he clung in his own person to a theological system divorced from reason: "The Gospel is a doctrine of a kind that cannot, like the doctrine of the law, be understood by reason, but clearly is at variance with reason; for reason cannot grasp attributed justice, and not even in the saints is this cognition sufficiently firm."[49] He asserts that "reason is opposed to faith. God alone can give faith and power of believing, against nature, against reason." "It is impossible for faith and reason to agree with each other." "The Sorbonne, the mother of errors, defined very badly that the same things are true in philosophy and theology; and impiously condemned those who asserted the contrary." "Although the saying is to be held that 'Everything true must agree with the truth,' nevertheless, the same thing is not true in different branches. In theology it is true that the Word was made flesh; in philosophy it is simply impossible and absurd."[50] Blessed John Fisher wrote in 1523: "You consulted well for your opinions when you sought to disparage the authority of the Scholastics and even of Aristotle. For take away Logic, and straightway the means of overthrowing what is false and of establishing what is true will have disappeared. Take away Logic, and we shall all be like gladiators brandishing our swords in the darkness. If you abolish Logic, it will not at all surprise me that those arguments of yours appear sound to some people. But if you admit Logic, there is no one but will think them to be what they really are, that is mere sophisms."[51]

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[44] His studies do not seem to have been thorough in any direction. Creighton ("Hist. of the Papacy," Vol. VI., p. 63) says: "He was not a scholar; indeed, he never was at home in Greek, and knew no Hebrew." Significant facts in the case of a translator of the Bible.

[45] Denifle, p. 436.

[46] *Ibid*, p. 462.

[47] Köstlin, I., p. 276.

[48] Denifle, p. 648.

The most elementary Catholic notions were all confused or distorted in Luther's system, if system it can be called. Faith is nowhere clearly defined, but turns into a kind of self-evolved and self-reliant confidence that sin is no longer imputed to the believer on account of the merits of Christ. In 1515-1516 Luther had defined it as "nothing else but obedience of the mind,"[52] though even then he had the strange idea that "every word that comes from the mouth of an ecclesiastical superior of a good and holy man is the Word of Christ."[53] This faith was supposed to result in a happy certainty of salvation, but among the first Lutherans, as might be expected, the weakness of the position was painfully apparent. Luther had no other remedy for doubt than to stifle it or to distract the mind by pleasure and a reckless presumption; he explains it as a suggestion of Satan, or as due to the inherent weakness of human nature and the difficulty of the doctrine. It was undoubtedly difficult of acceptance and unavailing in hours of depression or remorse. Denifle notes after 1530, when it was fairly widespread, "an increase of melancholy and depression, of anguish of conscience, despair of the grace of God, increase of suicides. Instead of a generation that, after more than a thousand years of oppression, doubt, anxious living and dying (such as is represented to have existed under the Papacy), is at last delivered from despair, fear and doubt by the joyful message of Luther to Christendom, we find a wretched generation, for which from 1530 onwards enough 'Consoling Booklets' cannot be written on the prevailing fear of death and of the anger of God, against gloom, melancholy, despair of God's grace and of the bliss of souls."[54]

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[49] *Ibid*, p. 608.
[50] Denifle, p. 638; years 1536-1539.
[51] *Ibid*, p. 621.
[52] *Ibid*, p. 627.
[53] *Ibid*, p. 467.

The notions of the Church, the priesthood, the sacraments, were essentially altered. Concupiscence, original sin, actual sin, mortal sin, venial sin, were all confounded. Indulgences lost their meaning; repentance became superfluous. The idea of sanctification vanished. Free will (in matters of salvation, as Luther carefully distinguishes) was denied altogether, and grace became a potent operation of God with which man is not even required to coöperate. This makes all direct voluntary service of God inconceivable and deprives all service of one's neighbor of any ideal motive; "that so a man may be a perfect Christian, within before God, Who does not need our works, by faith; without before men, to whom our faith is of no use, but our works or charity."[55] The greatest and the first commandment is thus commented on: "The law demands that you should love God with your whole heart and your neighbor as yourself. But who is there, pray, that does this? For even the love of the saints is imperfect and often disturbed by fear, by diffidence, by impatience in adversity. What, then, becomes of faith informed by charity? If God will not consider you just unless you love Him with your whole heart and fulfill the law, you will never be justified."[56] Luther bitterly resented the imputation that his doctrine of passive justification involved a denial of the necessity of good works. He did not mean that it should.[57] His theory, sadly belied by facts, was that they would flow naturally from faith. "Luther would never have been the leader of a great rebellion if he had clearly known whither he was tending,"[58] or if he had realized the force of Erasmus' words to Melanchthon: "What is there more detestable in the world than to expose ignorant people to hear public discussions on such subjects as good works, merits, good resolutions, pure heresies and to profess that our will is not free, that all happens necessarily, fatally and that it does not much matter what are or may be a man's actions?"[59]

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[54] Denifle, p. 782.

[55] *Ibid*, p. 721; year 1535.

[56] Denifle, p. 669.

[57] "To be sure he did not," says Denifle (p. 651), drawing another inference from a principle of Luther's. "But a man who presumes to pronounce sentence of death on a thousand years' past should surely consider his theories in such a way that they may be secure against fatal logical consequences."

[58] Creighton, "History of the Papacy," Vol. V., p. 89.

Luther's evolution of doctrine has, of course, been represented as a gradual discovery of light and truth. But Denifle proves: that his early views were in accordance with the precedent and subsequent teaching of the Church; that his later views rested on more or less wilful and increasingly violent misrepresentations of that teaching; that these views were subjective, based entirely on individual experience; that they have no consistency; and that they involve the most fatal consequences.

"One feels that all this doctrine is the fruit of an unbalanced and anxious soul, desperately seeking interior repose and peace."[60] But peace of conscience was not to be attained by it. Cristiani has an illuminating chapter entitled: "L'Etat d'âme de Luther après 1517." Luther, he says, may very well have believed at first that he was fighting in a good cause. He met with warm approval from esteemed and learned men: "On all sides there was an enthusiastic response to the passionate accents of an eloquence trivial, it is true, but always warm and moving."[61] Then "around him at Wittenberg is a throng of eager youth from which already emerge men of undisputed talent like Melanchthon and Georg Wicel."[62] Moreover, Luther did not see "the depth of the gulf that was opening between the Church and him." He was, "to use Möhler's expression, 'the plaything of passing feelings and of impressions of the moment.'" But the day came when he had to recognize "on the one hand that the Catholic world, though shaken, was not destroyed, and, on the other, that his own party, far from forming a Church, was breaking up into a thousand sects opposed and hostile to one another."[63] "Oh, what it has cost me," he writes on November 28, 1521, "and what pains and difficulties have I not had, even relying on the best established texts of Holy Scripture, before succeeding, and hardly succeeding, in justifying myself in the eyes of my conscience." He asks himself: "Are you alone wise? Have all the rest deceived themselves? And if you were deluded! If you had sent all these souls astray! And if through you they saw themselves one day condemned to eternal torments!" "Throughout his life he was pursued by this objection of the indefectibility of the Church. Here is one passage, amongst many, which reveals his difficulty: "There is another argument which it is excessively difficult to take from them [the Papists] and which we ourselves have much difficulty in resolving or refuting, all the more as we must grant that in the Papacy is the Word of God and the apostolate, and that from them we have received the Scriptures, baptism, the sacrament and the pulpit. Who, indeed, can rise up against the Church of which we say in the Creed: I believe in one Christian Church? Now, I find this Church in the Papacy, therefore I must obey. If I condemn it, I am excommunicated, rejected and condemned by God and by all the saints."[64]

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[59] Quoted by Baudrillart, p. 233.

[60] Cristiani, p. 83.

[61] *Ibid*, p. 159.

[62] *Ibid*, p. 160.

[63] Cristiani, p. 161.

Luther broke definitely with the Church when he burned the Pope's Bull in 1520. His enforced leisure in the Wartburg he used to make a new translation of the New Testament in support of his personally evolved tenets, and in directing a violent attack on a great outstanding bulwark of the Catholic religion with his book, "De Votis Monasticis." It demands a special mention. This and other statements of Luther about the religious life have been subjected by Denifle, for the first time, to a critical examination which destroys the legend of a Luther driven out of the Church by the intolerable mediæval monastic system. Luther in 1519 calls the counsels "certain and shorter ways to fulfill the commandments of God more easily and happily."[65] In 1521 he writes from the Wartburg: "Against the vows of religious and priests there is a strong conspiracy between Philip [Melanchthon] and me, to abolish and annul them."[66] He already hates the words nun, monk, priest. Celibacy is the first point attacked. He wants to make it optional, "as the Gospel demands; but how to manage it I do not yet clearly see."[67] The solution lay in a free interpretation and adaptation of all the relative Scriptural passages, from which he gets a new view of the content of the vows. As Köstlin puts it, religious "have vowed a life under a yoke of law that is repugnant to the freedom that we have in faith in Christ, that we should impose such a life on ourselves as something necessary; faith makes all exterior things optional, the vows impose them."[68] At one time Luther represents "religious as preëminently living according to the principle of justification by works and talks of the folly and iniquity of those who fast and pray themselves to death."[69] He rails at "Augustinians, Franciscans, Dominicans and others" who have forfeited the name of Christian, "for they have that by which they intend to be saved, their rule and vows."[70] But again he makes the most of abuses, which he erects into a statement of general practice. Here his own argument against Carlstadt and the Bildersturm condemns him: "If we were to reject everything that is misused, what state of things would we have? There are many people who adore the sun, moon and stars; shall we therefore cast the stars from heaven and pull down the sun and moon?"[71] Luther's utterances about the monastic life are clearly dictated by the memory of a past seen in the light of a violent revulsion and repugnance.

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[64] *Ibid*, pp. 165-166.
[65] Denifle, p. 38.
[66] *Ibid*, p. 40.
[67] *Ibid*, p. 305.
[68] *Op. cit.*, I., 466.
[69] Denifle, p. 315.

Luther's expressed views on the evolution of heretics, ranging as they do over a number of years, are illuminating. On the attitude of heretics to the Church (1514): "Heretics cannot themselves appear good, unless they represent the Church as bad, false and lying."[72] On their use of the Scriptures (1514): "This is the most hurtful kind of deception, namely, to stretch the Holy Scriptures by wicked glosses to a lie, that by such an authority the lie may become credible. For thus all heretics do not rely merely on reasons (though they begin with them and first establish what appeals to their reason), but also on the Scriptures, yet so that they stretch them to their own inventions of reason."[73] On the necessity of a mission and the insubordination of the heretic (1515-1516): "Before everything it must be noticed that he who teaches be sent by God, like John. This is the strongest weapon with which to strike heretics. For without the testimony of God or of an authority confirmed by God, but of their own motion, relying on an appearance of piety they preach."[74] "Heretics by no means recognize their error, but obstinately defend it and wish to seem Catholics."[75] In 1514 he writes: "No heretic is overcome by warring and contending. Because every such is obstinate and hardened and incredulous to the Word. For he is wise in his own eyes, and therefore hard to persuade and prepared to yield to no one";[76] and in 1527: "I have often said that it is not easily found that the author of a heresy was converted. I know no example, although those who are seduced can be converted, but the inventors commonly remain hardened; because St. Paul (Tit. iii., 10) says not in vain: 'A man that is a heretic after the first and second admonition avoid.' It is the nature of this sin to fight against grace."[77]

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[70] *Ibid*, p. 317.

[71] *Ibid*, p. 65; year 1522.

[72] Denifle, p. 13.

[73] *Ibid*, p. 496.

[74] *Ibid*, p. 628.

[75] *Ibid*, p. 623.

[76] *Ibid*, p. 764.

[77] *Ibid*, p. 479.

All these things apply literally to Luther himself. From the time that he became involved in controversy he read his preconceived ideas into all his authors, especially into the Scriptures. Ulrich Zasius, one of the foremost lawyers and humanists of the time, and at first strongly drawn to Luther's cause, writes: "Need I say that Luther with insolent effrontery interprets the whole Scripture of the Old and New Testaments, from the first book of the Bible to the end, against Popes and priests, as if God had had no other business from the beginning of the world than to thunder against the priesthood? With that clever forcing of the sense Luther extracts all this from the Scriptures; he alone does not see who will not see."[78] In no instance is his method of interpretation more clearly seen than in his distinction between Law and Gospel, which gradually assume the character of irreconcilable antitheses, until, finally, we arrive at this definition of the Gospel: "The word Gospel is nothing else than a new, good, joyous message or doctrine and preaching which announces something that men are heartily glad to hear. That cannot be a law or commandment which demands something from us and impels and threatens punishment and damnation if we do not do it; for no one likes to hear that; and although one may teach both long and intensely and live up to it as far as possible, no consolation or joy follows from it because, after all, we can never satisfy the law so that it does not cease to urge and accuse us. Therefore to help us God had to send another preaching through His Son, from which we might have comfort and peace. And that was: Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved."[79]

The assurance with which, at all events in his later career, Luther set up his views as dogmas, led him to treat adversaries with abuse instead of argument, and abuse that shocked even his adherents, accustomed as they were to a coarse controversial tone. Speeches, sermons, books, pamphlets, songs, pictures, all vehicles were used for the purpose. The pamphlet was a Lutheran novelty. The country was regularly flooded by means of it with mockery and abuse of Church, Pope, clergy. Werstemius repeats on the word of a Lutheran whom he found busy distributing these publications that Germany was full of them in 1528. This man "produces on the spot a number of dialogues, some in Latin, some in German, illustrated and got up with some taste, but so foreign to the spirit of the Gospel that I never saw more execrable mockeries. Nevertheless, I praised them and asked if he had anything newer. 'Anything?' he begins; 'do you see these in French; how attractive they are with pictures scattered all over them? I am taking these secretly to Liège, Limbourg, Namur, that they also may at length begin to appreciate the Lutheran Gospel."[80] Sometimes the relative importance of text and picture was inverted. Or the pamphlets took the form of songs set to well-known melodies, often hymn tunes.

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[78] Denifle, p. 334.

[79] *Ibid*, p. 799.

It would, however, be unjust to imply that Luther's appeal to the popular taste and to the natural man had only this side. His extension of the use of the German hymn and much writing and preaching of a devotional kind show another, which must have helped powerfully to blind ordinary people to his tendency. Religious emotion of a tense kind was compatible with all Luther's self-assertion and iconoclasm. Besides, the force of his personality was tremendous; and many instances are given where he shows kind feeling and tenderly human impulses. "Luther was a soul; a soul living, original and individual, but also profoundly German. 'I was born for my fellow-Germans,' said he, 'and I wish to serve them.' "[81] He boasts of his ascendency over them in these terms: "I would undertake, if I wished, to preach my people easily back to the Papacy in two or three sermons."[82]

Not that in the long run he relied on moral force only. The Reformation was anything but a purely religious revolution. Ranke[83] shows that the German princes looked on Luther as a possibly useful political tool. He himself made loud appeals to a national, anti-Roman spirit amongst princes, nobility and people. At one time representatives of the discontented German nobility, like Hutten and Sickingen, were his eager allies.[84] He found himself gradually driven to invoking the secular arm in defense of the "Gospel." "The Zwinglian schism, the rise of the Anabaptists and the Peasants' War altered the aspect of affairs. Luther recognized in them the fruits of his theory of the right of private judgment and of dissent, and the moment had arrived to secure his Church against the application of the same dissolving principles which had served him to break off from his allegiance to Rome. The excesses of the social war threatened to deprive the movement of the sympathy of the higher classes, especially of the governments. and with the defeat of the peasants the popular phase of the Reformation came to an end on the Continent."[85] "He instantly turned from the people to the princes, impressed on his party that character of political dependence, and that habit of passive obedience to the State which it has ever since retained and gave it a stability it could never otherwise have acquired. The notion of liberty, whether civil or religious, was hateful to his despotic nature and contrary to his interpretation of Scripture."[86] "Besides the consolatory doctrine of justification, he bribed the princes with the wealth of the Church, independence of ecclesiastical authority, facilities for polygamy and absolute power. Persuaded that the sovereign power would be on his side, he allowed no limits to its extent. The power thus concentrated in the hands of the rulers for the guardianship of the faith he wished to be used with the utmost severity against unregenerate men, in whom there was neither moral virtue nor civil rights, and from whom no good could come until they were converted. He therefore required that all crimes should be most cruelly punished and that the secular arm should be employed to convert where it did not destroy. The idea of mercy tempering justice he denounced as a Popish superstition."[87]

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[80] Denifle, p. 338.

[81] Baudrillart, Eng. ed., pp. 94-95.

[82] Denifle, p. 341.

[83] "Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation."

[84] V. Köstlin, pp. 301-310.

[85] Acton, "The Protestant Theory of Persecution" in "History of Freedom and Other Essays," p. 155.

Contemporary opinions of Luther vary with the point of view of the utterer, from the disciple to whom he is "an angel of the living God"[88] to Duke George of Saxony, who calls him "the coolest liar that has ever come under our notice."[89] "It is remarkable," says Ranke with a tone of surprise, "what different impressions Luther made on those present [at the Diet of Worms]. The more distinguished Spaniards . . . found the monk crazy. A Venetian [Contarini], who is indeed in the main very impartial, nevertheless remarks that Luther showed neither great learning, nor any particular judgment, nor blamelessness of life, and had not come up to people's expectations of him. Alexander's opinion of him can be imagined. But even the Emperor had got a similar impression. 'He,' he cried, 'will never make me a heretic.' "[90] Luther's own disciples were not altogether satisfied with him. Melanchthon writes in 1525: "Would that Luther would keep silence. I hoped that with age and custom among so many evils he would become more gentle, but I see that he is becoming more vehement. . . . That afflicts me grievously."[91] And in the same year he describes him as an extremely irresponsible man.[92] Pirkheimer, once an adherent, thinks in 1529 that he must be "getting mad or driven by an evil spirit"[93]

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[86] *Ibid*, p. 156.
[87] *Ibid*, p. 162.
[88] Denifle, p. 811.
[89] *Ibid*, p. 126.
[90] *Op. cit.*, I., p. 336.
[91] Denifle, p. 814.
[92] *Ibid*, p. 127.

But both friends and enemies of the primitive Reformation testify with one voice that a vast deterioration of public morals coincided with its spread. Doctrinal Lutheranism found most of its first recruits and apostles among the corrupt section of the clergy, and they accepted it all the more easily as many of them "lived in great ignorance. 'I had then,' writes Wicel [referring to the time when he joined Luther], 'in all my life seen no doctor of the Church, to say nothing of reading one, wherefore I was easy to mislead; besides, it is a case of the German proverb: "It is easy to pipe to him that wants to dance." ' "[94] A Lutheran visitation of parishes in Saxony was made at the instance of Melanchthon and by the authority of the Elector between 1527 and 1529. "It brought to light most desplorable facts. Everywhere the schools had gone down, where they had flourished under Catholicism. Around Wittenberg 145 parishes (not to count hnudreds of subdivisions) had only 21 schools. Elsewhere it was even worse. The preachers were sometimes ignorant and uncouth artisans. Ahorn was a weaver, Musel a baker, Seitenrode a cabinetmaker, who did not even know the Commandments."[95] Worse charges follow. The character of much evangelical preaching is thus described by Luther's disciple and intimate friend, Bugenhagen, in 1525: "You hear absolutely nothing from them except great, violent abuse of monks, of Papistical priests, of fasting on Friday, of good-for-nothing services and adornment of temples, of holy water and the rest, with which hitherto we have been misled; but the Gospel you do not hear from them."[96] The evidence of those who at first greeted the Reformation with joy and hope is very striking. Pirkheimer wrote in 1527: "We hoped that the Romish rascality and roguery of the monks and priests was to be remedied; but, as one sees, things have got so much worse that the evangelical rascals have made those others seem pious." And Erasmus in 1529: "Monkery, to be sure, is now prostrate, but . . . it appears to me that there is rising up a new race of monks, much more wicked than the former, in as far as these were wicked. It is folly to exchange bad for bad, but madness to exchange bad for worse."[97] And again in 1530: "Some that I had known before as pure, honest, guileless men, as soon as they joined the sect . . . became avaricious, quarrelsome, revengeful, calumniatory, vain, of detestable morals; they seem to have laid aside even what is purely human." Wicel, who had been a Lutheran, writes of them in 1539 that "they live as if there were no God, they sin as if there were no hell, they pass through life like irrational animals."[98] Such quotations, including frequent emphatic utterances of the leader himself, might be multiplied; let one suffice, chiefly for the sake of its conclusion, from Egranus, a Lutheran preacher, in 1543: "When one looks at the histories and stories of our ancestors, for eight hundred years, since the Germans became Christians, there have been no more unruly, culpable, wanton people among the German nation than at present, which chiefly comes from the doctrine by which good works are despised and rejected."[99]

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[93] *Ibid*, p. 843.

[94] Denifle, p. 307.

[95] Cristiani, p. 341.

[96] Denifle, p. 335.

[97] *Ibid*, p. 19.

Such a state of things cried out for a remedy and did, in fact, improve. But how? "First through the intervention of the secular authority [invoked even by the Reformers themselves], which in order to avoid wholesale ruin in the moral quagmire was obliged to and did look after public morals. Then through the efforts of more serious Protestant theologians, and in the same way in which they attained an improvement in other respects, that is, by returning unconsciously more or less to Catholic principles, partly even in their statements of belief." "The natural thought and feeling of the individual leads in that direction," says Denifle. "The good Lutheran always stands much higher than Luther and his doctrine." "The soul is naturally Catholic."[100]

The quick spread of the Reformation sounds in itself a note of warning; rapid success and a ready appeal have not been the lot of noble and elevating doctrines either before the time of Christ or since. The most indulgent and admiring students of the Reformation period are obliged to admit that Luther had his ignoble sides. "It was the misfortune of Luther," says Creighton, "that he rarely transcended the limits of his own surroundings."[101] But the real leader and reformer rises superior to his age.

It would be outside the scope of the present essay to do more than hint at the complex religious, social and national conditions amidst which the Reformation had its rise. "The highly significant movements of religious and ecclesiastical life at the end of the Middle Ages concurred with those of the most important secular spheres—of general mental culture, of political, civic and social evolution. A religious reform could not possibly fail to be essentially determined by this connection; had to assume an attitude to these things, and inevitably exercised a certain influence on them."[102] These words are true in a sense hardly intended by the writer. There was a "mass of combustibles"[103] waiting to be set on fire, and Luther's personality was mainly responsible for the actual conflagration.

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[98] *Ibid*, p. 804.

[99] *Ibid*, p. 804.

[100] Denifle, pp. 296-297.

[101] "The Papacy," Vol. V., p. 117.

Denifle's book raised a great storm of indignation in Protestant Germany, as though the author had intended to deal a crushing blow to a national hero. Obviously it could not be for any Catholic a mere exercise of curiosity or malice, or anything but a painful and laborious task to set Luther in a true light against the background of his time. For if he was the father of Protestantism, he was a disloyal son of the Catholic Church. In the interests of truth and justice the task had to be undertaken. The spectacle of the fair unity of the Church broken; of her office and teaching misunderstood, attacked and reviled; of her energies expended in repelling assaults and of so many of her children engaged in defending the outer walls who might have been content and happy to enjoy the pleasances within; of men of good will wayfaring painfully to her gates or by the mystery of God's providence wandering fruitlessly without; all this may well justify those who realize it in doing what they can to bring the same realization home to others.

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[102] Köstlin, I., p. 7.

[103] Balmez, "European Civilization," p. 7.

THE BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY.

A CHARACTERISTIC tendency of our time is the interest shown in the study of social problems. The impulse given by Rousseau and by the efforts at social reconstruction after the French Revolution has grown so deep and widespread that questions pertaining to Sociology occupy a leading place in academic and popular discussion. Taking a certain form in the collectivism of Fourier and San Simon, the movement with Comte assumed the name Sociology, which was eagerly taken up and expounded by the adherents of the evolution philosophy. It blended easily with the humanitarian movement then arising, which worked at times with a view to apply its philosophical principles, and at times aimed to achieve results by an appeal to the common sentiments of humanity. Thus Sociology is the new science which offers, as a warrant for its existence, the startling claim to present a unified view of human life and a body of guiding principles for the conduct of life. Religion once had this offiec; now, according to Comte, science, under the name of Sociology, has taken her place. In fact, looking back over the writings of the last fifty years we find the most prominent were those of the real or would-be social philosophers and reformers, as e. g., Tolstoi, Ibsen, Zola, Dickens, Hugo, Spencer, Mill and Comte. And to-day work of a most practical kind for the alleviation of human suffering brings those engaged in it sooner or later face to face with philosophical principles set forth by Sociologists. Hence Sociology, like Evolution, has become a modern watchword and fad. The newspapers are filled with it; the sociological novel presents its problems in concrete form; the workingman on the street or in labor unions unconsciously gives expression to its principles; its devotees glorify it as the panacea for every evil and the harbinger of the golden age; while the pulpit in many cases, putting aside the Gospel message, believes it has found Christ in sociological teaching. Even Socialism, which attacks the constituent principles of modern social order, arose from a study of society and shows the necessity of sound social knowledge. The purpose of the present article is to ask simply what is the basis of Sociology as a Science?

I.

THE BASIS OF COMTE.

The word "Sociology" was coined by Auguste Comte, but its subject matter is among the oldest topics of human speculation. Philosopher, moralist and theologian in setting forth the nature of man and his relations to the world have to a greater or less extent dealt with the problem of society. Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Suarez, More, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, have analyzed the relations existing between man and man. With Comte, however, the study of human society entered upon a new phase. His genius is shown not in a definitely constructed science, but rather in a method proposed and by him superficially applied, which resulted in a disposition to study social phenomena from an empirical point of view and along lines hitherto imperfectly explored. The fault of the method is that it is partial and exclusive. Rigid adherence to it shut out a source of knowledge absolutely essential for the investigation of human society, and gave to Sociology a one-sided and false development resulting in the inextricable confusion so apparent among sociological writers at the present day.

The Sociology of Comte must be studied over against its background of Positivism. The reaction against the absurdities of Hegel's metaphysics uniting with the rapid rise of the physical sciences resulted with Comte in this system of philosophy which has profoundly influenced modern thought. The essence of Positivism lies in its method. This maintains that the only source of knowledge is observation of and experimentation on facts grasped by the senses alone. This implies that the material order of things only exists, that beyond the material order there is nothing. As a result, the supersensible and absolute, as e. g., God, soul, substance, cause, etc., are once and for all time removed from the scope of knowledge; in reality they are merely the product of the imagination. Men did believe that such notions represented something real, but do so no longer. In explanation Comte proposes the law of historic filiation, according to which mankind in its development has passed through three successive stages: (1) the theological or imaginative, illustrated in Fetishism, Polytheism and Monotheism; (2) the metaphysical or abstract, which explained existing things not by divine beings, but by abstract powers or essences; (3) the positive or scientific, which holds that the only realities are phenomena and their laws as revealed by physical science. To Comte the reason for the chaos in modern thought is the simultaneous use of these three philosophies; whereas, the scientific, being the final evolution of the intellect, is the most perfect and alone ought to prevail. The positive method with the law of historic filiation prepares the way for his classification of the sciences. This classification should be made, he contends, according to the degree of dependence among the different order of phenomena. Hence the law which obtains in the classification is that the simplest and most general phenomena form a basis for the more complicated. Thus we have, in successive dependence, Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology or Biology and Social Physics or Sociology. Psychology is viewed as a branch of Physiology, for it gives us the one true doctrine of man. Thus the sciences lead up to Sociology, i. e., the science of man in society, the crown of the scientific edifice.

In Social Dynamics and in the law of historic filiation Comte apparently holds a link with the older philosophy of History. In his method and in the classification of the sciences he inaugurates a new departure. He claims to have definitely annexed the social order to the realm of natural science. The law of historic filiation, upon which the classification of the sciences rests, is, he maintains, to Sociology what gravitation is to Astronomy. It proves Sociology to be a natural science, whose phenomena are developed according to invariable natural laws. Comte thought that society could be regenerated and saved by science alone. The natural laws of coexistence and of sequence that may be observed among social states and conditions could thus be clearly grasped. He believed that the statesman trained in the true spirit and principles of the positive philosophy could organize and guide society so as to ameliorate the conditions of its members. Thus Sociology is to the statesman what Astronomy is to navigators and Physiology is to the physician. Hence the purpose and crown of Positivism was Sociology. In the effort to reconstruct society after the light and methods of modern science Positivism arose.

Comte set forth his views on the philosophy of knowledge and the theory of the sciences in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive,* published in 1842. In 1854 appeared the *Systeme de Politique Positive,* which contains his sociological programme. This embraces: (1) Social Statics, i. e., permanent conditions of social order; (2) Social Dynamics, i. e., his Philosophy of History; (3) Polity of the Future on Positivist lines, i. e., the doctrine of Altruism and the Religion of Humanity. In expounding this system of Sociology his guiding principles are: (1) Social phenomena, as objects of natural science, are controlled by laws admitting of scientific prevision. Thus the duty of the Sociologist is to search, in the language of physical science, for the laws and causes at work in society and to formulate their predictible effects: (2) appeal to Biology. The Biological analysis of the social organism appears in his hands as a scientific fact justifying the claim for individual submission to the public weal, and thus furnishes a new basis for Ethics. (3) The doctrine of Altruism assumed as a definition of the moral ideal. (4) Appeal to History, for while Sociology was in reality based on Biology, yet decisive guidance was to be found in the wise man's study of human phenomena shown, as he says, in the history of the past. Thus Comte assimilates man's life to natural or animal existence and views the evolution of society as only the final term of a progression which has continued from the simplest vegetables or animals up to the ascendency of the intellectual and moral man.

II.

BASIS OF PHYSICS.

In basing a science of society on a general theory of the existence and succession of social phenomena according to natural laws Comte gave form to an aspiration of his time. The fundamental conception of his Sociology, therefore, is expressed in the term "natural law." His explanation of its meaning is negative and vgaue. In the positive method and the classification of the sciences he expressly declares that the intellectual and moral have no distinctive departments as such. Hence he denies the word "natural" to these spheres of activity. He applies the term "natural" to the laws governing the phenomena of material or organic existence. Hence his Sociology gave rise to two parallel tendencies based upon the Physical and the Organic meaning of "natural law."

By using the term "Social Physics" to designate Sociology, and by the rigid mechanical conception of the forms in which the social principle works, Comte's system easily came into accord with the rising school of materialistic philosophy which culminated in the scientific materialism of Spencer, Tyndall and Huxley. While Tyndall and Huxley seemed content to explain the phenomena of mental, moral and organic life by materialistic principles, Spencer bent his genius to interpret society on the same lines. Hence his Sociology is in reality a department or phase of Physics.

Spencer's Cosmic Philosophy is based on (1) correlation of the physical forces which shows an underlying unity throughout the inorganic world; (2) organic evolution, which proclaims a like unity in the organic world; (3) the transition or evolution from one to the other must be made in terms of natural law. His evolution philosophy is therefore the assertion of the sufficiency of natural law, and to him natural law means physical law. Everything is to be explained in terms of matter and motion. Thus social evolution is a phase of evolution in general, yet the highest we know of, and the final outcome of the energy that is at work in the universe. Tyndall's conception of individual life as "a realm of physical and moral necessity" was applied by Spencer to society as a whole. The natural history of man now becomes the natural history of society. So fixed is his conviction in the sway of blind and irrevocable forces that, contrary to Comte's opinion, he doubts the power of the statesman to do much in the way of interfering with the natural and actual course of social evolution. We may, he holds, at most learn to describe social forces, but must not presume to organize or control them.

Thus with Spencer Sociology proper is essentially descriptive and is based on the data of Ethnology and History. He writes: "the only History that is of practical value is what may be called Descriptive Sociology." He gives a lengthy discussion on primitive man with a view of finding there all that is needed to explain the social man in general. The real value of the discussion is that it served to make "primitive man" an intellectual fad of modern thought. In describing "primitive man" as warlike and cruel Spencer departs from the French school of Anthropologists who follow Rousseau, and shows the influence of Hobbes. Hence he states that in the beginning small social groups were constantly at war from their relation to a common food supply. Through this warfare the groups became united in great states where military pursuits could be given up for the arts of peace. Thus militarism is the first phase of social progress, which in the process of social evolution gives place to other successive and higher phases until perfect human nature is attained and perfect equilibrium is reached.

With Spencer life is adaptation of the organism to environment, or, as he tells us, "the correspondence of internal relations to external relations, initiated and directed by the external relations." Applied to society in the degree Spencer applied it, this principle was revolutionary. Society is explained in terms of progressive human nature adapting itself to changing conditions. Thus attention was drawn to the power of environment in individual and especially in social life. Our nature, like the oyster, is the product of adaptations to environment in the past, and we are at the mercy of our environment in the present. Evolution Psychology has accepted this as a fundamental principle, and the Psychological novelist has presented it in concrete form as the Gospel of modern science. It is the solution of George Eliot's "Daniel Deronda" and "Middlemarch." In Sociology Spencer's theory of environment has had great influence. It has given scientific color and form to the economic interpretation of history, which takes for environment the primary necessities of existence. Thus the Economists with Marx, Loria and Professor Kearsbey attempt to explain morals, laws and institutions by the economic production at any given time in vogue. But we live in a physical environment also.

Hence the *anthropo-geographical* view of history or "Social Geography" which builds a Sociology on the basis of Geography, as shown in the writings of Mattenzi, Ferraro, Professor Geddes and Professor Ratzel. Other writers, e. g., Le Play school, combine the economic and geographical environments. Thus Vignes and Demoulins teach that nature determines work and reward, and work in turn fixes habits of life, forms of land tenure, customs of the family and of the community. Hence *types* of character are created. Environment is the law of life, but work, reward and tradition are its viziers. The physical environment thus indirectly leaves a stamp upon a nascent folk and we have a *type* and a geographical *route* for the explanation of society rather than the anthropological appeal to *sex, race* or *anthropological type* as shown in the shape of the head and as advocated by Ammon, La Pouge, Classon and Ripley. Finally, another writer speaks of the "Geology of human personality" and gravely assures us that "if we take a section through the various strata of society, we shall likewise find phenomena representing the eras of history" (Contemp. Rev., Vol. 87, page 552). Now, as a matter of fact, man can and does resist his environment. His efforts at progress are a reversal of the process of evolution. The underlying principle of social reform now universally admitted is that we can better our surroundings. In transforming our environment by the creation of an environment not only different from, but often opposed to, that furnished by nature alone, in moulding our characters along lines to a higher and more complete life than that marked out by natural laws, we show the utter falsity of any system of Ethics or of Sociology based on the determination of the physical forces.

To explain the structure of society Spencer employs the biological analysis. He calls society an organism because it grows by structural differentiation. But so, we may add, does a piece of complicated machinery. Society, he says, is an organism, in which the regulating system, i. e., government, appears as the analogue of the cerebral nervous system in the animal, the sustaining system, i. e., agriculture and industry, as the analogue of the alimentary tract, and the distributing system, i. e., commerce, as the analogue of the circulatory system. Professors Small and Vincent in their Manual faithfully reproduce this analogy, yet tell us that "Spencer's Sociology ends precisely where Sociology proper should begin." This criticism applies not to what Spencer has done, but to what he has failed to do. For they tell us that Spencer "has set a high standard for the descriptive social sciences; he has proposed conclusions which may be uncertain, but a safer philosophical structure than Spencer's must use a larger part of the foundation which he has laid," and that "Spencer matured a method which Comte could only by a very narrow margin save from contempt." But Spencer was content to analyze the structure of society; he failed to consider the structure as a whole composed of parts working together to achieve results. This task was taken up by Schäffle, Ratzenhover and Professor Small. Hence we read in the same manual: "there is no room in his (i. e., Spencer's) system for the theory and application of active in addition to passive Social Dynamics." In other words, Spencer gives us the Anatomy of human society; Professor Small takes this Anatomy and views it Physiologically as a structure fitted for work and performing that work. Thus, by the turn of a word, Spencer's entire system of Sociology based on Physics and ruled throughout by invariable laws of matter and motion, becomes a living thing and passes insensibly into the Biological conception of Sociology.

III.

THE BASIS OF BIOLOGY.

Comte's attempt to treat society as a natural science resulted in the formation of another and far more powerful school than the Physical Sociology developed by Spencer. This is the school of Biological Sociology, different from yet somewhat akin to the former, so that, as we have seen, one easily fused into the other. In the classification of the sciences Comte ranks Sociology next to Biology and writes: "The necessity of taking the ensemble of Biology as the point of departure for Sociology is so incontestable that no one any longer dares to dispute it." This principle inspires the theories of Espinas, Perrier, Fouillee, Schäffle, Lilienfeld, Sergi, Gumplowicz and Novicow. From Biology Comte learned to regard society as an organism and the organic analogy forms the substance of his Sociology, just as the analogy to physical laws constitutes its form. With the publication of Darwin's "Origin of Species" the biological analogy forged to the front. The theory of a natural growth based on a fundamental unity was applied to society, and has held a dominating influence upon Sociological studies. The controversy now being waged as to the transmission to offspring of acquired qualities shows that its influence is yet unshaken.

(1) The doctrine of organic evolution implies the common nature of man and brute. Man is merely the most exalted form of animal life, the last term of the zoological series and controlled, as Professors Ridgeway and Sutherland teach, by the same laws as the rest of the animal kingdom. This led to the explanation of the

higher, i. e., more distinctively human phenomena by the lower, i. e., in savage nations or in the animal world. The low traits in man were held to be the survivals of the animal or the savage. On this basis the Social Meliorism of Lester Ward rests. Hence the prominence given by Sociologists to the problem of human origins with a view to reconstruct primitive man. A new science was created, called Anthropology, whose aim was to set forth the true scientific doctrine of man as an individual and as associated in society. Topinard, its chief exponent, tells us that Anthropology properly so called is merely a chapter of Zoology, yet must be regarded as the foundation of Sociology, and accordingly divides Sociology into Animal Sociology and Human Sociology. Hence arose the comparative study of animal societies and human societies, proposed by Comte, amplified by Lilienfeld, Letourneau and Topinard, with the explicit aim of seeking in the former the cause and groundwork of the latter. While Darwin holds that sociality appeared with animal gregariousness and the advent of reason does not alter the animal impulses of gregarious creatures, but only extends them in range, and Lester Ward teaches that man originally was not a social animal and was descended from an animal that was not even gregarious by instinct, Topinard maintains that man sprang from social animals and animal societies in some ways are more perfect than human societies, because in them altruism holds sway in a more perfect form. Hence arose interminable discussions about primitive man and the primitive state of society carried on in the name and under the authority of science, but more fanciful than any metaphysical dreams Comte was wont to ridicule. To this also is due the confusion which exists even at the present day as to the proper scope and limitations of Biology, Zoology, Anthropology, Physiology, Psychology and Sociology.

(2) Professor Giddings says that modern Sociology is distinguished from previous sociological doctrine by the prominence given to the notion of the Social Organism. Darwin held that variability and adaptation to environment were the two fundamental laws of organic life, with selection as the means to obtain that adaptation. With the conviction that society itself was an organism, these two principles, which were considered sufficient to account for the development of the individual, were extended to societies, communities and nations. Just as the nature of the bee was moulded by the life of the hive, so human society was formed by the life of the community, which causes to develop in the individual certain capacities and organs not primarily for individual advantage, but for the gain of the community. Thus socialization devel-

oped the human brain and made man what he is. Karl Pearson tells us that the first function of science in national life is to show us what national life means and how the nation is a vast organism, subject as much to the great forces of evolution as any other gregarious type of life. And again, "a community of men is as subject as a community of ants or a herd of buffaloes to the laws which rule all organic nature. It is the herd, the tribe or the nation which forms the fundamental unit in the evolution of man." Thus society is an organism and man is a member of this organism, as a part of the whole, essentially dependent on the whole and bound to serve its interests. In doing so his nature evolves. Consciousness, morality, personality, all the qualities of his higher and social nature appear—called forth by the necessities of the environment and instruments for more complete harmony with the environment. By virtue of the organic analogy the Biological Sociologist gives new meaning to the statement of Aristotle that man is by nature a social animal, for the variability of an organic whole in constant interaction with an ever-changing environment has made him what he is. Hence the doctrine of the so-called moving equilibrium, physical with Spencer, biological with the followers of Darwin, which is held to be the essential basic element of progress in the evolution of the race. While Leslie Stephen finds, in the interaction of organism and environment, the source and explanation of Ethics, the Sociological writers, viewing the problem from a broader standpoint, see herein the cause and explanation of the social nature of man. Analyzed critically, the "moving equilibrium" is nothing real in itself, but merely a name applied to the social organism viewed at any definite moment of time in the progressive march. Its place and meaning in Sociology comes therefore from uniting the doctrine of the social organism with the theory of evolution.

(3) By far the most popular and characteristic element in Biological Sociology is the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection and struggle for existence. With the publication of "The Descent of Man," in 1871, the value of this teaching was grasped by the adherents of the Science-Philosophy. To Darwin natural selection is a biological hypothesis. He proposes to account for all living species by organisms, environment, heredity and variability. The first three sum up the struggle; all four give the result, i. e., selection. He takes for granted, but does not, nor can he in this way explain how matter should pass into life, or how animal should evolve into rational life. According to this teaching, there is nothing in the inherent nature of man by which his social nature can be rationally explained. It is merely the resultant of the tendencies,

to him accidental, as fostered by his particular environment. While Leslie Stephen, faithful to the older teaching, postulates a struggle, not between organisms, but between the individual and the claims of society, with a view to the fuller unfolding of life, and Sutherland teaches elimination, but not struggle, and Kidd holds for struggle without elimination, and Weissmann intensifies the struggle by making it the sole cause of progress; Galton proposes the new science of Eugenics which teaches that man, having now discovered the law of the survival of the fittest, shall utilize it for the high end of raising the race.

Darwin teaches that all living species have been marked off from each other and given a standing ground in nature by the working of natural selection upon minute and apparently casual variations. The means of natural selection has been the ceaseless struggle for existence. There is not room for all to live; those a little above the average are saved. The application of natural selection to society has extended the meaning of the term so as to include not only warfare, but strife of any kind. With plants and animals we find it in a crude form. As society increases it also develops in variety and complexity. Karl Pearson explains it both as warfare and as competition in manufacture and commerce. Bagehot applies it to states and political life. Darwin lays emphasis on the importance of group or tribal cohesion as a factor of success in the intertribal struggle. Society is viewed as a theatre of strife between classes, corporations and parties for the advancement of their respective interests. Loria, Vaccaro, Ratzenhover, Gumplowicz, Durkheim, Novicow set forth the forms, phases and laws of these struggles. Professor Small follows Professor S. Alexander in applying the struggle to types of ethical thought or conflict of ideals. Huxley's insight grasped the consequences of such doctrines. If reason teaches man that the whole animated cosmos has been and is controlled by a struggle for existence, what can man do but practice this blind selfishness throughout his life! Hence Huxley asserted that human morality was absolutely opposed to the cosmic process, and urged his hearers to be moral in spite of the nature of things. Drummond agrees with Huxley, but says Darwin's views were one-sided and holds that the true solution is found in the analysis of the Biological laws of sex. Drummond's doctrine of sex is physiological. So also Professor Thomas points out the influence of certain sex contrasts upon early social development. Kidd bases his Social Evolution on the biological laws of struggle, so that without struggle there is retrogression, but maintains that reason by developing selfishness interferes with struggle as a factor of progress; thus he introduces religion as a supernatural element which provides a sanction for social conduct. Again, as the aim of the struggle for existence was the evolution of the moral and social nature of man, and as Comte with his followers by sociality meant altruism, we begin to realize the startling contradiction, that Biological Sociology in proposing the doctrine of struggle as the law of progress bids us fight, and in setting forth the doctrine of Social Organism tells us we ought to live for the common good. Thus the crucial ethical problem of Egoism and Altruism comes to the front in Sociology and proves to be a stumbling block to the Sociologists who base their theories of society on the Science-Philosophy. Hence the Anthropologists with Topinard hold that "man as an animal and man as a member of society are contradictory," that "society is a compromise between the truths of science and the necessities of practical conduct," that the problem to be elucidated is "how has man changed from an egocentric to a sociocentric animal," and offer as a solution "Altruism in the form and as a species of differentiated and enlarged egoism." The Economists appeal to *community of interests,* and state that the social process is an assimilation brought about by a growing together of interests. The Sociologists even are not united in the answer to this difficulty. Some, e. g., the Social Psychologists, maintain that the fundamental social process is assimilation. Others adopt the theory of Lester Ward. Writing on the "Sociology of Political Parties ("American Journal of Sociology," Vol. XIII., page 2), he affirms that the underlying principle of political action is the same principle that underlies all forms of development and evolution in general. Political antagonism, he says, is a form of *social synergy.* Hence the parties that think they are opposing each other are simply working together for the accomplishment of an end of which they are unconscious. They are acting, he continues, in exactly the same way that hostile races act in the process of social assimilation, in the same way that organic beings act in the process of organic development, in the same way that cosmic forces act in the formation of solar and planetary systems. Ward thus meets the difficulty by coining a new word—a word vague enough to have a physical, biological or psychological meaning, or perhaps all three meanings together, but which, when read in the context, suggests the mathematical formula of the "Parallelogram of the Forces." Others, accepting the Biological analogy, take into account also the complementary analogy based upon the comparison of a society with an individual organism and thence deduce the fact of coöperation. They maintain that just as coöperation is evident from the structure of the individual, so it can be traced among the members of the animal kingdom. Hence the view which sees nothing but internecine strife in the animal world is one-sided and superficial. Topinard asserts that the struggle for existence is not so general or so merciless as the extreme disciples of Darwin would maintain. Schäffle considers society as a whole composed of parts working together to achieve results. Thus a Sociology based on "function" and "service" has evolved. While Ratzenhover teaches that "the conspicuous element in the history of the race is universal conflict of interests," yet he views civilization and adjustment as the resultants of social forces in the earliest stages. To him "Society is a process of adjustment by conflict between associated individuals." He proposes "the law of absolute hostility" as governing the earlier or biological stage of the process. Yet he maintains that the process viewed as a whole reveals another law, viz., "a law of diminuendo value governing the struggle phase and of crescendo value governing the socializing phase of the social process." Thus the analysis of the social struggle shows that "struggle and reciprocity are always to a certain extent functions of each other." Hence the process from barbarism to civilization is expressed in the formula "struggle based upon the narrowest selfishness, resolving itself gradually into a moralization that tends toward civilization inspired by the broadest selfishness." Thus "the tendency of the struggle is the common good of the individuals, the ultimate harmonization of all interests." The result, he says, "we call socialization or civilization" and "the process from unmitigated struggle toward relative socialization is always through gradual and largely unconscious adjustment of individual interests to widening circumferences of social interests."

IV.

BASIS OF SOCIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

The theories of Schäffle and Ratzenhover, based originally on Biology, merge insensibly into Psychology. In his work on "Contemporary Social Science" Fouillée attempts to reconcile the Biological with the Psychological method in Sociology. Baldwin says that Psychology, modified, gives us the true clue to the nature of society and holds it to be a permanent advance that the biological analogy is giving place to a psychological analogy. Hence the disposition among Sociologists to put aside organic or economic conceptions and to adopt what is known as the psychological method, e. g., Fouillée, De Greef, Giddings, Durkheim, Tarde, Baldwin, Small and Ward. To give place and form to this transition a new science was created under the name of Sociological Psychology. Not only has the development of Sociological Science from biological to psychological conceptions taken place along the lines of Comte's statement expressed in his classification of the sciences that Psychology as such is not a distinct science and should be regarded as merely a part of Physiology, but also the sphere of Sociological Psychology finds in Comte's later writings its initial impulse in the assertion that Sociology is the true Psychology, because it reveals to us the true nature of man. Therefore the effort to find a basis for Sociology in the science of Sociological Psychology is the last result of the positive method.

Professor E. A. Ross ("American Journal of Sociology," Vol. XIII., page 2) writes: "Social Psychology studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men, in consequence of their association. It seeks to understand and account for those uniformities in feeling, belief or volition and hence in action, which are due to the interaction of human beings, i. e., social causes. Social Psychology differs from Sociology proper in that the former considers planes and currents, the latter groups and structures. Hence the former should precede the latter." These words take on clearer light when viewed in connection with Professor Caldwell's statement ("Contemporary Review," September, 1898) that "Psychology and Sociology have progressed *pari passu* during the last decades of the century since the time of Lazarus and Stanthal, the great founders of Comparative Psychology," and of Professor Small's assertion ("General Sociology," page 430) that "Biology and Psychology have to do with the individual in the making; Sociology wants to start with him as the finished product." The real difficulty, however, in getting a definite conception of what all this means is that modern Psychology is an evolutive integration based on a blending of the English association theory and the German apperceptive theory with no reference to a soul and no line of demarkation between sense knowledge and thought. It is a result, a product of the positive method, a comprehensive gathering together of the various and conflicting leading conceptions in modern psychological thought, with the purpose of reading a harmony of evolution in the processes of mental life.

(1) Modern Psychology dilates on the important part played by the feelings in human life. Comte, in line with the Materialism of the eighteenth century, had asserted the subordination of intellect to feeling. The Anthropologists with Topinard say man has inherited the social instinct or consolidated need of the social animals from which he has sprung. That feeling is the fundamental psychic fact is asserted by the Evolutionists, and puts them in harmony with the English school of Associationism. Psychology became an integration of associated feelings growing more refined

as the process was carried on. Thus Ratzenhover bases his Sociology on "interests" and Professor Small on "wants." When Professor Giddings declares that the socializing process is "assimilation" and the fundamental social fact is "consciousness of kind," and in another place states "there is hardly a single fact in the whole range of sociological knowledge that does not support the conclusion that the race was social before it was human and that its social qualities were the chief means of developing its human qualities"; or again, "there is no reason to doubt the continuity of animal and human society," we are made aware that "consciousness of kind" is a refinement of Physiological feeling found in animals as well as in man. Thus he speaks of ("Principles of Sociology") "zoogenic association," i. e., existing before man was born, "anthropogenic association," i. e., which effected the transformation from animal to man, yet assures us that "no existing society is anthropogenic," and "anthropologic association," i. e., in primitive man. To him association is one of the great coöperating causes of the origin of species and of the formation of types; it has developed speech, and speech in turn developed intelligence among animals and a human nature. This teaching is in harmony with the so-called Genetic Psychology. Thus Professor Baldwin writes: "The relations of individual development to race development are so intimate—the two are so identical, in fact, that no topic in the one can be treated with great clearness without assuming results in the other." ("Mental Development," Pref. VII.) When therefore ("Social and Ethical Interpretations") he treats Sociology from the viewpoint of Genetic Psychology he says, "man is a social outcome, rather than a social unit" and "the child in getting to be a person uses social means to that end in his life-history; and the animal in getting to be a species by natural selection in race-history survives by his use of the same means." Hence "the beginnings of social life are found in the animals." To him the fundamental social fact is "imitation," and by this is meant any form or degree of mental appropriation or assimilation. Man's social acts "are his because they are society's first; otherwise he would not have learned them nor have had any tendency to do them." Thus is formed "the socius, the common self of the group," "which normally grows up in the budding years." In this way the thought of the other person, i. e., the "alter," is built into the thought of one's self, i. e., the "ego." To Giddings and Baldwin society must be studied not as an organism, but as a psychological association. Yet their Psychology is in reality a developed phase of Physiology, and the biological theories of selection are found in the earlier stages of their developed system, and especially in

Professor Baldwin's principle of "Social heredity." The same line of thought is shown when Sociology is treated from the viewpoint of Physiological Psychology or of Cerebral Physiology. Thus Schäffle proposes to follow the method of Comte, Littré, Spencer and Lilienfeld, pushes the analogies of Biology far beyond the application of his predecessors, and completes his Social Science by drawing on the Experimental Psychology of the laboratories in Leipsic and Freiburg. Professors Small and Vincent in their Manual professedly set forth the principles of Schäffle, entitled Chapter IV. of Book III., "The Psycho-Physical Communicating Apparatus or the Social Nervous System," speak of the individual as "a communicating cell," "a terminal cell," "an end organ," and yet tells us that "the vital principle of society is phychical force." Further on we read, along the lines of Spencer's Superorganic Evolution: "Psychology gives us an account of mind as we know it in the individual; Sociological Psychology describes the phenomena that result from the combination and reaction of the cognitions, emotions and volitions of associated individuals. Inasmuch as the latter manifestations are a higher integration of individual Psychology, they may be said to form the subject-matter of Super-Psychology or an Ultra-Psychology. Schäffle and De Greef are its leaders." Hence they teach that "Social Psychology is a composite photograph, in which the thoughts of individuals combine to form a product different in some degree from each of its elements." In this way "social knowledge, judgment and will are formed." Professor Ross discards the biological analogy and likens society not to an "organism," but to a "brain." Thus as the cerebral Physiologist, e. g., Professor James, in his "Psychology," treats only the "brain states" of the individual and perceives nothing beyond them, so Sociologists with Professor Ross study the "brain states" of the community.

(2) Investigations on the subject of Hypnotism have furnished interesting chapters to modern Psychology. Their value is not confined to mental life; they are important also as giving a new theory of social cohesion. Thus the normal hypnotism of Tarde and the abnormal hypnotism of Le Bon are at the basis of their respective treatises on Sociology. Tarde takes the fundamental social fact to be "suggestive-imitation." For him the true type of the social man is a hypnotic creature, acting under suggestions from others, though he is not aware of it, and is under the illusion that he is himself. In harmony with this we have the "imitation" of Professor Baldwin, akin to the "assimilation" of Gumplowicz and Professor Giddings, which in turn can be traced back to the "sympathy" of Darwin, Adam Smith, Leslie Stephen and Sutherland, in itself

considered either as a physiological factor with a view to explain the origin of morality in the individual or as of biological utility to promote the growth and preservation of animal and human societies. Tarde and Baldwin, however, hold that "imitation" is a psychic fact, and thereby offer a sharp contrast to Kidd, who teaches that reason is anti-social, because its action tends to promote our extreme selfishness, and that religion must be called in to counteract reason and promote sociality by its Gospel of altruism. In its ultimate analysis the Imitation method holds that the individual is not born, but made social; that his social character is something superadded through contact with others. Le Bon says that cohesion of men in society is largely spontaneous, and its simplest form is had in "the crowd." To him "the crowd" is a psychological unity, and as such its members are "in possession of a sort of collective mind, which makes them feel, think and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual would feel, think or act were he isolated." In explanation he states that in the crowd men lose their acquired characters, by which they are distinguished one from another, and revert to their instincts which form the substratum of subconscious life common to them all. In an excited crowd the subconscious self rises to the surface, as in an analogous manner the subconscious self of the individual is laid bare by the hypnotist. In the crowd, therefore, we lose our private interests and become one with the feelings and thoughts of others. This crowd Psychology furnished to Le Bon the basis for his theory of social development.

(3) The Double Aspect theory of mind and matter, broached by Spencer, Clifford and the early Science-Philosophers, is an accepted theory in modern Philosophy. According to this view, the two series, i. e., the physical and the psychical, correspond to each other as being simply different aspects of the same substance. At the same time Schoppenhauer was teaching a Monism of Will and Von Hartmann was setting forth his Philosophy of the Unconscious. While the Monism of Science-Philosophy has its psychological phase in Physiological Psychology and Psycho-Physics, the metaphysics of the German thinkers suggested to Psychologists studies along the lines of the "subconscious self." Their further applications to the problems of Sociology were in line with the drift of modern thought and is seen in the writings of Lester Ward and Professor Small. Professor Small writes: "Attainment of the proposed end (i. e., for Sociology) seems to me to be assured through positive monism as *Weltauschauung* and through monistic positivism as heuristic method. Monism presents all being to us as the work of a unitary principle of all phenomena and incidentally

society as subject to the inclusive regularity of nature." Ward tells us "that society, which is the highest product of evolution, naturally depends on mind, which is the highest product of matter." And Professor Small assures us that "although Ward's Monism and his Social Psychology form a coherent and a continuous system, the most confident dualist might adopt Ward's exposition of social phenomena without modifying his dualistic presumption." To Ward and Small the phychic side of the physical process is not conscious throughout. Thus Ward holds that "what is, may be nature partially realized and that the destiny of nature is to realize itself completely through action by its conscious parts upon its unconscious parts." Professors Small and Vincent in their Manual have some curious passages about the "unconscious" in the social whole. Thus "every social act is conscious from the individual, but not from the collective standpoint," "unconsciousness is a conspicuous characteristic of social activities and institutions," "social functions and growths are chiefly unconscious," "social consciousness, having effected changes in structures and functions, fades away." And in the same work (page 52) we read: "Whether mind is a property of matter or an energy distinct from matter, is a question of purely speculative interest to Sociologists, if both sides concede that the psychical is potent over the non-psychical." Now, what is the value of "speculative interest" and is the "interest purely speculative;" or why in a scientific treatise should "concessions" be sought, if not through a tacit admission that the theory cannot explain facts? It is impossible to understand, much less explain, such teaching. It shows to what strange extremes writers on Sociology may go on a blind trail after a positivistic method. They tell us that "general social doctrines can be justified only by the most minute research," they insist on the necessity of sound scientific principles, of exact data and of rigid application, yet they accept the most fanciful theories, rely on the slimmest possible analogies or abstractions and project more shadowy speculations than the *a priori* metaphysicians of the last century. When brought face to face with a difficulty, they naively ask their readers to overlook the difficulty to take certain things as granted. This is assumption, not science.

V.

CONCLUSION.

Such is a brief summary of the development and present condition of Sociology. Put forth by Comte as the supreme guide of life, set up by Topinard as the source from which all light is to come, claiming with Professor Ross sovereign authority in the field of science, Scientific Sociology to-day is a hope, not a fact. Its name stands for no definite body of systematic knowledge, but for a mass of vague and conflicting, if not inchoate, speculations. Proclaimed the "inclusive social science" by Spencer and De Greef, the "coördinating science" by Professor Small, the "fundamental science" by Professor Giddings, it betrays a conspicuous absence of agreement as to its scope, principles or province. Its professors do not claim that it is a science. Thus Professor Giddings says "much Sociology is yet nothing more than careful and suggestive guesswork;" Professor Small calls it "an inchoate science," "a method rather than a body of secure results," and Lester Ward confesses that it is impossible to tell what Sociology is, except that it deals with social phenomena. What must be the social anarchy that is sure to follow on the application of such teaching for the uplifting of man and the betterment of society? In its development Sociology is dominated throughout by the fateful genius of Comte. He is the leader, and to him every phase owes its initiative. In practical results Sociology has not advanced one step beyond his standpoint. Professors Small and Vincent in their Manual expressly warn students not "to regard Comte as an authority in Sociology." Yet in the preface to "General Sociology" Professor Small writes: "Social philosophy is a point of view, first about the reality in question, and, second, about the ways of inquiring into reality. As yet it has very meagre doctrinal content as distinguished from its literature of scope and of method." No more expressive words could be found in giving a criticism as to Comte's contribution to Sociology. Its accredited leaders pass condemnation on its method and results. Just as Darwin's "Origin of Species" has put back for fifty years real progress in Biology, so the one-sided view of society under the influence of evolution and the positive method has had precisely the same effect in Sociology. Physical science has failed to explain man; it has failed also to explain society. The Science-Philosophy has distorted all branches of knowledge to which it has been applied. The aim of the present article is to show its failure in Sociology and thus bring out in full relief the fundamental truth that the crucial problem of the past century and handed down to the present is the dignity of man and the true nature of the human mind. The development of Sociology is a luminous illustration.

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THE JEWISH ESTIMATE OF JESUS OF NAZARETH.

THE attitude of the Jewish mind towards the Founder of the Christian religion cannot fail to present itself to a very great many as a subject exciting a large amount of curious and mysterious interest. Jesus of Nazareth, according to the flesh of the seed of Abraham, has, across the ages, been looked upon by His national brethren in the light of a moral leper. His memory held in abhorrence. He has been kept "outside the gate," despised rejected, reviled. Gentle, kind and, above all, exhibiting in His character signs of a most attractive type of manliness, there has, nevertheless, been one notable exception in the list of the people that have succumbed in admiration to the power of His charms. That exception has been the stock from which He Himself sprung, the rock from which He was hewn out, "His own people."

In treating of this subject the present writer dismisses out of mind at once the accusations so frequently leveled against the Jews of being, when face to face with the problem which Jesus of Nazareth presents to them, a "stiff-necked people," blinded partly by their own obstinacy and partly by the Divine Will. That strange hardening of the heart by the Supreme Being, so that, "seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not understand," is a mystery which has often proved itself a stumbling block to the devout, and, as a question waiting for an answer, has always been the despair of the theologian. It is of all solemn matters the most solemn; and, implying as it does, great anger on the part of the Deity, and the worst punishment in consequence, it should not lightly be asserted about any particular individual or nation. Nor is there need to make use of the reason here. For explanations of a quite natural kind will most readily appear as we review the Jewish concept of the character of Christ since first that people was called upon to examine into the matter two thousand years ago.

Political interest absorbed that of every other nature in the Jewish mind at that time, and, as is well known, political interest was then centred in the expectation of a great temporal deliverer of the nation. Had it not been for this, the attitude of the Jews towards Jesus of Nazareth, even during the first years after the resurrection, would have been very different from what it actually was. Had the Romans not succeeded in taking Jerusalem at the close of the first century, and, even after that event, if the leaders of the New Faith could have seen their way clear to have joined with their compatriots in the fond hope that One must soon make His appearance who would establish the glorious "world to come," the centre of which would be Jerusalem, many things point to the conclusion that the Jews would have settled down in regarding Jesus as the greatest personality their nation had produced after Moses. From the death of Christ down to the destruction of the Temple a large number of the inhabitants of Palestine were inclined to admit, and a great number did admit, that in Him the Israelite had witnessed the life and death of the suffering Messiah.

The legend of the suffering Messiah, or, to give him his true name, the Messiah ben Joseph, like so many other legends connected with Jewish history, strikes its roots in the Talmud and assumes flourishing and widespreading importance only in post-Talmudic literature. By the Middle Ages the legend of Messiah ben Joseph had become closely associated with that of Antichrist, as well as with that of Ben David the Messiah, properly so called. He was to wage war with Armillus, by which name the great enemy of the human race at the end of the world is designated. At the commencement of the contest Ben Joseph will be victorious. He will restore the Holy Land to the Jews, the sacred vessels, taken away by Titus, to the Temple, and their ancient prestige, lost for so many generations, to the Israelites. Then reverses will come. Armillus will prove himself the final victor. Ben Joseph will be slain and the children of Israel will be scattered in all directions, their courage displaced by the greatest fear of their enemies. Hereupon, the principal Messiah, Ben David, together with the Prophet Elias, is to appear. The remnant of Israel will again gather itself together. A fierce encounter is to take place between the Deliverer and Antichrist, ending in a signal victory for the former. All nations will now acknowledge the Jewish supremacy, and Jerusalem, for a second time and permanently, is to become the seat of divine worship, and Sion will become the residence of the Messiah. His reign is to be inaugurated by proceeding, with the Prophet Elias, to the gates of the city where the remains of the minor Messiah, Ben Joseph, lie buried, and these, together with the bodies of many of the dead, he will raise to life again.

Much more to the point, however, is the following extract from the Talmud itself. In commenting on the words of the Prophet Zacharias, c. xii., v. 12, "And the land shall mourn, every family apart, the family of David apart, and their wives apart," the question is asked why there shall be mourning in the world to come, and what nature such mourning will assume. Opinions are represented as divided, some maintaining that the lamentation on the part of the righteous of a joyful and grateful kind and on the part of the wicked of much bitterness will be because God at the end of all things will lead out Concupiscence—so often personified in Talmudic literature—so that all may see it and will then put it to destruction. Others assert that the mourning will be on account of the death of the minor Messiah Ben Joseph:

"To what is this lamentation ascribed? There is a difference of opinion between Rabbi Dosa and Rabnan on the subject. The one says that this lamentation is on account of Messiah Ben Joseph, who will have been put to death, while the other says that it is because of Concupiscence then to be destroyed. This is the passage of Scripture adduced by those who suppose that the lamentation is on account of the Messiah Ben Joseph, 'they shall look unto me (sic) whom they have pierced, and they shall mourn for him as he that mourneth for his only begotten.' " (Succah lii., 1.)

This idea of a suffering Messiah, as distinct from a glorious one, doubtless took its origin from texts of Scripture similar in nature to the above, of which many may be found in the Psalms and in the books of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Daniel; but at what precise time it assumed the shape in which it appears in the Talmud and the Aggadistic writings will always remain a mystery. When it is remembered, however, that the earlier portions of the Talmud are a second century record of what had been quite common Rabbinic talk for at least a hundred years previous to that date, a strong suspicion will force itself upon the Christian mind that this idea of an afflicted Messiah became a definite portion of Jewish thought from an entirely new light thrown upon the Messianic conception by the sufferings and the death of Jesus of Nazareth. Before the tragic event which took place on Mount Calvary the really intellectual Jew, as opposed to the worldly minded Sadducee and a certain class of fanatical Pharisee, had never bestowed much of his attention either upon the claims or upon the person of Christ. Calvary changed everything. The life of Jesus might, indeed, be looked upon as of interest, but to the Jew, thoughtful, upright, sincere in his faith and attached to the traditions of his fathers, there was nothing in it of transcendent importance. Others had wrought miracles, had mightily moved the common people, had given expression to thoughts sublimely beautiful and deeply philosophical. It was Jerusalem and Golgotha which made all the difference. There the Gallilean stood alone, unique, with a host of Scriptural passages pointing Him out as they had pointed out no one else; for what other had ever answered, as He had answered by the calamities He had undergone and by the disposition with which He had met them, to the description of the "man of sorrows" given by Isaiah or to Him whose "hands and feet were pierced," all of whose bones were numbered, mentioned by the Psalmist?

The air of Palestine, moreover, became charged, as it were, with this argument, the whole weight of which rested upon the sufferings of Christ. The Apostles laid stress upon the Crucifixion as they did upon no other feature of the Divine life. The space allotted to the description of it by the four Evangelists is out of all proportion with that thought to be sufficient for any other incident. Whatever else the Jew might fail to be impressed by, it was felt that his reason could not hold out against the passion of Christ viewed in the light of the prophecies of the Old Testament. For, much as succeeding generations have both sought and found in the Gospel nerrative of the circumstances attending the death of Christ one of the best incentives to piety and devotion, there can be no doubt that the primary, if not the only, object the sacred writers had in view was not to inspire, but to persuade. They wrote, as one of their number himself says, "that men might believe." And the particular class of men they wished most of all to convince were the members of their own nation. The Jews had made it their boast that for them the Scripture was the great, the final criterion by which everything natural and supernatural had to be decided. They esteemed it, moreover, almost as sure as an axiom that the law prophesied only of the Messiah and His days. To the Scriptures, therefore, the Apostles sent them; to the Law and the Prophets they appealed; and, although they felt strong in their appeal to the Life of their Master, they realized that they were absolutely unassailable when they pointed to His death and brought forward, one after another, the passages and texts from the Old Testament which found a fulfillment in the circumstances of that death alone.

Not without interest in this regard is the undoubted fact that the Jewish attitude towards Christ, as manifested in the Acts of the Apostles, is so different from what it had been during His public life. The "away with Him" of the Gospels is absent. There is no accusation against Him, now that He has departed out from their midst, bearing the least resemblance to those which fell frequently and bitterly from the lips of His countrymen while He stood in person before them. The words "Samaritan," "friend of sinners," "possessed by the devil," "evildoer," are no longer applied to Him. The silence with which the Jewish authorities appear to treat His memory becomes eloquent when we remember their former abuse. For abuse is inclined to become more abusive still when the object of it is out of hearing; and if personalities are thought to be necessary against the founder of a system while he is present to hear them, and while he is simply putting forth his ideas, those personalities are, rightly or wrongly, thought to be more necessary when that founder is gone and his ideas are taking root and gaining ground. In their disputes with the Apostles the Jews leave the character of Jesus of Nazareth alone. Had some consideration, similar to that which now forced itself upon the minds of the Apostles, also obliged *them* to hesitate before they uttered the least word of blame against Him to whom before, in tongue and in deed, they had shown no mercy? On the first Easter the disciples going to Emmaus had received quite a new light on their views concerning the Messiah. The Scriptures were opened to them by Jesus Himself, and they saw that it was necessary that Christ should suffer. Were the Jews, too, for the first time, beginning to realize, not the precise truth held by the disciples, but at least this, that Jesus of Nazareth was the mysterious sufferer foretold by the prophets? How could they place themselves in opposition to such a one? Here was a part of the career of the Nazarene to which they were forced to give some kind of examination, and, unless they could positively make up their minds that He had absolutely no connection with the Person so carefully described by their wise men of old, they were obliged to treat His memory at least with respectful silence, and, at the same time, to spare His followers, so long as these did not contravene the enactments of the Mosaic Law. No one can read the Acts of the Apostles without a feeling almost amounting to certainty that it was some kind of reflection like the above which actually did influence the attitude of the Jewish rulers towards the apostolic Christians. Their leaders are allowed to live unmolested in Jerusalem, and Christian preachers are permitted to teach in the synagogues; while, on the other hand, the Jewish Christian, as distinct from the Gentile, frequents in the synagogue the devotional services, is present at the sacrifices offered in the Temple, and complies with the requirements of the ceremonial law. Of course, there was persecution. Some of the members of the New Faith had to suffer. But it is difficult not to feel that such persecution was measured out, so far as the religious authorities were concerned, only to those who could not bring themselves to make use of that economy which the Apostles, more wise than the rest, thought it advisable in the beginning of things to employ.

Not that this softening is to be taken as a sign that the Jews as a nation were in the least degree inclined to accept what may be called the orthodox view concerning Jesus. At no period of their history, unfortunately, have they shown the least disposition to acknowledge Him to be the Son of God. The fear with which the mind of the thoughtful Jews was now rendered uneasy was not that God, after all, may have appeared in human form and, unadored, cruelly handled, had passed through the midst of His chosen people, but rather that a grievous wrong had been done to a Jewish hero whose existence had been foretold and who, though human, was, nevertheless, of so exalted a position as to be justly regarded as a sort of minor Messiah.

That the state of the city of Jerusalem was completely sympathetic towards the person of our Lord at the outbreak of the war, the end of which was the fall of the city, seems quite evident from the well-known passage of Hegesippus concerning James, the so-called brother of Christ. This Apostle lived in Jerusalem not only unmolested, but esteemed and reverenced by all. Pharisees and Sadducees alike seek no incongruity in his being allowed, alone of all the citizens, to enter the holy places. They regard him as one of such authority among the people that he had but to speak and all would take his words for the truth. How can this general esteem felt for the first Bishop of Jerusalem be accounted for unless by the supposition that he was living in the midst of a population where all, high and low alike, were Christian in the same sense as they conceived him to be? They admired Jesus of Nazareth. They conceived that that admiration and veneration were quite compatible with the Jewish religion as they had received it from their fathers. They knew of many who did openly so unite the two, making of Christianity only a phase of Judaism in the same sense as Essenism was a phase. They did not suspect that James had far outstripped such as these in his views; but they believed that he admitted only that which they themselves admitted, namely, that the Messiah of inferior rank had appeared in the person of Jesus, that He had been a great religious teacher, and that, in life and death, He shone forth in lustre never before witnessed among men. They found out their mistake. The rulers had become aware, says Hegesippus, that many of the citizens were acknowledging the Nazarene to be the Saviour of the world, professing, moreover, that He was to be looked for as coming again as the Judge of the living and the dead. The Apostle is approached and asked to use his influence, not to eliminate all admiration and respect for Jesus, but to recall the people to their former views. The whole city, they said, had embraced these exaggerated doctrines, and must be persuaded to renounce them. This would at once be accomplished were James publicly to condemn the offending opinions. There is no question of doing away with a qualified belief in Jesus. Matters had gone too far, that was all; and the Pharisees consider that this would be as sincerely regretted by the Apostle as it was by themselves. The end is well known. James the Just openly professes the opinions he has been called upon to condemn, and dies for the faith that is in him; "a true witness," says Hegesippus, "that Jesus is the Messiah."[1]

The fall of Jerusalem deprived the Jewish race of its country, but, at the same time, it made devotion to the national faith more intense than it had been for at least a hundred years. It is very doubtful if Christianity itself received much advantage from the effect which the great catastrophe produced upon the inhabitant of Palestine. The Essenes in a body joined the ranks of the followers of Jesus, but while their mode of life and some of their practices had been already very similar to much contained in the new religion, they had never been found in the Holy Land itself in anything like the numbers in which they were to be met with in the adjacent countries. To the Palestinian Jew the Fall of the Capital acted as a divine call to greater strictness of life. Jehovah was offended. As, previously, He had allowed the Babylonian Captivity to take place in order to bring His people to a sense of the enormity of their negligence, so, now, the Roman arms had been victorious in order that the sword might cause the searching of hearts which the voice of prophets would have been quite powerless to bring about. And it produced in the soul of the Palestinian Jew a suspicion and an effect similar to that which the conquest of Rome, at the commencement of the fifth century, produced in that of the pagan Roman. For as these ascribed the capture of the Eternal City to the anger of the gods at the progress of Christianity, which had, by that time, left their temples deserted, so the Jews were haunted by the grave fear that too lenient a disposition had been shown by them towards the memory and the followers of Jesus of Nazareth, and that, therefore, Jehovah had left the Holy City to its fate. All sympathy with the Nazarene was now at an end. It became dangerous to express any opinion which might be interpreted as praise of Him. Twice had one of the most celebrated Rabbins of those times, Eliezer Ben Hyrcanos, been obliged openly to deny that he was a Christian because of his well-known admiration for Jesus, and, on one occasion, his Jewish enemies accused him to the pagan authorities as belonging to the new religion. We cannot doubt his own assertion that in no way was he inclined to separate himself from Judaism; but, at the same time, his admiration for Jesus seems evident from many passages in the Talmud in which Eliezer Ben Hyrcanos makes some of the loftiest sentiments of our Lord to appear as though they were his own. When asked if Jesus of Nazareth was in Paradise he evaded the question, too astute to affirm, and by so doing involve himself in endless persecution, too conscientious to deny what, as a sincere admirer of Christ, he was firmly convinced was the truth. Nothing, however, could save him in the end. He was excommunicated for disobedience to the decrees of the Sanhedrin and for arrogance manifested towards its principal members. It is much more probable that his admiration and sympathy with Jesus of Nazareth made him seem dangerous, and as he could not be convicted of being one of His followers, his arrogance and disobedience formed a pretext for getting him out of the way. He fraternized a great deal with the disciples of Christ after his excommunication, although to the end he strenuously maintained that he was a faithful adherent to Judaism.

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[1] "Certain, therefore, of those belonging to the seven heresies among the people, already described by me in the memorials, inquired of him what was the door of Jesus, and he said that He was the Saviour. Some from the number of these believed that Jesus was the Messiah. Many, therefore, also of the rulers believing, there was a tumult among the Jews, the scribes and Pharisees, saying that there was a danger of all the people looking for the coming of Jesus the Messiah. Assembling, therefore, together, they said to James, 'We entreat thee restrain the people, since they are gone astray after Jesus as though He were the Messiah. We entreat thee persuade all those that come hither for the Passover day about Jesus. For all of us believe thee.'" (Eusebius, H. E. Bk. II., c. 23.) It may be necessary to say that among other things which these heretics did not believe concerning our Lord were the doctrines of the resurrection and of the judgment. These they now accept from S. James.

Even after the Fall of Jerusalem it is still conceivable that the great bulk of the intelligent members of the nation would have preserved a reverent attitude towards the Founder of Christianity had not the fact become more and more evident that to His followers the question of the advent of the glorious Messiah to restore Israel to its own again was closed. This was particularly felt during the rebellion of the false Messiah Bar Kokba in the time of Hadrian, the Roman Emperor. In vain were the Jewish Christians exhorted to rally to his standard. In vain did the tyrant, for a brief period the triumphant vanquisher of the imperial legions, persecute those who persisted in regarding Jesus as the Christ. Both his victories and his torments left the Christians unmoved. With serene confidence they awaited the only issue of the conflict which, after the prophecies of their Lord, they felt to be possible. It soon came. The fortunes of war changed sides. Final victory remained with the Romans, and, as is generally the case with a conqueror who has known important reverses in the beginning of a contest, the Romans made the rebellious Jews suffer all the more because of their initial success. Jerusalem was again destroyed; its people were sent away into exile, and the principal sign of that people's religion—circumcision—was forbidden, under the severest penalties, evermore to be practiced or countenanced. After this Christianity was seen to be the greatest enemy Judaism possessed. It stood out openly as a religion, and its tendency any Jew that had eyes to see could see it, was completely to destroy that religion from which it had partly sprung. Zeal for the preservation of the faith of their fathers now produced in the breast of the Jew the most decided opposition to the New Religion, the violence of which became all the more bitter as the rapid strides of the great rival forced themselves upon the attention of all. Henceforth the attitude of the Jew towards the Christian faith was one of hostility, and that hostility took the character of Christ Himself as the principal object of attack.

The basis of this attack lies embedded in the intricate and embarrassing pages of the Talmud. When consulting this famous book, whether in relation to this subject or to any other, innumerable difficulties block the way which leads to a clear and definite view, at least when the inquirer is a Christian. Excepting as a reflection of the opinions held by the Rabbins, and as a record of what, in Jewish circles, during the third and succeeding centuries, were ideas commonly held and sometimes well, sometimes badly, expressed, there is hardly the least information which might be accepted as solid and sound history. The work has been called an encyclopedia, and while in some respects the title might be allowed as satisfactorily describing it, the one essential condition of an encyclopedia is absent. Of arrangement it has none. Without cohesion, without precision, no writer or list of writers has ever so completely run riot in a multitude of matters, no author or set of authors so entirely succumbed to the temptation of touching on subjects extraneous to the one in hand as have the learned Rabbins who compiled the Talmud. The effect upon the reader is consummate weariness, and very frequently an indefinable kind of bewilderment. Moreover, the embarrassment felt by the inquirer is rendered all the greater, perhaps irremovable, by the following assertion of Maimonides concerning the Talmud: "If one simply regards the appearance of these words and takes the sense of them as the letters present it, they will seem to him devoid of meaning and outside the limits of the intelligence. This was done purposely by our ancestors for certain wonderful reasons." The great reason given by Rabbi Judah in his book entitled *Life* is that of preventing Christians from despoiling the Jews of their sacred mysteries, "which they would have done long ago, as they have already done in regard to the Scriptures, perverting them and giving them a sense which they do not possess, had they not been bound up in the guise of certain astonishing fables." It is very evident, therefore, that little could be deduced from the Talmud on the subject under consideration were it not for the constant assertion of the majority of Jewish writers that certain cryptic utterances, to be met with there, find their real and only solution in the life of Jesus of Nazareth; and were it not also for the significant fact that the mediæval libels against Christ, promulgated by the Jews, show clearly the influence of the Talmudic passages in question. How obscure, how doubtful and how indirect these excerpts are in themselves may be gathered from the following, which is one of the principal of them. The writer is maintaining that, in the case of a false prophet, it is lawful to procure testimony against him from his own mouth by the employment of intrigue and artifice, and continues:

"Let a light be put in an inner room and witnesses be placed outside who, while they remain invisible to him (the culprit), shall be able both to see him and to hear what he says. Then he (a pretended disciple) will say to him, 'repeat to me that which already you have said to me apart;' and, should he do this, the former will answer, 'but how can we leave our God and serve other gods?' Now, should he express sorrow at this idea, it is well; but should he answer, 'it is our duty so to do,' or 'it would be a good thing so to act,' then the witnesses who are outside and hear him shall take him to the Judgment house and shall stone him to death. This was done to Ben Stada in Lud, who was hung on the eve of the Passover. Ben Stada is the same as Ben Pandira. Rabbi Chasda says that Stada or Pandira or Pappos, the son of Juda, was the husband's name, but I am of opinion that Stada was the name of the mother; that is, Mary the plaiter of women's hair." (Bab. Talmud Sanhedrin.)

From a passage of this nature, and from others equally obscure and indirect, one might well ask how it is possible to obtain any clear or definite idea of the Talmudic concept of our Lord. Impossible, however, as the task may seem, the vast majority of those who have bestowed much labor on the matter appear to be agreed in seeing the following well-marked outlines concerning Christ in the pages of the famous book, namely, that Jesus lived in the reign of Alexander or Janai, seventy years before the actual date; that his mother's name was Mary, his father's Pappos, his teacher's Joshua ben Perachiah, with whom he went down into Egypt. Here he became versed in the magic arts of the Egyptians, was disowned by his teacher, despoiled the magicians of their most profound secrets by means of an ignominious and, at the same time, an impossible trick, and, finally, returning to his own country, was put to death on the eve of the Passover in the suburbs of Jerusalem.

We see here nothing more or less than a reflection of the ordinary conversation about, or the common explanation of, the phenomenon

Jesus of Nazareth whenever, at the period of the third century, He came under Jewish consideration. Whether they cared to have it so or not, their celebrated countryman had become a part of the atmosphere of the times, and, as is the case generally in the unconscious inhaling of an atmosphere representing a line of thought or an intellectual system, their mind formed to itself the picture of a Jesus vague and indeterminate. It was hardly their fault that such was the case. They had no particular desire to read the New Testament; indeed, already that book had been placed under a ban by their religious leaders. Nevertheless, in a society such as that in which, in the large cities of the Empire, they found themselves, the One who had become the one topic of conversation forced Himself upon their unwilling ears. In the churches, in the schools, in the market places, in the houses, society in the third century was more occupied than at any time before or since in discussing the Gospel question, "What think ye of Christ; whose Son is He?" and even if a member of the orthodox faith were out of touch with the Jew, the latter found himself all the day long, and at every corner, brushing against some adherent of one or other of the innumerable sects to whom Christ was the centre of attraction. The Jew heard, and he received a confused impression of Jesus, such as a man receives on any subject about which he would fain hear nothing, but must, perforce, hear much, and that from dissentient lips. Prejudice did the rest. There was no *desire* to let the Nazarene figure in the pages of the Talmud. He entered there naturally as an example or as an illustration. He appears, to say the least, as a suspicious person, because, in the mind of the Jew, the nation seemed to have become disunited on account of Him—was still stunned by the blow which He had dealt it. He had done no good. He had led astray many into idolatry. There was no reason to disbelieve in His miracles; but, then, had He not been brought up in a land where magic was practiced to perfection? His powers as a teacher were acknowledged; but, then again, the office of teacher had been undertaken by Him in defiance of the wise men in Israel, and His persistence in that office had been marked with the greatest arrogance. There was no need to admit his Virgin Birth; surely, they hint, *that,* at least, might be explained in a manner perfectly natural; perhaps the circumstances of His birth were scandalous.

Such are the suspicions and such the gossip of insinuation or of open assertion which the pages of the Talmud seem at least to reflect. Certainly the passages in which they are supposed to be reflected have been made to do service in centuries following on to Talmudic times for preventing the suspicion from passing away; and in succeeding ages they became the fountain head, as it were, from which a bolder and a more decided attack upon the personal character of Jesus took its origin. Still, it ought to be mentioned that the greatest difference of opinion exists at the present moment in the ranks of Jewish scholars with regard to those Talmudic utterances. It is most difficult to decide whether the strange person ushered into those pages under the word *Peloni,* a certain one, is intended for Jesus or for any other real individual, or simply as a means of giving some kind of life to an illustration for which, in every language, a *certain man* is a convenient formula. The familiar assertion, again, that this indeterminate expression was employed because of the objection which the Jews of those days had to the very name of Jesus is hardly borne out by the fact that some manuscripts of the Talmud really present the name itself, while one Jewish writer at least is of opinion that the reason of this omission of the word Jesus was to prevent Superstition, since, at the time of the compilation of the Talmud, the members of Judaism themselves made use of it as a beneficent charm. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, although the Talmud is responsible for sowing the seed which afterwards in the Middle Ages sprung up into so strong a tree of infamous slander against the person of Jesus, it is yet in the Talmud itself that a kind of regret is evinced for His crucifixion and a tenderer estimate of Him appears to be advocated.[2]

Doubtful as the general attitude of the Jewish mind towards Jesus may be said to have been during the second and third centuries, the same attitude from at least the sixth century right through the Middle Ages is quite clear and decided. It was one of open and implacable hostility to the person of the Founder of the Christian religion. The hint thrown out by the Talmudic writers that the circumstances surrounding His birth were of a seriously reprehensible nature now took the shape of an assertion. Jesus of Nazareth was base born and, therefore, capable of anything and of everything that was bad.

It is difficult to assign the precise date of the commencement of this Jewish calumny which was afterwards, in the pages of the mediæval *Toldoth Jesu,* to become the fountain head from which every other evil action ascribed to Christ was made to flow. It is to be met with in a well-known passage of Origen's refutation of the objections brought by Celsus against Christianity, but it should be noticed that, although the objector places the infamous slander in the mouth of a Jew, it is by no means clear that the Jew was not an imaginary person, and that the author of the libel, in this instance, was not Celsus the pagan himself. Tertullian, a little earlier, at the end of his treatise, *De Spectaculis,* seems to glance at assertions of an uncomplimentary nature made concerning the Virgin Birth, but here again the assertions are not quite plain and there is nothing to prove that the whole passage is more than a mere oratorical enumeration of objections, some of which Tertullian conceives may only possibly arise and which he swiftly dismisses with a word.[3] Indirect evidence, however, that the very worst construction was being put by the Jews upon the miraculous nativity of our Lord exists in the account of a strange, apocryphal trial of the Blessed Virgin set forth by the Christians in the reign of the Emperor Justinian. The fact that this narration of the examination of Mary before the Sanhedrin in which the Mother of Christ is made to give the strongest confirmatory testimony of the Incarnation, is made to emanate from Theodosius, the Chief Rabbi in Justinian's reign, seems to point to the conclusion that the calumny had become common and had to be refuted in a manner which might particularly appeal to the Jewish community.[4]

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[2] Regarding the death penalty the Talmud is equally emphatic, showing unmistakably that the condemnation of Jesus did not find general approval by the later rabbis, and such masters as Rabbi Akibah and Rabbi Tarphon are reported as saying: "Had we been members of the Sanhedrin there never would have been passed a death sentence." (See Danziger's "Jewish Forerunners of Christianity," p. 278.)

Whatever may have been the real date when first of all this sinister view of the earthly origin of Christ took shape in the Jewish mind, there can be no doubt that it formed the most important feature of its attitude towards Jesus in the Middle Ages, and is responsible for much of the suffering to which that unfortunate race was subjected. The view is to be found in the Toldoth, the circumstances, in some manuscripts, being dwelt upon at length, while in others they are mentioned more soberly and succinctly. although in all they are put before the reader as connected with an event which did not, strange to say, reflect so much discredit upon thse imaginary parents of the Nazarene as it portended infamy and wickedness inherent in His own character. It did not seem to strike the writers that, had these circumstances been true, and not, as they were, the outcome of a mind diseased with vindictive prejudice, He, who was now become the great object of their attack, was more to be pitied than blamed. In the light of this version of His birth which prejudice had conceived and artfully elaborated the life of Jesus was judged and condemned. The old reason for His miraculous powers, an intimate knowledge of Egyptian magic, was now changed for one calculated to make His memory particularly odious to the mediæval Jew. Christ had committed the great sacrilege of entering the Holy Place and had stolen away out of it the proper form of the Divine Name of Jehovah, the exact pronunciation of which He had then learned, becoming in this way, according to the received superstition of the Jews for centuries, in possession of a talisman by means of which the elements must obey Him and death and sickness be subservient to His will. His sanctity of life, His mighty deeds, His knowledge of the Scriptures, His power over His followers, real as they all of them were acknowledged to have been, were the result of a fraud, which no one, unless perfectly debased in character, could have committed. His intention was the destruction of the Jewish religion. He hated the Rabbins; disobeyed Moses; desired to stand in the estimation of the people the greatest prophet Himself; and even allowed His followers to worship Him. But what could any one expect from one whose birth had been surrounded with circumstances similar to those which had surrounded His? He merited His death. The ancients of Israel had rendered a service to their nation by nailing Him to the Cross.

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[3] Quale autem spectaculem in proximo est adventus jam indubitati jam superbi, jam triumphantis? . . . Hic est ille (dicam) fabri aut quaestuarii (quaestuariae) filius, sabbati destructor, Samarites et daemonium habens. Hic est quem a Juda redemistis, hic est ille arundine et colaphis diverberatus, sputamentis dedecoratus, felle et aceto potatus. Hic est quem clam discentes subripuerunt, ut resurrexisse dicatur, vel hortulanus detraxit, ne lactucae suae frequentia commeantium laederentur.

[4] The account of this examination is to be found, according to Kraus ("Das Leben Jesu," p. 4), in Suidas s. v. Iesous, and it is from the same book that the words of Mary, asserting her innocence and representing the Incarnation in much the same manner as it is recorded in the Gospels, are taken.

In the estimation of his countrymen of the Middle Ages, moreover, the Redeemer of the world is made to stand out as the great culprit. He is the single, the unique offender. For a second time He had to "tread the wine-press alone." The Blessed Virgin is mentioned almost invariably with respect, sometimes even with a certain kind of praise. She is modest, virtuous, more sinned against than sinning. Simon Peter is represented as a hero who, in order to spare his people the evils of a terrible persecution at the hands of the Christians, became outwardly a member of the New Faith himself, that being the only condition under which the Christian authorities would consent to show themselves merciful. Even St. Paul is set forth as a Jew who saw in a personal acceptance of Christianity, with which he had no sympathy, merely a means by which peace could be brought to his nation, since by his pretended conversion he would make it his special business to lead the unruly members of the new religion out from the midst of Judaism. The one and only object of attack was Jesus of

Nazareth. For Him, and for Him alone, a bitterness is evinced which reminds one of some of the worst passages in which Jewish animosity against Christ is recorded in the pages of the New Testament.

Excepting as testimony for the estimate of our Lord formed by the Jews of the Middle Ages, the *Toldoth Jesu,* from which the above views have been gathered, is utterly valueless. Only a very slight acquaintance with it is necessary to convince even the most biased that, interesting as the document may be as a literary curiosity, it is completely unhistorical from beginning to end. And the more examination we bestow upon the notorious book the more we are convinced, from the manner in which persons, who, in real life, were separated from one another by even centuries are brought together, as well as from many of the incidents recorded and the expressions sometimes used that here we have to do with a specimen of mediæval folk-lore. The great, central figure, Jesus of Nazareth, is made to appear as a contemporary of the Emperor Constantine. The Blessed Virgin Mary is set forth as a relative of Constantine's mother, Helena. St. Peter lives at the same time as Pope Julius I. St. Paul is not much anterior in time to Nestorius, the author of the Nestorian heresy in the fifth century. If such instances show the complete worthlessness of the Toldoth in the domain of history, many others might be given making it equally clear that the book is really a romance, in some parts of such questionable taste that the Jews themselves preface it with a notice of the unadvisability of allowing young persons to read it; and yet, romance as it is, it is put forth with all the solemnity of serious history and rendered all the more weighty by a generous sprinkling of texts from the Bible.[5]

Powerful as this personal attack upon the character of Christ most certainty was in restraining the members of the mediæval Jewish communities from embracing the religion of Christendom, it, none the less, was certainly the very worst kind of polemics for insuring a peaceful residence of that people in the midst of European nations. Long before the Toldoth was reduced to book form the sentiments of the Jews on this subject had ceased from being confined to the walls of the Synagogue or to the privacy of the home in the Ghetto. In the year 830 Agobard of Lyons mentions many of the calumnies which could have reached his ears only owing to a complete disregard on the part of the Jews to the danger which, by wounding the susceptibilities of the Christians, must most surely have threatened them.[6] Had nothing else been said but the serious allegations made against the character of the Blessed Virgin, this itself were quite enough to inflame the Christians with the bitterest hatred for the Jew, a hatred which might at any moment burst forth into a conflagration of the fiercest persecution. At no time as then has so devout an attitude towards the Incarnation been shown. Never, as through the Middle Ages, has so much religious pleasure been felt from the contemplation of the entire sacredness and innocency of all the three persons connected with that great event. Deep and tender devotion to the Mother of Christ in those very days reached its profoundest depths and willingly abandoned itself in unrestrained affection. To attack her honor was worse than an onslaught made upon the honor of one's own mother; and the Christian would hardly have been a Christian at all had he not been moved at these Jewish libels in which the fair fame of Mary was sacrificed for the purposes of controversy. Bitter persecution was undoubtedly the sad lot of the Jew at that time; but in apportioning the blame it were altogether unjust to represent the Christian as one who without provocation invariably ill treated a weak and defenseless race. And his provocations on this subject were very great. At the same time, when once these infamous assertions had been made in book form, no fair-minded person will be hard upon the mediæval Jew for believing them to be genuine. Four and five hundred years ago, and, of course, in the days preceding them, the surest way of giving the most absolute falsehood the perfect appearance of truth was to commit it to manuscript, or, later on, to printing. There is no need even to accuse those authors of bad faith who in Church matters, and quite as much in those relating to States and to courts, have published records and narrations then implicitly believed and now known certainly to be untrue. Writing has always been largely made up of hearsay; and report was as eagerly seized upon as plain truth then as it is now. Only then the convenient word *alleged* was unknown, and the writer must frequently have found himself in the predicament of having to treat common hearsay with complete silence or to set down what he had heard simply as a fact. Imagination, prejudice, precipitate conclusions, carelessness in the matter of exactitude, each one of them a cause in itself of errors expressed without the least wish to deceive, were as powerful then as they are to-day, while then there existed no check, as there does now, upon the mistakes liable to result from one or all of them. One thing only may lawfully be laid to the charge of the Jews with regard to the subject under consideration. They *desired* to be deceived. Their wish produced this crooked view of the character of the Founder of Christianity. But they can answer with truth that they are not the only nation which has welcomed the most extravagant misrepresentation concerning a person who, rightly or wrongly, has been conceived to be detrimental to a nation's welfare, nor is theirs the only religion whose very zeal to defend itself has easily inclined its adherents to believe their opponents guilty of the grossest crimes.

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[5] In some of the mediæval translations of the Toldoth Kraus assures us that he has seen the following notice, which he gives in the original Hebrew: "The following page has been handed down from one individual to another, and it may be written only by hand, but not allowed to be printed. And forasmuch as one will understand how evil the days are, though he see (the contents of this page) he will nevertheless hold his peace. He will hold his peace else long and bitter exile may be the result. And God forbid that he should read it publicly or before young and frivolous women, and least of all before Christians who understand German." (Kraus, "Das Leben Jesu," p. 10.)

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[6] In doctrinis majorum suorum legunt, Jesum juvenem quemdam fuisse apud eos honorabilem et magisterio Baptistae Joannis eruditum, quamplures habuisse discipulos quorum uni propter duritiam et hebetudinem sensus Cephae, id est, Petrae nomen imposuerit. . . . Ad extremum vero, propter plura mendacia accusatum, Tiberii judicio in carcerem retrusum eo quod filiae ipsius—cui sine viro masculi partum promiserat—lapidis conceptum intulerit. Inde, etiam, velut magnum detestabilem furca suspensum.

With the revival of learning the Toldoth commenced to lose that universal trust of which for all too long a time it had been the recipient. Its power as a document that had kept alive and perpetuated views and opinions of which in the beginning it was itself merely a record has gradually, since the sixteenth century, been becoming less and less. If we may believe the Rabbi Salman Zebi, a learned Jewish controversialist of the seventeenth century, it had ceased before his time to be read at all by the cultured; at least, he assures us that he had never seen it, and he casts a doubt upon the assertion of Brenz, a convert to Christianity, who maintains, and that with truth, that the poorer Israelites were still accustomed to read the Toldoth secretly in their houses. Books like individuals fall into disgrace, and no book, once held in high esteem, has suffered so complete reverse of fortune as this Toldoth, the so-called History of Jesus of Nazareth. The wish to lay the blame of its existence at the door of Christian writers seems evident from the assertion of one Jewish writer that "we can now understand why the printed copies of the Toldoth have been written in such wretched Hebrew; they were probably translated by apostates or by Christians from the vulgar tongue for polemical purposes."[7] Even the fact that the book enjoyed so much as a passing kind of popularity has been denied in the following words: "The unlearned Jew from religious aversion never so much as handled the writing, but the learned considered it as a fiction unworthy of even a glance."[8] So that the Toldoth may be said to have reached the worst kind of fate, that of being disowned by its creator and, out of shame, rejected by the ardent admirers of other days.

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[7] Kraus, "Das Leben Jesu," p. 12.

It will be readily understood, however, that completely as the Toldoth has fallen into disrepute, its contents still continue to exercise some influence over the minds not only of the ignorant Jew, but over that of the ordinary Rabbi who, by reason of his occupations, might not have the time, or, because of intellectual limitations, might be without the disposition critically to examine a work which, for so long a period, has been received as authentic by his forefathers. Even Samuel Kraus, whose deep learning and wide reading are apparent on every page of his *Leben Jesu* (1902), a book written, as it seems, for the express purpose of showing that the absurdities, misstatements and want of historical strength of the Toldoth are not so wide of the mark nor so imperfect as they seem to be, obliges his readers to feel that he is, after all, only a special pleader who finds the old influence too strong for him. He has made up his mind that the Toldoth is not far wrong in its estimate of Jesus, and, consequently, he attempts what to others would appear, and which still remains, the hopeless task of making out the book to be not nearly so bad as it looks. Prejudice dies hard. Enlightenment, sometimes even with the cultured, works but very gradually, and the darkness produced by literature of a controversial and suggestive nature is often proof against the clearest light. Nevertheless, a great change is taking place in Judaism with regard to the person and character of Jesus. The old view, stubborn and loath to move as it is, is certainly losing ground before the advance of a new attitude in which the Founder of Christianity is regarded as a great Jewish hero, even as the finest and most glorious product of the Semitic or of any other race.

Side by side, almost, in the pages of a recent Jewish writer we may see the old spirit and the new—the ancient dislike of the Gallilean and the enthusiastic admiration for Him which is fast gaining a place among the Jews. Harris Weinstock, in his book, *Jesus the Jew,* describes the sentiment prevailing during his childhood in the following words:

"I recall that, upon one occasion, one of the pupils by some chance brought into the religious school a book containing the name of Jesus. I remember how wrought up and excited the Rabbi became when he was aware of its presence in the schoolroom. 'Sacrilege! Sacrilege!' he indignantly cried, and seemed afraid to touch it. I remember how he delivered an impassioned discourse to his pupils on the terrible sufferings to which the Jews had been subjected because of Jesus. 'How, then,' he concluded, 'can any self-respecting, loyal Jew take into his hand a book containing the name of Jesus? How can the name of Jesus be thought of without connecting it in the mind of the Jew with centuries of inhuman outrage and persecution heaped upon him by the followers of Jesus?'" (*Jesus the Jew.* Page 12.)

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[8] M. Güdemann, quoted by Kraus, p. 12. The evidence for just the opposite of this assertion of M. Güdemann's is overwhelming. Among much more to be found in Kraus is the following, written by a convert Jew in "Saat auf Hoffnung" (1894), p. 22: "A book which I read in my tenth year ('The Toldoth'), 'The Life of Jesus.' At that time, while engaged in reading that abominable book, frequently was it said to me, 'See, now, this miserable Man gave Himself out to be God, and Christians believe in Him and adore Him,' and I thereupon approved of the ridicule (poured upon Him) by this worthless author."

The author assures us that the above expresses his own feelings towards Christ for years. He could not help believing that "the badge of suffering had been placed upon the Jew by the words and the acts of Jesus." It is, however, in the pages of *Jesus the Jew* that we are allowed to see how far away, both from the mediæval conception of Christ as well as from the violently antagonistic attitude towards Him of much more recent times, the intellectual Jew of the present has traveled. Under the pen of Harris Weinstock Jesus becomes "the gentle Nazarene," "the gentle teacher," who "by His simple yet matchless eloquence, by His self-sacrificing spirit and His devotion to the poor, the neglected and the forsaken in Israel created a spiritual wave among His Jewish brethren which was destined to have a far-reaching influence." It is the fact that the Founder of the Christian religion was of Jewish nationality of which the author boasts. Jesus is the glory of the Jewish race. If, on the one hand, He was an instrument of blessing to the Gentiles by making it possible for them to share in "the most important doctrines of Judaism," on the other, He is a great national asset whose glorious character has shed an additional lustre on to the Jewish name. This, the author assures us, is becoming more and more the opinion of modern Judaism. The old sentiment of hatred is "speedily being replaced in the Jewish mind by the keen appreciation of the beauty and the nobleness of the character of Jesus. His wisdom and gentleness, His unselfishness of spirit and His love for humanity . . . are becoming better understood, so that the modern Jew looks upon Jesus as one of the greatest gifts that Israel has given to the world, and He is, therefore, proud to call Jesus his very own; blood of his blood, flesh of his flesh." (*Jesus the Jew.* Page 34.)

It is impossible not to feel impressed in reading the above passage, and more particularly is this the case when it is remembered that, during the Middle Ages, the Jew showed himself both indignant and regretful because of the fact that the Nazarene was of the seed of Abraham. The famous meaning of the name of Jesus, "may His name and His memory be blotted out," which the writers of the Toldoth had invented, is now turned, as we see in the passage just quoted, into "Jesus, one of the greatest gifts that Israel has given to the world." The Crucifixion, which no Jew four hundred years ago would dream of disowning and, which, indeed, was regarded as an action of the ancient Rabbins worthy of all praise, is now passionately denied to have been a Jewish operation at all. In *A Rabbi's Impression of the Oberammergau Passion Play* the real culprits were Pontius Pilate and the Gentile soldiers. Dr. Krauskopf, the author, says:

"It is a serious statement I make when I say that the story of the Jews having persecuted, betrayed, condemned and crucified Jesus . . . is nevertheless historically untrue. . . . To no other conclusion have I been able to arrive than that Jesus, the gentle preacher, and healer of Nazareth, the enthusiastic lover of His country and people, felt Himself called, as did many another unfortunate enthusiast before Him and after, to deliver the Holy Land from the hand of the cruel Roman. . . . He was seized in the dead of night and made to pay the penalty of His love for His country and people by a traitor's death upon the cross at the hand of the cruel Roman." (*A Rabbi's Impressions.* Page 142.)

The arguments set forth by this writer in his endeavor to prove that the Gentile officials were alone responsible for the Crucifixion are not, it must be confessed, of a very forcible description; but we are impressed by the spirit which prompts him to make the attempt at all. For he resents the burden of blame which the Jews have had to bear in the matter, not merely because of the cruel persecutions of which this accusation has been the cause, but also because Christ Himself was so wonderful and so sublime a personality that no nation ought to settle down covered with the blame and the shame of putting Him to death if it can at all show that, after all, it has been wrongly accused. Expressions of admiration for the character of Jesus are everywhere springing up in Dr. Krauskopf's book. The author writes: "I have before me the kindly yet suffering face of the Nazarene Jew." And again:

"I will yield to none in recognizing the civilizing influence of the Man of Nazareth; I am ready to bestow on Him as high a tribute as any one has yet bestowed; if I cannot say that it was He who made divinity human, I am ready to rank Him among the foremost of those who have made humanity divine." (Page 43. Ibidem.)

While, once more, in the following, we meet with what will appear to be in complete disagreement with much concerning the insolence of Jesus mentioned in the pages of the Toldoth:

"If ever there was a time when peace was needed among Israel itself, that was the time; and if ever there was a man able to knit the people in closest bond of mutual sympathy and hopefulness in the hour of the country's direct distress, Jesus was that man. Not He to brand the teachers of His people 'hypocrites,' 'scorpions,' 'whited sepulchres;' there was not enough gall in Him to force such words to His lips. He who preached to love the enemy, to bless those that curse, to do good to those that harm, to resist no evil, certainly could not harm or curse them that had not harmed nor cursed." Page 63.

The sentiments of the two foregoing writers were expressed in addresses delivered to Jews. They appear to have caused no commotion. No one was moved to protest, as would most assuredly have been the case one hundred years ago, even could we bring ourselves to imagine that such sentiments could have issued from a Rabbi's lips at that time. Nor must they be regarded as the words of men who had ceased to believe in the religion of their fathers. Their very zeal and enthusiasm for Judaism itself moves them to speak. Israel itself ought no longer to settle down calmly in allowing the Gentile to appropriate as all their own One who was not a Gentile, to begin with, and who, in addition to being a Jew, was the finest specimen of that race. They betray, in fact, a curious disposition to claim Jesus of Nazareth completely for themselves; or, where this is not so, to regard Him as one of the world's greatest and best characters, for the possession of whom the nations ought to manifest some marks of gratitude to the Jew from whose stock He sprang.

Still farther expressions complimentary of the personality of the Founder of Christianity may be met with in that remarkable book, *Liberal Judaism,* by Claude Montefiore. Here, it is true, very little is said in a direct manner concerning Jesus of Nazareth, but it is not difficult to gather from certain passages on cognate matters that Montefiore regards Him as a distinctly great, wonderful and attractive individual. Of the teaching of Christ this author makes the following statement: "It would seem that He was disposed to make light of some Rabbinic additions to the Pentateuchal law, and in these very points we liberals must admit that He saw clearly and did well. As to the Pentateuch, He seems, in the true spirit of the ancient prophets, to have urged the greater importance of the moral commandments and the comparative unimportance and secondary character of the ritual and ceremonial commandments. Would not Amos, if he had lived again, have done precisely the same? Jesus seems to have taught that all religion and morality flowed from two or three great and central principles, and that it was well and serviceable to look at religion and goodness from this unifying and centralizing point of view, rather than to split them up into a number of disconnected and heterogeneous enactments. Any philosophical analysis of religion and morality would, I believe, approve of such a procedure." (*Liberal Judaism.* Page 172.)

According to this writer, Jesus is very similar to and as grand as the ancient prophets of Israel, whose limitations He shared, whose greatness He, perhaps, surpassed. They thought a great deal more of right conduct than of exact ceremonial, and so did He; and while they conceived that there is much of a beneficial and even of a necessary nature in ritual observances, they were, nevertheless, convinced that the eye of the soul must be fixed first of all and irremovably upon the religion of the heart. This, too, says Montefiore, was the view held and preached by the Founder of the Christian faith. He was "a great religious and ethical teacher." And the opinion held by this author concerning the personal holiness of Christ may be inferred from his remarks on the excellence of the New Testament, the relationship of which with our Lord he would, of course, regard as that existing between cause and effect. He says:

"I would venture to say, provisionally, that our conceptions of character and sin, of our duty to the sinner and the outcast, and of religious inwardness and spiritual intensity can be heightened and deepened by a study of the New Testament." (Ibidem. Page 178.)

The author pleads with his people for a more sympathetic reading of this book in which, more than any other subject, the sublime life and the exemplary death of Jesus of Nazareth are described at length. "It would be a mournful and irreligious thing," he says "if a book which, together with much evil, has also done much good, which has had such a gigantic influence, which has formed the religion of so many noble souls, and which the most different sorts of people in every age—believers and unbelievers alike—have agreed in thinking the greatest and most beautiful of all religious books—if such a book contained nothing which was both good and true." (Ibidem. Page 179.)

It is difficult not to feel that the beauty which has impressed all unprejudiced readers of the New Testament has not allowed the author of *Liberal Judaism* to escape its spell, but whence comes that beauty if it does not radiate from the charm of the personality of the Son of God drawn for us in those pages by the hands of four masters of their craft?

Indeed, so intellectual and poetic a race as the Jewish cannot well help being impressed by the wonderful life of Jesus, so soon as it is able to rise superior to the prejudice which many causes have combined together in producing, and many centuries of heredity have had the effect of fixing deeper and deeper in the national mind. That the contemplation of the character of Christ can excite in the breast of the Jew a sentiment of enthusiasm almost bordering on to worship is evident from the pages of Adolf Danziger, another modern Jewish writer. "In writing of Jesus of Nazareth," he says, "I seem to myself to hear a voice such as came to Moses in the desert of old, 'take the shoe from off thy foot, for the place on which thou standest is holy ground.'" It would be difficult for one while still professing the Jewish faith to place our Lord in a more exalted position than that suggested by the foregoing words, and, nevertheless, they are only a small portion of a chapter, every line almost of which breathes with a spirit of the greatest veneration for the Nazarene. Danziger refuses to be bound down simply to terms which, as in the other writers already mentioned, willingly admit that Christ was a great prophet or a great national hero. He says of Him: "The greatness which can speak in the presence of torture and death as Jesus spoke; which can return good for evil, love for hate, blessing for curses; which not only teaches the law of love, but lives by it and dies for its sake, is a greatness before which all other fades into nothing."[9] Even more, "The man Jesus is the most heroic, the grandest, the noblest personality of all time and age."[10]

When we consider the quarter from which these sentiments originate and remember, moreover, the bitterness which, in the centuries of the past, both near and remote, has reigned against this wonderful Person in the same quarter, it is impossible not to feel pleasurably surprised. No theological importance can, of course, be attached to them. By no amount of ingenuity can they be exaggerated into an acceptance of the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ. Nevertheless, in fervor, in enthusiasm, it might almost be said in affection for Jesus of Nazareth, the following might have fallen from the pen of an ardent Christian, instead of, as is actually the case, from that of a Jew: "A spiritual light shines there and universal love for man. The fetters that bind Him cannot lower the dignity of His person; the fierce hate of His enemies, who rage for His life, neither daunts Him nor affects the mildness of His words."[11] Or again, "He has made humility honor; He has carried the highest wisdom to the homes of the lowly and the ignorant of the world; He has carried it beyond all barriers of schools and Temple, and for this He is to die a death of shame. The Redeemer of the poor, the teacher of the ignorant, the friend of all that faint with toil and are oppressed with cares must die on the Cross."[12] Or, finally, the following: "Over the supreme tragedy let the angel of sorrow spread his wings. Veil thy face, sun! Be darkened, sky; let the earth tremble and men mourn in tears! The most angelic of men, the most loving of teachers, the meek and humble prophet, is to die by the death of the Cross."

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[9] "Jewish Forerunners of Christianity," p. 52.

[10] *Ib.*, p. 52.

[11] "Jewish Forerunners of Christianity," p. 50.

Such views, expressed with more or less ardor, it can hardly be doubted, are becoming more common in the ranks of Judaism year by year. They are not to be taken as a profession of faith. They manifest no departure, even in thought, of those who give utterance to them from the religion of their fathers. Jews as a body, whether intellectual or ignorant, are, unfortunately, as far removed from orthodox Christianity as they have been at any time of the nation's history. What the expressions are evidence of is this, that even among those who start with the most violent prejudice against the person of the Founder of Christianity, Jesus of Nazareth cannot fail in completely winning the greatest admiration and reverent esteem for Himself, so soon as the story of His life is considered attentively and without bias.

JOHN FREELAND.

Bedford, England.

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[12] *Ib.*, p. 51.

Book Reviews

HOMILIES ON THE COMMON OF SAINTS. Being Volumes V. and VI. of the "Homilies For the Whole Year." By *Right Rev. Jeremias Bonomelli, D. D.*, Bishop of Cremona. Translated by Right Rev. Thomas S. Byrne, D. D., Bishop of Nashville. Two volumes, cloth, net, $2.50. New York: Benziger Brothers.

In this set of two volumes Bishop Bonomelli fulfills the promise he made in the preface to the first four volumes of the "Homilies" when he said: "I propose to give homilies on the Gospels and Epistles of the Masses known as *De Commune,* which are hardly ever explained to the people."

The noted prelate condemns most emphatically the custom which now prevails of giving *Conferences* rather than *Sermons* on the several phases of religious teachings. He would have more of positive instruction, explaining the various dogmas of our faith, exhorting the faithful to fulfill the Commandments of God and the Precepts of the Church and exposing the meaning of passages taken from Holy Writ and the Church's liturgy.

In this connection in the Preface to these volumes he says:

"The novel is loved and sought for even in preaching; very well, let us go back to the old models and we shall be *novel,* so far and so universally have we strayed from them.

"One of the purposes, and not the least, I had in view in writing my *Series of Homilies* was and is to bring back this kind of preaching to the ancient pattern, such as we find it in the Fathers. The Homilies of St. John Chrysostom, of St. Augustine and St. Bernard, not to mention others, are commentaries on the Sacred Books, in which dogma and morals are woven together with admirable art, and the errors of their age touched upon and refuted as the occasion arose. In as far as my poor abilities permitted, I endeavored to imitate them, taking always for my secure groundwork the Sacred Text. In this way we have as a foundation the doctrine taught by Jesus Christ Himself, which has ever been the same in all past ages and will be for all ages to come; the development of it, of course, will be various, according to place and time and the people to whom we speak."

For those who are familiar with the Homilies for the Sundays, and with the explanations of the Christian Mysteries, no higher recommendation can be given than the assurance that the Homilies on the Common of the Saints are fully equal to the others in the original and in the translation. For those who have not yet become acquainted with Bishop Bonomelli's works, it may be said they furnish a collection of sermons that have seldom been equaled and rarely, if ever, excelled.

THOUGHTS OF A CATHOLIC ANATOMIST. By *Thomas Dwight, M. D., LL. D.,* Parkman Professor of Anatomy at Harvard. 12mo., pp. 243. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.

The learned author gives us the keynote to his book in this quotation from the Preface:

"If I be not mistaken, there is more or less curiosity on the part of those outside of the Church to know what Catholics of education, especially those who themselves have worked in science, think in their own hearts of the dogmas of the Church on the one hand and of the assertions of modern science on the other. Are not Catholics guilty of dishonesty in appearing to subscribe to beliefs which they do not sincerely hold and which fail to accord with what is accepted by the public as science? The suspicion is perhaps not unnatural, especially on the part of those whose ideas of Catholics are distorted by the misrepresentations of centuries. It may be, too, that this suspicion is somewhat strengthened by the very natural unwillingness of men to wear their hearts upon their sleeves, to tell their most secret and solemn thoughts in the marketplace.

"It is often said by those outside of the Church that they cannot see how a Catholic can be a man of science, and conversely how a man of science can be a Catholic. Indeed, I fear there are many poorly instructed Catholics who are very much of the same opinion. It may be that it is my duty, on account of the position I have the honor to hold, to give to both of these classes such poor help as I can. It is many years since I began this book, which I have thrown aside again and again."

It is, then, the clear and fearless declaration of a learned man of science that there is no contradiction between revelation and reason. This declaration is made so briefly and so simply, in language free from technical phraseology and fortified so strongly with the best authority, that every fair-minded person can easily understand. The contradictions of so-called science are plainly shown, the wide conclusion from narrow premises are indicated and the confusion of theory and fact brought out into the light.

The chapters are entitled "Thought of the Day," "Theories of Evolution," "God," "Religion," "Design and Plan," "Living and Non-Living," "Man," "The Descent of Man," "Variations and Anomalies" and "Adaptations." It is an excellent book for all students, but especially for those who attend secular schools where an immense amount of falsehood is masquerading under the mantle of science, so skillfully disguised as to deceive almost the elect.

The death of the learned author since the publication of the book adds a pathetic interest to the work.

MISSALE ROMANUM in Small Quarto. Editio XI. post alteram uti typicam a S. R. C. declaratam, Cum approbatione Sacr. Rituum Congreg. Size, 8¼ x 11¼ inches, 1⅞ inches thick. New York: Frederick Pustet, 1911.

There has for a long time been a demand for a Missal in size between the regular quarto and octavo. The result is this beautiful book. The handy shape and size, small bulk and bold easy-to-read type make it the Missal "par excellence" for churches and chapels, where the larger ones would not suit. It is embellished with the highly prized, artistic vignettes of Brother Schmalzl, C. SS. R. Besides all the standard features which are always found in all the liturgical publications of Pustet, and which make them reliable beyond question and worthy of the approbation of the Church authorities in Rome and every other part of the world, this Missal has some special features that are worthy of note.

(1) For greater convenience a collection of prayers for the commemoration of Ferials in Advent, of the Blessed Virgin and of the Holy Spirit, etc., is inserted between the Proper of Time and the Proper of Saints.

(2) On the Feasts of Saints which have only the Prayer proper the Secret and Postcommunion from the Common are printed with it for greater convenience when the Feast is only commemorated.

(3) In such cases, however, lest the celebrant should turn from the Common for the Secret and Postcommunion, it is noted that only the Prayer is proper.

(4) In the Index, Feasts of Our Divine Lord and Feasts of the Blessed Virgin are placed before Feasts of the other Saints.

The addition of these improvements shows the great care which the publisher uses not only to be correct and up-to-date, but also most efficient.

HERDER'S CONVERSATIONS-LEXICON. Dritte Auflage. Reich illustriert durch Textabildungen, Tafeln und Karten. Erganzungsband. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder, 1911. Pp. 1,500.

At this particular time when attention is being called, not only to the neglect or inadequate treatment of Catholic subjects in the latest of the English encyclopedias, but also to the unfair and bigoted manner in which they are presented, it is a great pleasure to be able to call attention to Herder's Conversations-Lexicon, and to say here is a model encyclopedia. It is true that these nine volumes cannot be compared to a work in twenty-nine volumes, either in comprehensiveness or in fullness of treatment; but making due allowance for the difference in size, the book before us is perfection compared to the other.

It is well to remember that it is not a Catholic dictionary or encyclopedia treating of Catholic subjects only, or of others in their Catholic bearing only, but it is a general encyclopedia, covering the whole encyclopedic field, treating Catholic subjects with a Catholic pen and seeing other subjects through Catholic eyes, so that the reader gets true knowledge, just as the Catholic child gets true knowledge on all subjects in the Catholic school. It is the very best general encyclopedia for Catholics, just as education in Catholic schools is the very best for them. The eminent scholars who are the contributors to the book are most competent in their various departments. It is devoutly to be wished that Herder will bring out an English translation of this work. Surely, it would be a success. It is the right size for practical use, for experience shows that those who consult encyclopedias oftenest use the smaller book most frequently and the larger one rarely. The objection which is made to all foreign books of reference, that they give a preponderance of space to foreign subjects, could be overcome easily by careful revision. The supplemental ninth volume contains new articles, corrections and statistics up to date. This whole third edition shows the added perfection that only experience can produce.

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THE RIGHT REV. JOHN B. DELANY, D. D., SECOND BISHOP OF MANCHESTER, NEW HAMPSHIRE. By *G. C. D.* 8vo., pp. 452. Lowell, Mass.: The Lawler Printing Company.

The Life and Writings of Bishop Delany have been published at the urgent request of his many friends among the clergy and laity. No attempt has been made at a formal biography. The memoir has been compiled from various sources; from the Bishop's diaries, his home letters, from some of his editorials and public speeches and from articles printed from time to time during his priestly and episcopal career. As much as possible his own words have been used, for they better than any others disclose the dominant idea of his life and the principle that guided him at all times. Several events have been related by his intimate friends and by those who labored with him in his sacred ministry. To these and to all who have in any way assisted the present publication sincere and heartfelt thanks are extended.

It is not usual to publish the life and works of so young a man who has occupied the episcopal office for only about two years, but it is the work of a loving sister, and those who read the book will be much edified by the piety and zeal that distinguished the student, priest and Bishop who was called to his reward so early. His Eminence of Boston, who knew him well, thus testifies to his worth:

"What my beloved friend, the sweet record of whose noble life is written here, thought upon the subject of old age I know not. But I do know that when he fell in the thick of the fight for Holy Church he smiled. He was too young not to feel the human pathos of a death so early, so unlooked for. But he loved and trusted his King too completely to even ask Him why.

"He worked all his life as he had seen men work in the busy city where his youth sped by. There in the early morn the bell sounded to labor and again at night to rest. His brain was too active, his mind too vigorous, his heart too happy to ever know what idleness meant.

"As a student he still studied when his task was finished. As a priest he still found or invented other duties when those allotted him were completed. As a Bishop he planned new labors when the end came."

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Part I. Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. First number (QQ. I.—XXVI.), 8vo., pp. 361. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1911.

The book is very appropriately begun with the Encyclical of the late Pope Leo XIII. on the restoration of Christian Philosophy, according to the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor. The impetus given to the study of St. Thomas by the eloquent words of the learned Pope, who was himself a lifelong disciple of the Angel of the Schools, to whom he owed his reputation as a brilliant theologian, was so great as to swell the number of his followers until they formed a strong, continuous chain around the Catholic world. It may be questioned if St. Thomas has ever been so widely known or so extensively studied since his own day as he has since the Encyclical of Leo XIII. appeared.

It was certainly more desirable to extend the circle of his readers still further and to make him accessible not only to classical students of Philosophy and Theology, but also to all classes of students, especially in high schools and universities, and most of all to scientific men. This is done most effectually by the publication of the complete work in the vernacular, under the editorial direction of the sons of St. Thomas. We have had compendiums of the great theologian's "Summa" and commentaries on it before, but the best way to study St. Thomas is to go to him directly.

This book should be in all the seminaries, convents and high schools of the country, as well as in the libraries of students generally. It ought to be in the public libraries, because it is Christian theology in the best form. Catholic readers should create a demand for it in these institutions.

FURTHER NOTES ON ST. PAUL: The Epistles of the Captivity; Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon. By the *Rev. Joseph Rickaby, S. J., M. A.* 12mo., pp. 203. London: Burns & Oates.

The first words of the title "Further Notes" are explained by the author's previous work, "Notes on St. Paul: Corinthians, Galatians, Romans." The writer informs us that the present volume ends his labors in this field, but we hope that he will complete the work by adding another on the *Thessalonians,* the *Pastorals* and the *Hebrews.*

In order to ascertain the true value of this book we must keep in mind the author's purpose. He did not intend to produce an exhaustive work on the subject, dealing fully with the philosophy, theology, history, archæology and controversy of the epistles, but rather to set down in the form of notes the result of his meditations and study of these sacred writings, which he has reverently and affectionately made throughout the years of his life. The result is most interesting and instructive, as all Father Rickaby's work is. We cannot help thinking that knowledge gained from a book of this kind has a value not found in more strictly technical works, because there is an unction and a personality about it that draws and holds and impresses the reader in a way that conduces to more profitable and permanent results.

LOS ESPONSALES Y EL MATRIMONIO SEGUN LA NOVISIMA DISCIPLINA. COMENTARIO CANONICO—MORAL SOBRE EL DECRETO NE TEMERE. Par el *R. P. Juan B. Ferreres* de la Compania de Jesus. 12mo., pp. 460. Madrid: Admon. de Razon y Fe.

The Decree of Pius X. on Betrothal and Marriage has attracted world-wide attention, because it is universal in its application. Its commentators, therefore, include theologians of all countries, and their commentaries, although couched in different languages, are equally instructive for the faithful in all countries. The Commentary of Father Ferreres is exceptionally good, and it has already reached the fifth edition. In it the author first takes up the Decree proper, commenting on each section clearly and fortifying his comments by quotations from the best authorities, and then in a special section introduces a comparison between the former discipline of the Church and the present discipline. This second part is unusually interesting and informing. Altogether, the book is well worthy of the attention of all students and practitioners.

LA CURIA ROMANA SEGUN LA NOVISIMA DISCIPLINA DECRETA PAR PIO X. Par *R. P. Juan B. Ferreres* de la Compania de Jesus. 12mo., pp. 575. Madrid: Administracion de Razon y Fe.

This second edition, enlarged, called for in the short time which has elapsed since the Constitution *Sapienti Consilio* was promulgated, indicates an unusual degree of merit. Nor is the indication deceptive. The author not only produces the Constitution, with all the Rules that govern the various Congregations, and a full description of their offices and modes of procedure, but he goes into the history of the subject in a very comprehensive and instructive manner, tracing each Congregation back to its origin, showing its variations and development down to the present time, and extending his labors even to those Congregations that have not been revived. The book is, therefore, not only a commentary, but a history. The extent of the author's labors as well as his learning is shown by the unusually large and complete bibliography that accompanies the book and also by the splendid index, which is a model.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE CATECHIST; or, Headings and Suggestions for the Explanation of the Catechism of Christian Doctrine (No. 2). With Numerous Quotations and Examples from Scripture, and an Appendix of Anecdotes and Illustrations. By *Rev. George Edward Howe*, author of "Sermon Plans." Sixth edition. Two vols., 8vo., pp. 658 and 680. New York: Benziger Brothers.

HISTORY OF POPE BONIFACE VIII. AND HIS TIMES, WITH NOTES AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. In six books. By *Don Louis Tosti*, Benedictine Monk of Monte Cassino. Translated from the Italian by Right Rev. Mgr. Eugene J. Donnelly, V. F., Pastor of St. Michael's Church, Flushing, Long Island. 8vo., pp. 546. New York: Christian Press Association.

THE CULTURE OF THE SOUL. By the *Rev. P. Ryan*, author of "Catholic Doctrines Explained and Proved" and the "Groundwork of Christian Perfection." 12mo., pp. 226. New York: Benziger Brothers.

SOCIAL FRANCE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By *Cécile Hugon*, Sometime Scholar of Somerville College, Oxford. With twelve illustrations. 8vo., pp. 321. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911.

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